We look at current Russian writing on combined arms ops, naval surface warfare, air ops, & long-range strikes. Despite the massive technological/tactical churn, Russian operational and strategic thinking remains wedded to pre-war ideas, and Russia plans for war the same way it did before UKR. 2/2

One reason Russia has struggled so badly in UKR is the moribund state of Russian military operational art, which ensures tactical outcomes are linked to strategic goals. New CNA research with me, Paul Schwartz and @gabrielairosa.bsky.social shows how this is true. 1/2 www.cna.org/analyses/202...

We first met when he was a 1-star at Naval Forces Europe and have crossed paths quite frequently since. It’s not my job to blindly cheer on the Navy, but he’s a great choice; smart, demanding, creative, take-no-prisoners. He’ll work his staff hard, but he’ll also get results.

Ironically, that sushi place shares space with a pizza place.

Detailed article quoting 🇬🇧 UK defence sources on 🇷🇺 Russia's undersea warfare, surveillance and maritime sabotage activities near Britain.

Some highlights: a 🧵

1)
🇷🇺 Russian ASW sensors suspected of attempting to spy on the UK’s nuclear submarines have been found hidden in the seas around Britain.

It’s only a small thing and doesn’t change your great points. I’d suggest that SSGNs are taking on a conventional/NSNW version of the old Yankee missions - land attack is the primary, not ASW. Too few SSGNs, too many SSBNs. Fits better with strategic deterrence concepts. But I agree with you on all

A thoughtful thread worth a read. I might quibble on Russian submarine missions, but the larger point holds. And there are theater-wide implications beyond Norway. The Barents can be a key staging area for long-range attacks into the UK and Iceland. Adds to importance of UK/Norway partnership.

I’ve known ADM Franchetti since she took command of Sixth Fleet. We worked some hard warfighting problems together and it was a huge honor to be a part of her team when she became CNO.

This is one of my go-to’s in the face of the “just buy drones” crowd. A TLAM is, warhead-pound-per-dollar, already more cost effective than a Shahed, not even counting the guidance system, survivability, and modular deployability advantages. Drones are good but not perfect.

Asked if Russia would be allowed to maintain its naval port at Tartus and the Hmeimim air base in Latakia, Abu Qasra said: “If we get benefits for Syria out of this, yes.”

www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/0...

I won’t take sides in this argument, but the bottom line is that no matter what the reason for this latest incident, Russia’s dark fleet is a significant danger in the maritime environment and requires more thoroughgoing and permanent policy solutions beyond stationing naval vessels in the Baltic.

I’ve made this argument before but it bears repeating based on the latest ceasefire new: if CENTCOM’s strategic objectives in the Red Sea include the restoration of white shipping, you have to understand that corporate incentives are not neatly aligned towards a quick return to the Suez route.

I was Halsey Alfa faculty for a year before setting up a similar program for Russia. Hands down, Halsey Alfa is *the* premier US/China warfighting analytic and educational program in the US Navy. It goes far, far beyond any other China warfighting analysis in the world. There’s nothing like it.

That’s a fair point. But this is a pretty crazy problem on a system of systems like a ship.

I’m not a skeptic of China’s military power, but a common theme of Chinese military equipment in Russian hands is that it is highly unreliable. Why would this be different if it was in Chinese hands? Either Russia analysts are overstating it or China analysts are ignoring it. What gives?

One outcome of the Ukraine War is that U.S leadership has begun planning for the possibility of protraction while Russian strategy writers continue to rely on the idea of a short, sharp war with NATO.

She has commanded in combat. She knows how the Pentagon works, critical for a new SECNAV who doesn't. Last year, when she was asked in her confirmation hearing about "wokeness" in the Navy, whatever that means, she responded, "The only 'W's' I care about are warfighting, warfighters, and winning."

Hegseth thinks ADM Franchetti is an example of "the perils of promoting diversity and inclusion?" If true, he is wrong. I've known her since 2018 & worked for her in 2023/24 as CNO. She's successfully commanded fleets, strike groups, & destroyer squadrons. She's for real.
www.wsj.com/articles/joh...

Looks like folks may have counted Russia out of Syria too soon. (Probably the same people who refuse to capitalize Russia’s name, I’d wager.) www.bloomberg.com/news/article...

One possible outcome among many here is a renegotiated basing agreement that has more balanced terms than the one currently in effect.

An exceptional thread as always. To this, I'd add a point about sealift. Unless Russia has to leave immediately (they don't right now), you will see more ships at Tartus, not fewer.

The Kremlin claims to be in contact with "representatives of the armed Syrian opposition" and supposedly got guarantees on "the security of Russian military bases and diplomatic institutions in Syria." tass.ru/mezhdunarodn...

I’ve said it elsewhere, but unless they leave a lot of equipment behind, perhaps a better indication of imminent evacuation of Tartus is more Russian sealift appearing there, not less.

I stand corrected, thanks. Still, LSTs, replenishment ships, AOs, rescue tugs? Except for that one Pacific Fleet deployment, the number weapons-firing warships remains between 2 and 4. They may yet go, but unless they are leaving a lot of things there, I'd expect more sealift, not less.