Sam Bresnick
@sambresnick.bsky.social
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Research Fellow @csetgeorgetown.bsky.social China + Emerging Tech
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I'm excited to share my new piece in @foreignaffairs.com, where I argue that the Chinese military faces several political and organizational challenges that could hamper its ability to deploy AI on future battlefields. 1/2

www.foreignaffairs.com/china/obstac...
The Obstacles to China’s AI Power
Why the Chinese military struggles to take advantage of new technology.
www.foreignaffairs.com
sambresnick.bsky.social
11/ The PLA is tapping both legacy defense giants and a rising class of civilian AI innovators. The U.S. must prepare for a more diffuse, harder-to-target Chinese defense industrial base.
sambresnick.bsky.social
10/ While this work covers only a small slice of China’s military procurement landscape, it suggests that China’s military-civil fusion strategy is paying dividends.
sambresnick.bsky.social
9/ For the U.S. and its allies, this complicates research security, export controls, and sanctions. Most of these NTVs/universities are not under U.S. restrictions. Distinguishing between benign and risky ties is harder than ever.
sambresnick.bsky.social
8/ Our findings reveal that the PLA is diversifying its AI supply chain. SOEs still win the highest-value contracts, but NTVs and civilian institutions are making the ecosystem more agile and competitive.
sambresnick.bsky.social
7/ Civilian universities are also in the mix. Tsinghua, Shanghai Jiao Tong, and others won AI contracts with direct military applications, from swarm navigation to targeting software.
sambresnick.bsky.social
6/ One telling example is Flytek Digital (closely linked to iFlytek), which won 20 contracts for AI-enabled speech processing & decision-support algorithms. Other top NTVs include PIESAT (satellites/AI) and Chengdu JOUAV Automation (drones).
sambresnick.bsky.social
5/ Most of the NTVs are young. The majority were founded after 2010, and they specialize in dual-use tech, ranging from drones to data fusion. They see both defense and civilian markets as paths to growth.
sambresnick.bsky.social
4/ BUT nearly ¾ of the suppliers were “nontraditional vendors” (NTVs), or companies with no self-reported state ownership ties. Together, they won 764 contracts, more than SOEs or universities.
sambresnick.bsky.social
3/ We found that legacy defense players lead AI procurement. State-owned giants like CETC, CASC, and NORINCO, as well as defense-linked universities like the “Seven Sons,” remain the backbone of the PLA’s AI procurement.
sambresnick.bsky.social
2/ Between Jan 2023–Dec 2024, the PLA issued 2,857 AI-related contract award notices. 1,560 entities won at least one bid. We zeroed in on the 338 suppliers that won multiple contracts.
sambresnick.bsky.social
1/ 🚨 In a new @csetgeorgetown.bsky.social report, Cole Mcfaul, Daniel Chou, and I examine the inner workings of China’s military-civil fusion strategy and AI defense industrial base. Here’s what we found 🧵
sambresnick.bsky.social
If you read the article, you'd realize we're in fact not arguing China would be able to use Taiwan's fabs to produce chips.
sambresnick.bsky.social
5/ Of course, political considerations will be the most important factor in China's Taiwan calculus, but the semiconductor prowess that once shielded Taipei could become a strategic liability by making it a more tempting target.
sambresnick.bsky.social
4/ Export restrictions have choked off China's access to many of these chips, and China is making progress on mature semiconductors. If Washington’s AI advantage grows too steep, China may feel compelled to act—both to reclaim Taiwan and level the AI playing field.
sambresnick.bsky.social
3/ Complicating matters further is the fact that the U.S.–China AI race is heating up, and Taiwan sits at the heart of it. The world’s most advanced AI models rely on the cutting-edge chips produced in Taiwan.
sambresnick.bsky.social
2/ That dynamic is now shifting. Several geopolitical factors are eroding its protective power, including worsening cross‑strait tensions, China's rapid military modernization, and doubts about U.S. willingness to defend Taiwan, among others.
sambresnick.bsky.social
THREAD: Why Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield” might be turning into a target.

1/ For years, Taiwan's dominance in semiconductor production has served as a kind of "silicon shield," a deterrent against Chinese aggression because any conflict could devastate global chip supply chains.
Reposted by Sam Bresnick
lawfaremedia.org
On Lawfare Daily, @jshermcyber.bsky.social spoke to @sambresnick.bsky.social about his recently published report, “Big Tech in Taiwan,” on 17 companies’ Taiwan entanglements, and how greenfield foreign direct investments, data centers, supply chains, and more expose those companies to Taiwan.
sambresnick.bsky.social
To do this, the U.S. government should work with allies and partners and invest in industries of the future. By integrating world-class hardware with leading software, Washington can fortify its position against global competitors.

END

nationalinterest.org/feature/amer...
America Must Rebuild Its Physical Economy
In order to compete with China and boost growth, the United States must better balance the software and hardware components of its economy.
nationalinterest.org
sambresnick.bsky.social
Rebuilding the “physical economy” isn't about recapturing past glory; it's about creating a resilient ecosystem where advanced hardware and innovative software co-evolve to meet the demands of modern warfare and the global market.
sambresnick.bsky.social
Rebalancing is the challenge at hand. To remain competitive, U.S. policymakers must ensure that innovation in software is matched by strength in hardware.
sambresnick.bsky.social
Future technological breakthroughs, such as AI-powered drones and autonomous vehicles, demand the seamless integration of software with robust hardware production. Without this balance, the U.S. risks falling behind in the global tech competition.