StartupChai.in
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StartupChai.in
@startupchai.in
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7/ Final lesson for founders in sectors like alcohol, aviation, and lending: Compliance is your go-to-market. If you get a second act, you must professionalize management, narrow the playbook to high-margin SKUs, and swap brand vanity for disciplined cash-flow. #Bira91 #StartupIndia #Alcobev
6/ Why Bira fell: It confused branding with buoyancy. It failed to master the "boring stuff"—tax deposits, timely vendor payments, and iron-clad compliance. The result? Delayed salaries, employee revolts, and lost shelf space. Trust is harder to recover than a license.
5/ The structural trap: Beer in India is taxed by volume, and every state is a different country for excise. Bira optimized for growth but not unit economics or policy agility, causing its operational tax to compound relentlessly.
4/ The creditors have acted. Kirin (largest shareholder) and Anicut Capital (lender) invoked security on pledged shares and seized control of the profitable subsidiary, The Beer Café. The message is clear: Creditors ring-fence good assets when the parent is in doubt.
3/ The financial hit was immediate: sales froze for months, ₹80 Cr of finished goods expired in warehouses, and revenue fell 22%. This exposed fatal flaws underneath: thin governance muscle, massive seasonality risk, and high dependence on cash-burning surrogate ads.
2/ The visible trigger was shocking: A simple legal name change (Private Ltd $\rightarrow$ Limited) for IPO prep caused a regulatory avalanche. States treated Bira as a "new entity," freezing sales and making all licenses/labels null.
1/ The fizz is gone at Bira 91. Once the poster child for premiumization, the company is in a full-blown structural crisis. FY24 losses (₹749 Cr) now exceed annual revenue (₹638 Cr). The auditor flagged a going-concern warning and ₹1,900 Cr+ in accumulated losses.
7/ Conclusion: India doesn't have a capital issue; it has a conviction and discipline problem. The slower deployment is a feature, not a bug, because the bar for quality is finally where it should be. The real liquidity unlock: fewer bets, clearer moats, cash back to LPs. #VentureCapital #DryPowder
6/ Founders' uncomfortable truth: The paradox isn't ending in 12-18 months. Money will keep chasing the extremes (elite Seed or de-risked Late Stage). You must tie milestones to gross margin, burn multiple, and contribution profit, not just GMV slides.
5/ The new sectoral focus is IP-heavy: AI, semiconductors, deep tech. Moats are now built on science and defensible technology, not expensive ad budgets. This justifies deploying $25-50M into fewer, high-conviction names.
4/ Investors are using this leverage to push stronger protections: steeper liquidation preferences and tougher anti-dilution clauses. In this market, a down-round doesn't just hurt pride - it can effectively wipe out founder common equity.
3/ The core shift: DPI (Distribution to Paid-in Capital) is the new religion. LPs are done with paper mark-ups; they want real cash exits. This is forcing GPs to prioritize profitability and counter-cyclical investing.
2/ Money is flowing through a narrow pipe. Q3 2024 funding surged (double YoY), but it was driven by just ten mega-deals. Established winners get giant cheques (Zepto-scale); average deals get the cold shoulder.
1/ India's "funding winter" is a misnomer. It's really a dry powder paradox. Funds are stuffed with cash raised in prior years, but deployment is at its most cautious pace in a decade. Why? VCs are waiting for sane prices and clean unit economics.
7/ Lenskart will succeed because of real infrastructure and a brand moat. But the IPO will decide its fate; it will signal whether India’s public investors - bitten before - will finally let realism anchor the price, or if the pendulum swings back to suspended disbelief. #LenskartIPO #Eyewear
6/ Globally, Warby Parker is the cautionary tale: once valued at $6B, now trading at less than a third of that. The market quickly punishes a D2C brand when its valuation exceeds category maturity.
5/ Lenskart's strength is operational: vertically integrated, controlling manufacturing, and enjoying 60% gross margin. But eyewear is a slow-moving category with long replacement cycles. Profitability hinges on premium positioning and frequency.
4/ Founder Peyush Bansal's timing is shrewd: He recently bought 4.27 Cr shares at ₹52/apiece, and is now cashing out approx 2.05 Cr shares at ₹402/apiece in the IPO. A standard late-stage playbook: lock-in low, monetize high.
3/ This IPO is OFS-heavy (approx ₹5,128 Cr Offer for Sale vs. approx ₹2,150 Cr Fresh Issue). It’s more of a massive wealth transfer for investors (SoftBank, Kedaara) and founders than a primary fundraise for growth.
2/ The "profit" is fragile. While Lenskart reported ₹297 Cr net profit in FY25, a significant chunk came from a one-time accounting gain linked to the Owndays acquisition. Adjust that, and the true net margin is razor-thin.
1/ Lenskart's IPO is a high-stakes test. It's listing at a projected ₹70,000 Cr valuation (P/E > 220x!) - testing whether Indian investors are ready to back Silicon Valley multiples again, despite the lessons from Paytm/Nykaa.
7/ The new valuation multiple (~4-5x revenue) is probationary. The co-living market needs structural winners. The verdict is simple: this model can work, but only if Stanza trades speed for structure and converts "beds under management" into "contracts that cash-flow." #Proptech #CoLiving
6/ Stanza's homework for the next year: Stop chasing "largest footprint" vanity. Start publishing real metrics: Occupancy, ARPB (Average Revenue Per Bed), and Contribution Margin by city. Shift inventory off fixed leases to management contracts.
5/ The playbook that works globally (Unite, iQ) is unsexy: PropCo/OpCo models, long-term university nomination agreements, and 97%+ occupancy. Durable profit accrues to those who de-risk demand, not those who maximize beds.
4/ The industry's lifeline: GST exemption for stays greater than 90 days and less than ₹20,000/month. This directly improves affordability. But policy scaffolding alone doesn't fix an undisciplined lease book or weak demand contracts.