Full piece here @carnegieendowment.org : carnegieendowment.org/research/202...

Given the stakes, restoring some degree of transparency/confidence is vital, despite the clear political and at this point technical hurdles. But success requires Iranian buy-in. Without cooperation, nuclear ambiguity will undermine regional stability for years to come.

The "12 day war" has dramatically amplified the risks I wrote about back in October. What baselines remained are now gone. We just don't know how much damage the war caused, or how many capabilities Iran has retained (and can readily access).

This decision also increases the burden on natl intelligence services, and our dependence on their conclusions (and how policymakers interpret them). That intel assessments are already being contested publicly between members of the same administration is not reassuring.

Iran is not Iraq (for one thing, its nuclear program is far more advanced). But history suggests that curtailing oversight yields limited leverage and incurs major liabilities. Even if Iran doesn't sprint for the bomb, it will struggle to convince others it has abandoned pursuit.

At first the consequences seemed minimal (SH had already concluded compliance wouldn't beget sanctions relief), but ambiguity festered. Saddam's repudiation of intl oversight ultimately rendered contestable claims and interpretations more credible, easing the path to war in 2003.

Saddam Hussein followed a similar playbook after the first Gulf War (when UN/IAEA inspectors were tasked with dismantling his covert nuclear weapons program). Eventually, intransigence triggered targeted strikes on Iraqi military facilities + the loss of inspector access.

The decision isn't surprising, especially given the sequencing of the BoG determination of non-compliance and the Israeli/US strikes. It also fits a longer pattern of Tehran wielding access as a diplomatic cudgel post the US exit from the JCPOA.

Even if Iran never reconstitutes a nuclear weapons program, this is not something that we can take for granted, and without some degree of international oversight, speculation and suspicion is likely to fester. The pretext for the next intervention practically writes itself.

It is, however, a problem. Iran's nuclear program was highly sophisticated, and re-establishing verification baselines matters. US and Israeli intel is clearly very good, but exclusively relying on it (or what leaders say it says) is risky (just look at the Iraq War, or Trump/Tulsi).

Meanwhile, in Iran, the Majlis passed a bill, calling for the suspension of Iran's cooperation with the IAEA. This is not surprising, given that the US (a nuclear weapons state) and Israel (an undeclared nuclear weapons state), just attacked a number of facilities under IAEA safeguards.

That's because the strikes have created a lot of uncertainty! (and some "known unknowns," e.g. the fate of Iran's HEU stockpiles, are pretty concerning). Earlier today, however, Trump essentially said that the crisis was over, and any diplomatic commitments would essentially be superfluous.

News media and social media are already saturated with speculation about the state of Iran's nuclear program (how much did the US/Israel destroy, how quickly could they reconstitute, will the regime pursue the bomb or not)