🔗 Read the full article here: table.media/africa/stand... (german only)

🇪🇺 We argue that the EU should:
•⁠ ⁠Prioritize multilateral responses,
•⁠ ⁠Deepen mutually beneficial partnerships with the Global South,
•⁠ ⁠Consider early reform and extension of its own GSP,
•⁠ ⁠And design retaliatory measures carefully

⚠️ If the formula-based tariffs are reinstated, they would disproportionately affect some LDCs as they are based on trade balances — and LDCs tend to:
•⁠ ⁠Import little from the US (These are often expensive & capital-intensive)
•⁠ ⁠Export more to the US (stuff the US can’t produce [competitively])

Also some open questions, like will Pharma get their own sectoral tariffs?

𝗡𝗼 𝘀𝘂𝗿𝗽𝗿𝗶𝘀𝗲:
• Nothing reciprocal about this. According to their own formula, the U.S. should lower tariffs for many countries. Instead, everyone not on the list gets the 10-percentage-point flat-rate increase. Who could have seen that coming…

𝗠𝘆 𝗯𝗶𝗴𝗴𝗲𝘀𝘁 𝘀𝘂𝗿𝗽𝗿𝗶𝘀𝗲𝘀:
• Russia and Belarus are absent on Trumps list, despite the U.S. running a goods trade deficit with them. The administration claims there’s “no trade due to sanctions”— is factually not true and absurd given that the Falkland Islands made the list.

The EU should see this as window of opportunity to win developing countries as partners for mutual benefits, e.g. for cooperation on critical raw materials or energy transition.

• Some developing countries, particularly in Asia, are hit hard. Some African countries with trade deficits are included, others are not. Likely, this comes down to raw materials and political considerations.

• The EU also needs to shift Trump’s perspective on trade. Yes, the EU has a goods trade surplus, but it also runs a services trade deficit with the U.S. While services aren’t easy to tariff, the Anti-Coercion Instrument might offer new ways to respond.

• The EU is speeding up trade agreements – that’s a good sign. Perhaps it has more leverage from a Trump trade FOMO (e.g., exploring closer cooperation with CPTPP) than from retaliatory tariffs alone.

𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗱𝗼𝗲𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗺𝗲𝗮𝗻 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗘𝗨?
• Focus on more cooperation with other countries on trade and uphold rules-based trade. Getting more skin in the multilateral game should be a priority. Countries like India - hit with a 27% tariff increase and blocking WTO processes right now – should feel the same.

𝗜𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗿𝗲 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗮 𝗰𝗮𝘀𝗲 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗻𝗲𝗴𝗼𝘁𝗶𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝗧𝗿𝘂𝗺𝗽 𝗻𝗼𝘄?
• No country that tried to secure a better deal upfront actually got one.
• Trump remains laser-focused on bilateral goods trade deficits, tariffs do not seem like a good instrument to change that.

Some observations from my exercise and thoughts on what this means going forward:

The EU has an opportunity to position itself as a reliable partner, strengthen its economic security, and restore trust in the rules-based trading system.

🔗 Read our full argument in Global Policy Opinion: www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/06/03/2...

#TradePolicy #EU #Tariffs #Multilateralism #WTO

Why not link multilateral tariff reductions to the items on the EU’s retaliation list? This could shield the EU from price hikes while reinforcing its multilateral rhetoric and proving that “open strategic autonomy” is more than just a slogan.

Read the policy brief and explore our recommendations for a modernized and more impactful AGOA:
doi.org/10.23661/ipb...

@idos-research.bsky.social

In our latest policy brief, we analyze the potential impacts of AGOA’s expiry if Sub-Saharan African countries have to switch to current US MFN tariff treatment. We find AGOA’s effectiveness has been limited overall, but its expiry poses risks for certain countries and key sectors.

Under President Trump’s “America First” approach, nearly every aspect of US trade policy (bit.ly/3EetSp8) and development cooperation (bit.ly/4h8agl6) is under scrutiny, further calling into question the extension of AGOA - set to expire later this year.