Joshua Tallis
@doctallis.bsky.social
370 followers 230 following 98 posts
Naval strategy and operations | GWU adjunct professor | St Andrews PhD
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doctallis.bsky.social
New guy here looking to recapture that navalist energy.

Detailed from the Center for Naval Analyses as a special assistant to the CNO, most recently writing her Navigation Plan. Before that, two years as an advisor to the 6th Fleet Commander.

Here for all thing Navy, NATO, Arctic, and Pacific.
doctallis.bsky.social
As a US administration once again looks towards hemispheric security issues, many of the challenges I anticipated are coming to the fore. As I argued in 2019, there is a path to success here, but it is narrow and at times counterintuitive.
doctallis.bsky.social
Military tactics, however, may not be the ideal mechanisms for challenges that are often closer to crime than war. Leveraging the Navy’s capabilities, without overly militarizing maritime security, is a complicated problem that requires a strategic and partner-oriented approach to the challenge.
doctallis.bsky.social
In 2019 I published a book on maritime insecurity, and in particular the challenge of aligning constabulary ways with military means. I argued at the time that, as maritime security threats rose in sophistication, it would be increasingly appealing to apply military resources to counter them.
The War for Muddy Waters: Pirates, Terrorists, Traffickers, and Maritime Insecurity
The War for Muddy Waters: Pirates, Terrorists, Traffickers, and Maritime Insecurity [Tallis, Joshua] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. The War for Muddy Waters: Pirates, Terrorists, Traffickers, and Maritime Insecurity
www.amazon.com
doctallis.bsky.social
This highlights the importance of transitioning mature UxS out of experimental task forces and into the hands of commanders who need to gain operational familiarity with these systems in order to understand how to best employ them. That is, not coincidentally, a key charge in the 2024 NAVPLAN.
www.navy.mil
doctallis.bsky.social
(3) The author assesses that poor target/weapon pairing contributes to some meaningful portion of small UAS failures. Commanders in Ukraine use drones because they have them, regardless of whether they are the most economical or effective tool for a strike.
doctallis.bsky.social
This is consistent with the findings from my own @warontherocks.bsky.social analysis last year, which observed that the operational effectiveness of UAS and USVs in the Black and Red seas were both highly dependent on integration with more conventional cruise and ballistic missiles.
The Calm Before the Swarm: Drone Warfare at Sea in the Age of the Missile - War on the Rocks
We are not yet at a paradigm-shifting moment in the role of autonomous or robotic systems at sea. Nor are we likely to reach a revolutionary precipice
warontherocks.com
doctallis.bsky.social
(2) Offensively, a critical observation here is the importance of understanding uncrewed systems as enablers operated in conjunction with other, often legacy systems (“the vast majority of our sorties were against targets that had already been struck successfully by a different weapons system”).
doctallis.bsky.social
My take on 3 U.S. Navy implications:

(1) Defensively, the author’s findings may prove instructive for Navy’s counter-UAS strategy, given these systems may be less effective and less operationally impactful than initial observations suggest (particularly for precision strike).
doctallis.bsky.social
The author notes (with regard to UAS) that “[higher end] loitering munitions provide greater precision in day and night, more ease of use, and higher resistance to electronic interference than first-person view drones… The investment in quality seems to justify the greater expense.”
doctallis.bsky.social
BLUF: “If a member of a NATO military were hypothetically to ask me whether NATO countries should acquire first-person view drone capabilities, based on my experience and given the current state of the technology, I would probably say no.”
doctallis.bsky.social
This @warontherocks.bsky.social article offers a valuable, skeptical assessment of how transformative first-person view (FPV) drones have been on the Ukrainian battlefield—and is a great illustration of why it matters to collect data on the ground.
I Fought in Ukraine and Here’s Why FPV Drones Kind of Suck - War on the Rocks
In 2024 and 2025, I served for six months as an international volunteer on a first-person view attack drone team in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. My team
warontherocks.com
doctallis.bsky.social
And while industry is not, so far, pricing in a Hormuz closure, they do seem to expect continued postponement of Red Sea traffic. The former is good for tankers, the latter for containers, though the long term impact on freight rates may not be as large as the Red Sea crisis has been.
Tankers Keep Moving Through Strait of Hormuz as Israel-Iran Conflict Escalates
Merchant shipping is continuing to pass through the Strait of Hormuz despite Israel's attacks on Iran on Friday, the multinational, U.S.-led Combined Maritime Force said, although some shipowners were...
gcaptain.com
doctallis.bsky.social
Shipping seems to believe that conflict is not bad for business. Asian shipping stocks rose on the news of the strikes. Part of that is a hypothesized boon to crude carriers capitalizing on a potential dip in the number of Iranian tankers available to operate (see above from Lloyd’s List).
Tanker and gas stocks lead shipping shares rally after Israel attacks with Hormuz Strait in focus
Frontline, Okeanis and Hunter Group all see stocks rise, as did BW LPG
www.tradewindsnews.com
doctallis.bsky.social
An executive at an international shipping association believes that any “tripwire” for impacts to global shipping in the Strait of Hormuz or the Red Sea would be the perception of U.S. involvement (so far no evidence of that).
Combined Maritime Forces on war footing as Iran promises revenge
Israel launched a strike on Iran overnight that targeted nuclear sites and military facilities, and shipping is braced for what comes next
www.lloydslist.com
doctallis.bsky.social
So far, observers are not forecasting major shocks to global distribution. Iran is not yet reporting damage to oil facilities, and the head of the International Energy Agency issued a statement that oil “markets are well supplied.” x.com/fbirol/statu...
x.com
doctallis.bsky.social
The Strait of Hormuz straddles >1/3 global crude shipments. Existing pipelines in the region (in KSA, UAE, Iraq) have limited spare capacity to move much more by land (maybe 4 million barrels a day). A disruption to Hormuz traffic could impact around 11 mbpd, most of which goes to Asia.
Oil transit through Strait of Hormuz unlikely to be disrupted by regional unrest
13 Jun 2025: The Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear and military facilities on Friday 13th June, followed by Iran’s retaliatory actions, have heightened fears of a broader regional conflict and potent...
www.drewry.co.uk
doctallis.bsky.social
Israel has temporarily shut down exploitation of its Leviathan gas field, the major deposit in Israel’s EEZ west of Haifa. The complex supplies gas to Egypt, which may see the cost of LNG rise as Cairo looks to seaborne alternatives. Energy prices are not something you want to see spiking in Egypt.
Israel Orders Temporary Shutdown of Its Biggest Gas Field
Israel shut down production at its biggest natural gas field after it launched airstrikes against Iran, stopping supplies to import-dependent Egypt and raising concerns about fuel shortages there.
www.bloomberg.com
doctallis.bsky.social
As the kinetic nature of the Israeli strikes on Iran capture attention, there are also other impacts across the maritime space, particularly looking at energy and commercial SLOCs, worth tracking.
doctallis.bsky.social
It was a pleasure to rejoin the Sailor Pulse podcast to talk about the good, bad, and indifferent in Navy’s “fight from the MOC” journey. This was an interesting and fun discussion that reflects the underlying aspirations and frustrations in how fleet commanders envision the role of MOCs in war.
warontherocks.bsky.social
Maritime Operations Centers were created with clear ambitions. But how often do those goals match reality?

Listen here: warontherocks.com/ep...
doctallis.bsky.social
Who could have seen that coming…
doctallis.bsky.social
I’ve rarely seen a command execute thoughtful in-stride campaign analysis. This should be a five alarm concern for CCDRs, the inability to monitor and self-assess operational level progress turns a four star into chief tactician instead of the strategic leader they’ve been selected to be.
jjschroden.bsky.social
I worked at CENTCOM for 4 years in the 2000s trying to help them improve their assessment capabilities/approaches. If there’s one thing that command is NOT good at, it’s devising metrics that actually measure effectiveness
aric.bsky.social
This new Times piece on the last month of American bombing of Yemen has some insane details.
www.nytimes.com/2025/05/12/u...
doctallis.bsky.social
Rhymes with my own analysis from prior to Operation Rough Rider as well. warontherocks.com/2025/04/how-...
doctallis.bsky.social
It was a pleasure to join @thecipherbrief.bsky.social to talk about the importance of the Arctic to the U.S.. In addition to the usual talking points on national security, I tried to also emphasize economics, trade, and climate here, without which we cannot understand global interest in the region.
Why the Arctic Matters More Than Ever
YouTube video by The Cipher Brief
youtu.be
doctallis.bsky.social
My only reclama is that we keep the scale of the two efforts in mind. The US under OPG downed ~400 projectiles prior to the latest round of shooting. Nearest I can tell, EU Naval Forces claim around two dozen, which U.S. and UK forces did on some individual days in the thick of the fighting.