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Ukraine’s internal divisions” didn’t manage to tear the country apart during two decades’ independency. Yet the conflict sparked as soon as Putin’s troops arrived.
The loss of the strategic town of Debaltseve and Donetsk airport after the ceasefire was signed in September suggests that Ukraine’s anti-terrorist operation probably wasn’t the main driver of the war after all.

The alleged “long-term Ukraine’s internal divisions” didn’t manage
During the next few months, all major successful “rebel” operations, like the battle for Debaltseve, were due to direct Russian involvement.

In August 2014, Cohen argued that “if Kyiv’s assault ends, Putin can probably compel the rebels to negotiate”.
In his final point, Cohen blames the war on Ukraine’s “anti-terrorist operation” waged “mainly in Luhansk and Donetsk.” First of all, the operation never touched other regions than Luhansk and Donetsk, and secondly, it was launched days after Igor Strelkov’s unit seized police arsenals
Myth #5: The underlying causes of the crisis are Ukraine’s own internal divisions, not Putin’s actions.

Fact #5: Independent Ukraine’s had its ups and downs, but the only time when war began was after Putin’s mercenaries invaded.
How, according to Cohen, Russian army invading Crimea and an Russian ex-intelligence officer entering Eastern Ukraine east from occupied Crimea with his own unit to “pull the trigger of war” are reactions to ousting a dictator, is anyone’s guess.
After the Yanukovych fled the country, his own parliamentary majority turned against him in a vote of impeachment supported by the 328 of 447 MPs. 3 months later, presidential elections were held and a stable government replaced the temporary one formed by the former parliamentary opposition.
The obvious radicalization of the protests was triggered by the forceful breakup of the protest in November 2013, passing laws against protests commonly known as dictatorship laws in January, and, finally, killing over a hundred of protesters by riot police and snipers.
First of all, sociology shows that any organizations, not just “nationalist forces”, played a very minor role in the protests, initially making up fewer than 10% of the protesters and later rising up to 30% of permanent Maidan camp residents, the vast majority remaining unaffiliated.
The initial source of violence was Yanukovych giving orders to pacify the protests.
Cohen’s fourth point attempts to re-tread the history of the Euromaidan movement, yet in doing so parrots Kremlin propaganda clichés of a “fascist Euromaidan” and “street radicals”.