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🔴 Our interactive news map: https://www.rfunews.com/map 🔴 Subscribe to unlock full access to the map + exclusive strategic insights: https://www.rfunews.com/pricing Today, there are interesting developments from Ukraine. Here, Russia has relied extensively on armored vehicles, reflecting the central role of columns of them in the military doctrine for decades. However, drawing on the devastating outcomes of armored offensives in Ukraine, Russian analysts conclude that such formations are no longer achieving their intended operational objectives. Despite being regarded as reliable and effective in the past, the continuous use of armored columns by the Russian army has led to catastrophic losses. Several key factors explain why they have become less effective, the first of which is modern precision anti-tank weapons that allow defenders to target individual vehicles at standoff distances, neutralizing armor before it can support infantry or achieve a breakthrough. Extensive minefields and fortifications like dragon’s teeth slow down movement, forcing vehicles into predictable lanes where they are more vulnerable to direct and indirect fire. Persistent surveillance by drones continuously monitors advances, denying operational surprise and exposing movements from the earliest stages, providing real-time targeting data that enables defenders to pre-plan and dynamically adjust fires. As a result, losses increasingly occur during movement rather than at the frontline, with disabled vehicles creating choke points that obstruct follow-on forces, compounding attrition and undermining operational momentum. Together, these factors create a clear pattern in which mechanized assaults are detected early, tracked in real time with no chance to hide, and addressed systematically while still en route to their targets. Additionally, the repeated use of the same axes of advance by the Russian command further reinforces this attrition, turning rear areas into kill zones, deciding the outcome of mechanized assaults long before reaching the frontline. Geolocated footage from a recent Russian assault near Huliaipole confirms this, showing how two infantry fighting vehicles transporting approximately 14 Russian soldiers attempted to exploit fog to mask their advance. The assault was detected during the dismount phase, and infantry from the 225th Separate Assault Regiment, operating with FPV drone support, engaged the enemy. The initial strike disrupted the dismounting of the infantry and effectively halted the attack. Over the course of approximately one hour, both vehicles were destroyed, and the Russian assault group was systematically neutralized through a combination of small-arms fire, drone-dropped munitions, and indirect fire support by artillery. Additional footage demonstrates a similar outcome involving other Russian forces in the same sector. In this instance, a Russian column attempting to advance toward the frontline was detected using thermal-imaging reconnaissance drones operated by the Ukrainian 412th Nemesis Brigade. Once identified, the column was engaged by its operators, who employed kamikaze drones to immobilize the vehicles. Follow-on strikes using drone-dropped munitions completed the destruction of the column, preventing the Russians from reaching their intended positions and reinforcing the pattern of early detection and interdiction during movement. These engagements affect more than just this single battle because armored vehicles no longer function as enablers of maneuver, and instead of facilitating breakthroughs or shock, they increasingly become reason for detection and Ukrainian fire, being targeted accurately from multiple directions. Using armor now makes them more vulnerable instead of stronger, and it forces their movements to be slow and predictable, while creating bottlenecks where losses accumulate without the achievement of any operational gains. With armored vehicles increasingly unable to survive sustained exposure on the frontline, Russia is effectively losing the last coherent framework of its offensive doctrine. The decline of effective tank and vehicle attacks challenges the long-held idea that Russian ground forces can rely on sheer numbers, speed, and heavy protection to win battles. Without armored protection, offensive action degrades into costly infantry advances, lacking both operational depth and the ability to achieve decisive breakthroughs. Overall, these instances indicate that armored vehicles no longer provide a decisive offensive advantage but instead impose disproportionate costs when employed according to Russian doctrine. While armor may retain its role in defensive roles, its future use is likely to be increasingly constrained. For Russia, this erosion and the thousands of lost armored vehicles force them to resort to small-unit infantry infiltration tactics, emphasizing dispersion and concealment, although with highly doubtful chances of success.