International humanitarian medical care NGO Médecins Sans Frontières /Doctors Without Borders (MSF) says it has... The post MSF ops scaled back in Central Darfur after fatal Zalingei hospital attack appeared first on Dabanga Radio TV Online.

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With almost no mental healthcare available, Sudanese women in Chad form their own support networks.

Trump envoy denies bias as he pushes for Sudan peace plan Massad Boulos addressed reporters at a briefing in the UAE President Donald Trump's senior Africa envoy, Massad Boulos, has rejected criticism that the US's latest proposal to end the Sudan civil war is "biased". The US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been attempting to mediate between Sudan's army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which have been fighting for more than two years. On Sunday, Sudan's army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan said the latest ceasefire proposal was unacceptable and future ones would also be one-sided as long as the UAE was involved in the negotiations. The Gulf state denies it is offering support to the RSF and on Tuesday Mr Boulos said the bias Burhan spoke of was non-existent. "He was making reference to something that does not exist, that has never been presented by us. So we have no idea what he is talking about," the AFP news agency reports Mr Boulos as saying while at a media briefing with UAE presidential adviser Anwar Gargash. In a video address on Sunday, Burhan said the latest peace plan proposal was "the worst ever" because it sidelines the army and "allows the Rapid Support Forces to remain". He accused Trump's adviser of attempting to impose conditions. "We are not advocates of war, nor do we reject peace, but no-one can threaten us or impose conditions on us," he said. "We fear that Massad Boulos may become an obstacle to the peace sought by all Sudanese." The US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and UAE - collectively known as "the Quad" - proposed a three-month humanitarian truce to the two sides in September. They said the agreement should be followed by a permanent ceasefire and a transition to civilian rule. The army at the time rejected "foreign interference" - which observers say is a reference to the UAE - and any attempts that equated it with a "racist terrorist militia that relies on foreign mercenaries". The Sudanese army has repeatedly alleged that the UAE has been supplying the RSF with weapons and foreign fighters. UN experts say accusations of such military support are credible, but the Gulf nation has denied all involvement with the RSF. On Monday, the RSF announced a unilateral three-month ceasefire "in response to international efforts, chiefly that of His Excellency US President Donald Trump", to end the war. However, the army said on Tuesday that the RSF had attacked the town of Babanusa, the army's last stronghold in West Kordofan state. Earlier in November, Sudan's capital, Khartoum - which is held by the army - was hit by a drone attack the day after the RSF agreed to an earlier humanitarian ceasefire. The RSF's ceasefire declaration "seems to be largely a political ploy", Sudanese analyst Kholood Khair told the BBC's Newsday programme. "The army has been so intransigent about the prospect of a truce and effectively it's a way of getting a political win in the eyes of the Quad, in particular the United States," Ms Khair the founder of Confluence Advisory think-tank said. Last week, Trump said he would intervene to help end the war, which has forced 12 million people from their homes and caused what the UN has called the world's worst humanitarian crisis. There has been no systematic recording of the number of people killed but in May 2024, then US special envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello pointed to estimates of up to 150,000. In recent weeks, reports of atrocities in the Sudanese city of el-Fasher have sparked international condemnation. The RSF has been accused of committing mass killings, ethnic cleansing and sexual violence after last month's seizure of the city, the last major location that remained outside of their control in the vast western region of Darfur. The paramilitary group, once an ally of the army, has repeatedly denied the abuses, though last month the militia's leader, Gen Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, declared an investigation into "violations" committed by his soldiers. Both sides have been accused of war crimes during the conflict that erupted in April 2023. Go to BBCAfrica.com for more news from the African continent. Follow us on Twitter @BBCAfrica, on Facebook at BBC Africa or on Instagram at bbcafrica Adblock test (Why?)

Al Jazeera spoke to refugees fleeing Sudan’s el-Fasher who recounted torture, rape, and family loss.

The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have announced their agreement to a three-month humanitarian truce,... The post RSF declares three-month truce, calls on SAF to join appeared first on Dabanga Radio TV Online.

Massad Boulos demanded the opposing sides accept plan without seeking preconditions.

Several airlines in India have been forced to cancel flights because of dangerous volcanic ash in the air.

Les coupes budgétaires des bailleurs traditionnels – notamment des Etats-Unis, le plus grand d’entre eux – ont « privé la population d’une aide humanitaire vitale au moment même où elle en avait le plus besoin », affirme Oxfam dans un communiqué.

The latest report came hours after the RSF agreed to a three-month humanitarian truce.

Under heavy fire, Adam Ahmed left El Fasher in North Darfur State, coinciding with the late October attack by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in which they seized the army base in the city. However, he did not manage to escape. RSF gunmen arrested him at one of the city’s exits, took him to an unknown location, and demanded a ransom of two million Sudanese pounds, approximately $700 USD, for his release. At that time, Adam – a pseudonym for security purposes – did not have the money to buy a meal, let alone come up with $700 to purchase his freedom. He had been under severe siege inside El Fasher throughout the war, relying on community kitchens and animal feed (locally known as “ambaz”) for his survival. For over a year, the RSF laid siege to the city in a bid to capture the last army-controlled base in the vast, western Darfur region. In late October, the city finally fell to the RSF, but at enormous cost to its residents, including Adam. The Sudan Doctors Network put the death toll from the RSF attack at 1,500 in the first few days after the city’s fall, but the true number could be far higher. Like many citizens trapped in the fighting in El Fasher, Adam was exhausted, hungry, and felt utterly overwhelmed. Having endured months of shelling amidst scarce resources, he found himself kidnapped by RSF gunmen, Adam’s relatives told Ayin. A member of Adam’s family shared a video with Ayin, where Adam appealed to his friends and acquaintances to help him pay the ransom demand and promised to repay the debt as soon as he was released. The video depicted Adam looking worn out and defeated, with bruises and wounds across his body. Eventually, the RSF released Adam after payment, his relatives said. The case of Adam is, unfortunately, far from an exceptional occurrence. Instead, kidnapping civilians, including those displaced by the conflict, has become a new source of income for the RSF soldiers and allied militias. One RSF commander, who spoke to Ayin on the condition of anonymity, revealed that most RSF soldiers do not receive a monthly salary and must “earn from the battlefield.” The RSF source stated that while profiting from the war’s spoils may have been effective in the early stages of the conflict, the ongoing rampant looting has left few individuals in the country with anything left to plunder. Many of those trapped in El Fasher, for instance, relied on relatives abroad to provide support through banking apps as a means of survival. The RSF and allied forces are now targeting this lifeline. Tawila Hassan* is a volunteer who supports the droves of recently conflict-displaced from El Fasher who made the perilous journey to the sprawling displacement settlement in Tawila, North Darfur State. The recent influx of displaced people entering Tawila may be over 750,000 people as of mid-November, according to UN estimates. “Every morning we receive video clips on our phones of citizens who have been kidnapped by the Rapid Support Forces, appealing to good people and their acquaintances to pay the ransom to the gunmen so that they will be released,” Hassan said. “Those fleeing El Fasher have no money or savings, as they have run out of everything they had during the long siege; even their clothes are torn.” According to testimonies collected by Ayin, RSF soldiers randomly detain those fleeing El Fasher, film them, and send the ransom demand videos to the friends and relatives, demanding payment within a certain number of hours. Distraught families have started collection drives, desperate to find ways to cover ransom costs sometimes as high as 4 million Sudanese pounds (around US$ 1,200). Abdullah, a citizen from North Darfur State currently outside of the country, had to pay 6 million Sudanese pounds to ensure the release of several of his relatives who fled the fighting in El Fasher. “According to my observations, there are large numbers of citizens being held by Rapid Support Forces militants, waiting for huge sums of money to be paid for their release. Kidnapping citizens and demanding ransom has become a lucrative business for the Rapid Support Forces in El Fasher and its surroundings, which has increased the suffering of civilians fleeing the hell of war.” Mellit A female medical volunteer who remained in El Fasher throughout the war recalled to Avaaz how she was subjected to strip searches, looting, and extortion by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) while trying to reach Mellit, a town about 60 kilometres north of El Fasher. “We could only travel in RSF vehicles because they were everywhere; there were no other vehicles,” she explained. “We were heading to Mellit, and we were so close that we could see the minarets of the mosques there, but the driver suddenly turned. He drove us into a forest on the side of the main road and stopped the car,” says the medical volunteer. Two Rapid Support Forces soldiers then set up a “Starlink” satellite and demanded that all passengers transfer money or be killed, she said. “They told us to contact our relatives to pay the ransom, but we explained that our phones had been stolen and we hadn’t saved any numbers. They didn’t care.” The RSF started shooting in the air and separated the men from the women, threatening to kill the men. “In the end, they took us back to Mellit at night. They threatened us again, demanding payment. I managed to reach someone who paid me, and most of the others did the same.” Three men were unable to pay and were handcuffed and taken away in an RSF vehicle, she added. “I have no idea what happened to them.” In some cases, the RSF do not guarantee the release of those kidnapped, even if a ransom payment is made. Ishaq Mohamed told Darfur 24 that his family had paid four million Sudanese pounds (US$ 1,200) to secure the release of his nephew. He explained that the abductors had promised to hand over his nephew to Kabkabiya, about 155 kilometres west of El Fasher, but no further contact was made after the money was transferred. “They took the money and disappeared. We do not know if he is alive or dead,” Ibrahim said. Kordofan Similar to what is occurring in El Fasher, widespread kidnappings of civilians and demands for financial ransom have spread in the Kordofan region, especially in the states of North and West Kordofan, where the RSF control large swathes of territory. RSF looting sprees have decreased, local residents in West Kordofan State told Ayin, but kidnappings have increased. According to local sources, more than 12 people were kidnapped from the vicinity of Abu Zabad city in West Kordofan state during the past month. Hassan Mohammed* can recount how the RSF kidnapped him in Abu Zabad earlier this year. A combat vehicle with several armed men wearing RSF military uniforms took him from his home. The armed men initially told him that they were going to take him to the police station because there was a criminal complaint against him. “But I knew without a doubt that they were going to kidnap me,” he told Ayin. As soon as they left town, the gunmen put a hood on his face, and after travelling for more than two hours, they demanded he pay a sum of money if he wanted to return home. “I told them I had no money. They ordered me to open the “Bankak” banking app, but they found it empty of any funds.” They ordered him to contact his family to transfer six million Sudanese pounds (roughly US$ 1765) or they would kill him. But the war had impoverished Hassan and his family. Six million Sudanese pounds was far too much for them to afford, however much they feared for their son. “I remained with them for two days without food, and after difficult negotiations, my relatives were able to transfer 2 million pounds,” he said. “Then they left me on the city’s edge, and after a few hard days, I got back to my family.” Often, armed groups with suspected links to the RSF capture shop owners and people who work in the weekly markets in the Kordofan region. In October, armed men kidnapped five young men from a village outside of Abu Zabad upon their return from a market carrying goods and food supplies. After six days, the young men were released, as reported by their relatives to Ayin. In the same area, a shop owner was kidnapped by gunmen and released a week later after a huge ransom exceeding 30 million pounds was paid, according to a close associate. Lucrative “The phenomenon of kidnapping civilians and demanding ransom is not new,” according to military expert Omar Arbab. “It was present in all the areas controlled by the Rapid Support Forces throughout the war, and it came in succession with the widespread looting operations. This behaviour cannot be changed in the near future, as the Rapid Support Forces have weak control over their members and cannot change this approach,” he said. Even if the RSF were paid, Arbab adds, the returns from ransom payments are “incomparable to any salary.” While the RSF leadership are calling for citizens to return to their homes, their own forces ensure people remain afar, fearing for their security. * Names changed to protect the sources’ identify

20 November 2025 To keep our readers informed of the multitude of events taking place in Sudan amidst the ongoing, devastating war, we have developed a series of weekly news briefs, covering nine major topics of the week. In this week’s edition: Fierce battles escalate across Kordofan UAE detentions of Sudanese activists labeled “enforced disappearance” Thirty-two women raped fleeing El Fasher, medical network warns Port Sudan rejects UN investigation into El Fasher abuses Community kitchens shut down at Uganda refugee camp, leaving 10,000 at risk Lawyer defending detained historian survives assassination attempt Companies withdraw from Heglig oil field after drone strike Arrest campaign targets activists opposing toxic gold mining in South Kordofan Forced salary deductions to support the army spark outrage in White Nile Over 100,000 displaced from El Fasher amid dire humanitarian warnings 1. Fierce battles escalate across Kordofan Fighting between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has intensified across Kordofan, marking some of the fiercest confrontations since the war began. Over the past week, clashes have erupted on multiple fronts as both sides race to secure control of strategic areas in the region. In West Kordofan, the RSF tightened its siege on the army’s 22nd Infantry Division in Babanusa, forcing battles into the vicinity of the division’s headquarters, the last remaining army position in the city. A field source told Ayin that RSF fighters launched a three-pronged assault on Sunday and briefly breached the division’s walls before withdrawing under heavy resistance. Meanwhile, North Kordofan has witnessed violent clashes following successive offensives by the army and allied groups. On Saturday, army units stormed the towns of Kazgil and Umm Dam Haj Ahmed, only for the RSF to retake both areas within hours. Fighting resumed Monday when the army and allied factions launched simultaneous assaults on Bara and the Um Sayala area. While forces briefly entered Um Sayala, the RSF mounted a counter-attack and regained the area, wounding Sudan Shield Forces commander Abu Aqla Kikel, according to a Tuesday statement. A military source told Ayin that a parallel attempt to advance on Bara was repelled outside the city, forcing army units to retreat toward El-Obeid. RSF fighters later circulated videos showing destroyed military equipment and bodies they claimed belonged to army-aligned units. The RSF declared a “resounding victory” in Um Sayala, claiming to have eliminated an entire mobile force and pursued fleeing soldiers into White Nile State. The army and its allies have not publicly commented on the losses. 2. UAE detentions of Sudanese activists labeled “enforced disappearance” Human rights lawyers say Sudanese activists living in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are being detained without charge, describing the arrests as arbitrary and amounting to an “enforced disappearance”. A lawyer following dozens of cases told Ayin that detainees’ names cannot be disclosed due to security risks. According to the lawyer, UAE authorities have arrested Sudanese nationals through phone surveillance and social-media monitoring. The Central Al-Salha Resistance Committees in Omdurman confirmed that their spokesman, Nader Meryoud, was detained inside the UAE on 16 November after seeking refuge there during the war. The committee said the arrest came hours after it published a statement criticising the UAE’s alleged support for the RSF, which has been accused of mass atrocities in El Fasher, Bara, and other areas. Prominent Sudanese politician Mohamed Farouk Suleiman has also been detained in the UAE since January 2025, with no explanation of charges. Sudanese army commanders accuse Abu Dhabi of funding and arming the RSF, led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). The UAE denies the allegations, accusing Sudan’s army of prolonging the war and seeking Islamist support. Human rights activist Mohamed Khaled told Ayin that Sudanese authorities in Port Sudan are failing to press the UAE for answers, leaving activists vulnerable to prolonged detention or deportation. He described the situation as a combination of intimidation by UAE security and neglect by Sudan’s interim authorities. Khaled said many detainees fear being forcibly returned to Sudan through Port Sudan airport, where they could face further reprisals. 3. Thirty-two women raped fleeing El Fasher, medical network warns The Sudanese Doctors Network has documented 32 confirmed cases of rape involving girls who fled El Fasher for Tawila within a single week. According to the network, some attacks occurred inside El Fasher after RSF forces stormed the city on October 26, while others took place during escape attempts. The network asserted that the assaults represent severe breaches of international humanitarian law, equating to war crimes and crimes against mankind. It warned that the pattern reflects systematic targeting of women and girls in RSF-controlled areas, where protection mechanisms have collapsed. The group held the RSF fully responsible for the attacks and called for urgent international intervention. It urged an independent investigation, immediate protection for survivors and witnesses, and unhindered access for medical and humanitarian agencies. The UN Human Rights Council on November 14 approved creating a fact-finding mission to investigate alleged violations in El Fasher, including sexual violence and unlawful killings. The mission will document evidence for potential future accountability mechanisms. Humanitarian groups say the number of unreported cases is likely far higher due to fear, stigma, and restricted access to medical services. 4. Port Sudan rejects UN investigation into El Fasher abuses Sudan’s army-aligned government in Port Sudan has formally rejected a UN Human Rights Council decision to deploy a fact-finding mission to El Fasher, where widespread violations have been reported since the city fell to the RSF on October 26. Human rights defender Ahmed Osman told Ayin that military leaders fear the mission will expose them to international prosecution if investigators access victims inside Sudan. He noted that the army has consistently refused to cooperate with the mission since its creation in October 2023. Osman added that the UN inquiry previously gathered testimonies from Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries, but they had been blocked from entering Sudan. The army is also reportedly concerned about the UN’s ongoing interest in alleged chemical-weapons use in Khartoum. Sudan’s representative in Geneva argued that national mechanisms are sufficient to investigate abuses, and he opposed clauses authorising an international mission. The Foreign Ministry echoed this position, citing existing domestic and UN structures. The RSF welcomed the mission, which analysts say reflects its attempt to engage with international actors independently of the Port Sudan government. Rights groups note that the government refused mission entry three times in 2024. UN investigators are now expected to gather testimonies from survivors outside Sudan, using remote methods common in conflict zones. 5. Community kitchens shut down at Uganda refugee camp, leaving 10,000 at risk Nearly 10,000 Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda face acute hunger after volunteer-run community kitchens were forced to shut down due to funding shortages. The kitchens had served as a lifeline for residents of a camp hosting around 70,000 Sudanese. A volunteer coordinator told Ayin that the World Food Programme reduced cash-assistance programmes to “zero” in May 2025, leaving refugees increasingly dependent on the kitchens. Recent economic hardship has deepened demand for free meals, but donations have dwindled. The civilian coalition “Somoud,” led by former prime minister Abdalla Hamdok, urged international agencies to restore funding and prevent a humanitarian emergency. The coalition thanked Uganda for hosting tens of thousands of Sudanese since the war’s outbreak. Around 100,000 Sudanese refugees have fled to Uganda, many living in extreme poverty in remote settlements. Tensions flared in July 2025 when South Sudanese refugees attacked Sudanese residents, killing one and injuring several. Humanitarian worker Rashid Mohammed said UN agencies have “completely abandoned” Sudanese refugees in the region. He warned that thousands of children, elderly people, and the chronically ill face worsening malnutrition and called for third-country resettlement or sustained humanitarian support. 6. Lawyer defending detained historian survives assassination attempt A lawyer representing Sudanese historian Khalid Bahiri narrowly survived an assassination attempt in Wad Medani after being struck by a speeding vehicle. Advocate Maria Suleiman volunteered to defend Bahiri, who has been under detention by army intelligence for 10 months. Bahiri’s son, Mohammed, told Ayin the attack occurred two days before his father’s fourth court hearing. He accused the perpetrators of attempting to intimidate Suleiman after she challenged the prosecution’s allegations of RSF collaboration. Bahiri was abducted from his home in January 2025, forcibly disappeared for three months, and later moved between detention sites before being brought to trial. Mohammed said the prosecution has produced no evidence linking his father to the RSF. Instead, the only witness—a Sudan Shield Forces member—testified that Bahiri was engaged solely in humanitarian work during RSF control of the city. The prosecution has repeatedly requested postponements, which the family says are attempts to prolong his detention. Bahiri, 70, suffers from chronic illnesses, and his family is demanding his immediate release, describing the case as politically motivated retaliation. 7. Companies withdraw from Heglig oil field after drone strike Companies operating in the Heglig oil field in West Kordofan have withdrawn staff and halted operations after a drone strike last Thursday killed and injured workers. The RSF is accused of carrying out the attack. A field worker told Ayin that facilities processing Sudanese and South Sudanese crude had been fully shut down, and personnel had evacuated through South Sudan. He said companies had been preparing for withdrawal for months due to persistent threats. The shutdown included South Sudan’s central processing unit, effectively halting its oil exports—an economic blow to a country heavily reliant on oil revenue. Observers warn this could deepen South Sudan’s fiscal crisis. Petrolines Crude Oil Limited (PETCO) confirmed that three missiles struck its workshop and laboratory, causing severe damage. The company declared force majeure, noting it could no longer meet contractual obligations. Heglig is guarded by the army’s 90th Brigade, one of the few remaining military positions in West Kordofan, where most towns are now under RSF control alongside nearby Babanusa. 8. Arrest campaign targets activists opposing toxic gold mining in South Kordofan Security forces in South Kordofan have launched a wave of arrests targeting activists and residents protesting toxic gold-mining practices in Talodi. A local activist informed Ayin that police initially held the detainees before transferring them to military intelligence without any charges. Families have been barred from visiting the detainees, raising fears about their safety. Activists say the arrests escalated after residents protested a recent poisoning incident that resulted in deaths, though the official medical report has yet to be released. The Teachers’ Alliance (TAM) said mining companies continue using banned chemicals such as cyanide and mercury at local processing sites, despite widespread public opposition. Residents say police and army units arrested at least a dozen people, with more facing threats. Following protests, some residents burnt small mining operations they accused of using toxic substances. Authorities have since opened criminal cases under Article 61 of Sudan’s Penal Code, which concerns the organisation of armed groups. Local activists warn that tensions may escalate further amid a lack of government response to demands for safer mining practices. 9. Forced salary deductions to support the army spark outrage in White Nile Teachers and government workers in White Nile State say they are being forced to surrender part of their October salaries to support the Sudanese army, sparking widespread anger. A document obtained by Ayin shows mandated deductions of 5,000 SDG from employees and 3,000 SDG from workers. Teachers, who describe their salaries as “catastrophic”, say the deductions worsen already dire living conditions. Several teachers informed Ayin that security actors respond to their objections with threats, fostering an environment of intimidation. The Sudanese Teachers Committee condemned the move as a “crime”, saying the unions imposing the deductions have no electoral legitimacy and exist mainly to enforce levies. It noted that teachers in many states face salary arrears of up to two years and have lost allowances since the war began. The committee demanded an immediate halt to deductions, enforcement of laws prohibiting salary cuts without court orders, and payment of 14 months’ outstanding wages. It also urged reinstating allowances removed during the conflict. Labour groups warn that continued coercive levies may further destabilise the education sector, which is already weakened by mass displacement and economic collapse. 10. Over 100,000 displaced from El Fasher amid dire humanitarian warnings More than 100,000 people have fled El Fasher and surrounding areas since the RSF seized the city on October 26, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported on November 17. The displacement has spread across 23 districts in nine states, with many escape routes marked by insecurity and violence. The crisis has compounded a humanitarian catastrophe already unfolding across Darfur. Large numbers of people from Zamzam, Abu Shouk, and other areas have been repeatedly displaced since the war began in April 2023. IOM chief Amy Pope warned that humanitarian needs have reached “enormous proportions,” with widespread reports of atrocities against civilians. UN agencies say aid operations are nearing collapse due to insecurity, funding shortages, and access restrictions. On November 14, thousands more displaced families streamed into arid regions, including the town of Golo. UNHCR reported that people fleeing El Fasher were arriving “every hour” in Ad-Dabba, where conditions are severe and resources scarce. UN humanitarian chief Tom Fletcher described Darfur as “the centre of human suffering in the world” and called El Fasher a “crime scene.” He urged safe corridors for aid delivery, warning that children—who make up more than half of the displaced—are facing profound trauma, hunger, and violence. Local authorities in Ad-Dabba report more than 40,000 displaced since the war began, with thousands arriving after El Fasher’s fall. Many are sleeping outdoors without food, water, or medicine. UNHCR says many have survived multiple displacements and were robbed or extorted during escape. Sudan now faces the world’s largest displacement crisis, with nearly 13 million people uprooted inside and outside the country since April 2023. Fighting between the army and RSF continues to trigger mass civilian flight and mounting casualties.

20 November 2025 By Jean-Nicolas Armstrong-Dangelser, MSF Senior Operations Advisor “The choice is ours.” This sentence has echoed in my mind throughout the time I spent in Sudan as part of the operational support team responding to the growing humanitarian needs caused by more than 30 months of reckless war. These needs extend beyond Sudan’s borders. They spill over into the vast gaps faced by Sudanese refugees fleeing for their lives to neighbouring countries, such as eastern Chad, where I also spent several months responding to the humanitarian crisis. The accountability for what is happening is, ultimately, a collective failure. I have met countless firsthand eyewitnesses. One memory that stands out is meeting refugees who fled the mass killings of June and November 2023 in El Geneina, the capital of West Darfur. I met them in May 2024, when the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) started to surround El Fasher. They recounted their horrific experiences: how thousands of their community members were slaughtered and they already feared that El Fasher would soon suffer the same fate. I remember the shock and sadness on the faces of people returning to Khartoum after Ramadan. They were coming back to entire neighbourhoods that were completely destroyed after months of relentless street fighting and campaigns of indiscriminate heavy artillery shelling and airstrikes. The desolation was a stark indication of the armed factions’ aim to destroy the enemy and maintain power over people without any regard for the preservation of human lives and dignity. I remember the mothers in the neonatology ward of El Geneina Teaching Hospital, counting how many newborns had died over the past week alone because of the unmet gaps in healthcare delivery across West Darfur. The scale of devastation in Sudan is soul-crushing. The complexity of the conflict cannot be summarised in a few sentences, but what is clear is that the social fabric of the country is being ripped apart, and people are being forced to take sides due to the sheer pressure of survival. The forces at play are emerging from ethnic fault lines that warring parties exploit for their own gain — much like colonial powers did before them. These societal fractures are deeply rooted in the past, and the reverberations of the current events will be felt for generations to come. The darkest side of humanity in front of our eyes I wouldn’t describe what we are witnessing in Sudan as “inhuman,” because that word itself is the first step of the othering process at the very root of the crisis. Rather, what we are seeing is the darkest side of humanity exposed through actions carried out against civilians in Sudan for the past 30 months. It tragically reminds us of the genocide of the early 2000s. The violence unleashed during that period involved the exact same actors at play today, even though many relations and alliances have shifted in the meantime. For too long, and even at the time of writing, armed actors in Sudan have been erasing the humanity of entire communities through their written words and speeches that justify the physical and cultural extermination of these people. However, violence and darkness are not the only factors echoing from the past in today’s situation. The generosity, courage and boldness of the Sudanese people are also extending the old traditions of solidarity in various ways. The community kitchens fed millions of people for months, if not years, and continue to do so. The doctors’ networks and the Emergency Response Rooms treat hundreds of thousands of patients and save countless lives. And these are only a couple of examples of the mutual aid ecosystem that exists in Sudan. They are not only doing incredible work, but they are also the bulk of the aid that the Sudanese people are receiving, particularly in areas that have been off-limits to international organisations and state institutions for months. We all failed Sudan The international humanitarian community failed the Sudanese people when, at the start of the war, most international staff in all institutions abandoned them to their fate. It has failed to deliver aid where and when it is needed due to a lack of leadership and coherence. The same failure extends to international mechanisms: from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to foreign powers deeply involved, directly or indirectly. Despite Resolution 2736 of the UNSC, which demanded that the RSF end its siege of El Fasher, no concrete or meaningful actions were taken. In the post-truth era we live in, every belligerent claims to defend civilians and uphold international humanitarian law, while decision-makers claim they have no leverage to stop the violence. These hollow declarations are empty gestures, and the Sudanese people are still waiting to see genuine political will transform into real change in their lives. Mutual aid flourished not only out of tradition and conviction, but also out of necessity. As the conflict drags on, needs continue to grow in increasing parts of the country, weapons continue to flow from foreign powers despite a constantly violated embargo that should have been expanded from Darfur to cover the whole country, and international funding continues to decrease steadily. Despite repeated warnings from history, from experts, from field workers, and from Sudanese themselves, those with the power to act across the international system have failed to prevent the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives. This war is not inadvertently forgotten, but it is consciously ignored. The tragedy unfolding today was predictable, but not unavoidable. The choice remains ours.

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In this episode of The Horn, Alan Boswell is joined by Crisis Group’s Africa Program Director, Murithi Mutiga, to discuss the inauguration of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Africa’s largest hydroelectric dam. They trace the project’s development during a tumultuous period for the region and explore its economic and political significance for Ethiopia. They examine why the project has raised tensions with the downstream Nile countries, Egypt and Sudan, why mediation efforts failed before completion, and to what extent concerns about GERD are justified. Finally, they discuss whether the dam can deliver the economic transformation Ethiopia hopes for, what it would take for Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan to avert a future crisis, and how the dispute over the dam could still drive regional tensions for years to come. Click here to listen on Apple Podcasts or Spotify. For more, check out our Ethiopia and Horn of Africa pages.

Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed attend the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding agreement, that allows Ethiopia to use a Somaliland port, in Addis Ababa, January 1, 2024. REUTERS/Tiksa Negeri Share A surprise memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland has aggravated tensions in the Horn of Africa with reverberations beyond. Somaliland, a former British colony lying along the Gulf of Aden, proclaimed independence from Somalia in 1991. Its independence is not recognised by any country, but it has attracted significant foreign investment, partly because of its strategic Berbera port. On 1 January, Somaliland said it had agreed to lease land to Ethiopia to build a naval facility on its coast in return for the latter’s recognition of its statehood. The deal has angered Somalia, which considers Somaliland to be part of its territory and worries that regional giant Ethiopia will impinge upon its sovereignty. The resulting crisis could escalate, as Somalia is rallying international opposition to the deal, while Ethiopia and Somaliland appear determined to plough ahead. Observers, and indeed Somali officials, fear the dispute may play into the hands of Al-Shabaab, the Islamist insurgency in Somalia, and further polarise the region. Though Ethiopia has not publicly committed to recognising Somaliland as an independent state, many Somaliland officials ... claim that it promised to do so. So far, the preliminary accord’s details are opaque, with Ethiopian and Somaliland officials offering different accounts of its contents. First, Ethiopian officials have suggested that the new facility will have both military and commercial purposes. Yet Somaliland insists that Ethiopia will build only a naval base, continuing to use the Berbera port for trade. The size of the area under discussion is also unclear. While the two sides originally announced that Ethiopia would lease 20km of coastline, a top Ethiopian official later said the deal covers 20 sq km of land and sea. Even the facility’s location is vague. Some claim that it will be situated at Lugaya, close to the Djiboutian border. Others say it will be close to Berbera. By some accounts, the deal provides for Hargeisa to obtain shares in Ethiopian state-owned enterprises such as Ethiopian Airlines. Though Ethiopia has not publicly committed to recognising Somaliland as an independent state, many Somaliland officials, including President Muse Bihi, claim that it promised to do so under the accord. Given that Somaliland would be unlikely to move ahead with such an explosive initiative without extracting the prize of official recognition, it seems clear that the two signatories understand the memorandum as a port-for-recognition swap. What happens from here is unclear, however, in no small part due to the practical and technical details that would need to be hammered out to move the deal forward. In the meantime, the news has sent shock waves through the Horn of Africa, reminiscent of those generated by Addis Ababa’s 2011 announcement that it would build a massive hydropower plant on the Blue Nile upstream from Egypt and Sudan. The project sparked a bitter dispute with Ethiopia’s regional rival Egypt that remains unresolved even after the mega-dam began filling in 2020. Many in Addis expressly compare the two episodes, claiming that the government will persevere with the port as it did with the dam. If Ethiopia begins constructing a coastal foothold while recognising Somaliland as an independent state, tensions among the various powers jockeying in the region will soar. With relations between Ethiopia and Somalia increasingly acrimonious, a flurry of diplomatic activity on both sides of the Red Sea suggests that regional divides are widening as other countries line up behind the two opponents. Ethiopian Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy and Somaliland’s Bihi have presented the deal as a major win for their respective national goals: restoring sea access, on Ethiopia’s side, and gaining international recognition, on Somaliland’s. With some 120 million people, Ethiopia is the world’s most populous landlocked nation, having lost its coastline when Eritrea seceded in 1993. Over the last two decades, successive administrations have stressed that the country is over-reliant on neighbouring Djibouti’s port, which handles the bulk of Ethiopian trade. But, before the January memorandum, the closest Ethiopia got to port ownership was a 2017 agreement with Somaliland under which Addis Ababa was to take a 19 per cent share in Berbera. The deal fell through, reportedly because Ethiopia failed to make timely payments. Abiy’s ascent as prime minister gave the aspiration to restore sea access a new push. He and his close-knit team of advisers have long signalled that he views sea access as part of the legacy he wants to leave the country. The prime minister has also made clear that he envisions Ethiopia as a future naval power. Strains between Ethiopia and Djibouti, partly due to Ethiopian complaints about Djibouti’s port fees and excessive red tape, may factor into Abiy’s calculus. In a speech televised on 13 October 2023 (but reportedly delivered months earlier), he described regaining sea access as a matter of existential importance to a growing Ethiopia. Many regional and outside officials took Abiy’s speech as an implicit threat to invade Eritrea and seize its southern port of Assab. Following quiet diplomatic entreaties, Abiy clarified that he was not envisaging military action. For Somaliland, the memorandum of understanding is a political gamble that has energised its long quest for outside recognition. Since 1991, Somaliland has developed many trappings of a state, including a largely stable, functional administration and relations – both diplomatic and commercial – with foreign powers, including the U.S., UK and United Arab Emirates (UAE). In particular, the Emirati firm DP World is investing $442 million in Berbera port, aiming to make it into a regional trade and logistics hub. Meanwhile, Somalia continues to demand that Somaliland rejoin its federation, leading external partners that want the two to resolve their differences amicably to support off-and-on talks between Mogadishu and Hargeisa. The latest attempt at reviving these talks came just days before the memorandum, with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and President Bihi of Somaliland meeting in Djibouti on 28-29 December. Somaliland officials described the memorandum to Crisis Group partly as a response to Somalia’s uncompromising stance on the independence question, including at that meeting, and an expression of frustration with Somaliland’s unresolved status. Additionally, the deal with Ethiopia is likely driven by Bihi’s desire to bolster his political standing at home. A long-running dispute over how to sequence elections likely weakened his chances for the presidential vote, which is now scheduled for November. He has also taken flak for a disastrous military failure in the Sool region, which Somaliland disputes with neighbouring Puntland. In February 2023, Hargeisa attempted – and failed – to quell an uprising by the Dhulbahante clan in Las Anod, Sool’s capital. The Dhubalhante belong to the Darod family, which is not part of Somaliland’s dominant Isaaq clan. The Dhulbahante prefer that the Sool area, in which they make up a majority, become a state in Somalia’s federation, rather than fall under Somaliland (or Puntland) jurisdiction. In August, after recurrent clashes, Somaliland forces retreated to positions about 100km west of Las Anod, and an uneasy calm settled in. Nonetheless, the front lines are heavily militarised, the two sides eyeing each other warily and expecting that fighting could resume at any moment. The announcement infuriated Somalia, which recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia and immediately declared blocking the accord a national priority. On 6 January, President Mohamud signed a parliamentary bill declaring the deal “null and void”, though this step was mostly rhetorical. Opposition to the deal spread quickly among the public as well, and government officials participated in a protest march in the Somali capital on 11 January. Mogadishu’s most hostile move so far came six days later, when it denied air traffic clearance to an Ethiopian Airlines flight carrying a high-level Ethiopian delegation to Hargeisa for discussions about the memorandum. (Mogadishu has almost no sway over what happens inside Somaliland, but it retains control of the skies.) Somalia is angry about more than the idea that Ethiopia might recognise Somaliland’s independence. First, it accuses Addis Ababa of meddling in its internal affairs, initiating discussions about an affair of state with Hargeisa without even notifying Mogadishu in advance. (Ethiopia says it did inform Somalia that talks would take place, but Somali officials say Addis did not provide full details.) Secondly, while Somali officials say they do not object to Ethiopia using the Gulf of Aden coast – whether at Berbera or another port along the Somali cost – for commercial purposes, they draw a red line at an Ethiopian military installation on what they consider Somali soil. Thirdly, and relatedly, the initiative feeds centuries-old Somali suspicions that Ethiopia is eyeing Somali-inhabited lands. This last sentiment is deepened by the fact that Mogadishu is not sure what is in the memorandum, given the conflicting reports about its contents. Mogadishu has focused on galvanising its allies and international organisations to help persuade Ethiopia to renege on the January memorandum. But despite the torrent of condemnatory statements, the Somali government has thus far acted cautiously vis-à-vis Ethiopia. It has refrained from cutting political or economic ties with Addis or from undertaking military preparations. Its approach probably reflects the asymmetry in its overall relations with Ethiopia, which has sent thousands of troops to fight Al-Shabaab, both as part of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and as a separate contingent. Instead, Mogadishu has focused on galvanising its allies and international organisations to help persuade Ethiopia to renege on the January memorandum. It has been able to convene emergency summits and meetings of the League of Arab States, the AU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a Horn of Africa body, and the UN Security Council. (Lacking outside recognition, Somaliland is excluded from all these organisations.) International reactions have largely favoured Somalia’s argument that the deal runs counter to principles of preserving territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. In the immediate vicinity, Abiy’s push for sea access has unsettled neighbours Djibouti and Eritrea, which both seem to have sided with Mogadishu. Although Eritrea’s government has been quiet about the deal, President Isaias Afwerki invited Somalia’s President Mohamud to Asmara. Mohamud’s press office said “profound talks” were held “while refraining from a reactive posture to various provocative agendas”. Djibouti, which is friendly with Somaliland despite competing with it commercially, has come out strongly against the January memorandum. Djibouti has taken on significant Chinese debt to improve a road connecting its port to Ethiopia, assuming that a large volume of trade would continue to transit, and stands to lose significant revenue from port fees if the deal holds up. Additionally, Bihi signed the memorandum shortly after Djibouti President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh tried to mediate between Somaliland and Somalia, which likely came as an insult. Farther afield, Egypt has perhaps been most active in capitalising on the dispute, doubtless due to Cairo’s longstanding rivalry with Addis Ababa. On 20 January, Egyptian President Abdelfattah al-Sisi invited President Mohamud to Cairo, pledging to defend Somalia if asked. Traditional partners like the European Union and the U.S. have expressed strong support for Somalia. Other powers closer to the Horn of Africa, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and the UAE, have publicly backed Mogadishu but likely seek to balance their relations in the region. The UAE appears to be in a particularly awkward position, given its majority stake in Berbera port, its strong security partnership with Mogadishu and its warm relations with Addis Ababa. Somali officials complain quietly that they see the Emirates playing a role in the deal, given Emirati leaders’ proximity to Abiy, although foreign diplomats are less certain. The AU has urged its high representative to the Horn, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, to foster dialogue between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa. But early indications are that Obasanjo is struggling to make headway, with Somalia reluctant to engage him. Mogadishu has thus far refused to enter bilateral talks with Addis: Abiy reportedly tried to speak with President Mohamud, but Mogadishu insists that Addis pull out of the memorandum before the two leaders meet face to face. Indeed, hopes that the two leaders would talk on the sidelines of the annual AU summit in Addis Ababa on 17-18 February quickly evaporated. Mohamud claimed that Ethiopian authorities tried to prevent him from leaving his hotel to drive to AU headquarters. Ethiopia blamed the incident on the Somali delegation, saying it refused the Ethiopian security team assigned to it under AU protocols. Authorities also alleged that Somali security personnel tried to enter the AU building’s premises carrying firearms without prior notification. Kenya seems to be taking a lead within the regional bloc IGAD to mediate. Abiy and Mohamud met separately with Kenyan President William Ruto in Nairobi, on 28 and 29 February, respectively, but there was no significant breakthrough, although some reports suggest a quiet agreement to de-escalate. Ethiopia and Kenya released a joint statement pledging to respect the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of states” but without naming Somalia. The agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland could spell further friction in an already troubled Horn of Africa. Even if the deal collapses, the question of sea access for Ethiopia will remain a divisive issue that is likely to resurface soon. Abiy is bent on restoring it, and he has a penchant for unilateral action. Although the prospect of more armed conflict as a result of the January memorandum seems low, given that both Ethiopia and Somalia seem to be keeping their differences in the diplomatic and political arena, that could change if Addis Ababa and Hargeisa move quickly to the deal’s next stage. Another major concern is that the feud could become the latest front for proxy shadowboxing in the Horn of Africa, echoing previous bouts of competition among Gulf powers in the region. The deal could drive a wedge between two emerging blocs – on one hand, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and their allies, including Eritrea and Djibouti, all of which are situated on the Red Sea; and the UAE, Ethiopia and their allies, on the other. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Eritrea share a desire to prevent other powers from encroaching on the Red Sea, while Djibouti has drifted closer to Saudi Arabia since it fell out with the UAE and seized control of a container terminal operated and jointly owned by DP World. These blocs are already at odds over the Sudan war, with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Eritrea favouring the Sudanese army on one side and the UAE backing the rival paramilitary Rapid Support Forces on the other. Recent developments – Egypt’s vocal support for Somalia, the pomp attending the announcement of a surge of Saudi aid to Somalia, and a series of meetings between Djibouti and Saudi Arabia – suggest that the parties are indeed positioning themselves along these lines. Al-Shabaab is another concern. A breakdown in relations between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu could threaten their close cooperation in fighting the insurgents. Should Addis use its troops as a bargaining chip or Mogadishu expel them to spite Ethiopia, a security vacuum would emerge that Al-Shabaab could exploit. The insurgents would then pose a greater danger not only to Somalia but also to Ethiopia and other countries in the region. Even the threat of such measures could prove destabilising, given that ATMIS is slated to draw down by the end of 2024 and talks with the AU about a follow-on mission are still under way. Al-Shabaab may also benefit from the nationalist backlash to the memorandum in Somalia. It has portrayed itself as the only actor capable of rolling back Ethiopian ambitions in Somali territory, depicting the Somali federal government as too weak to stand up to outsiders trying to manipulate it. Al-Shabaab will undoubtedly attempt to win new recruits based on this narrative, something it has done in the past, particularly following Ethiopia’s 2006 invasion of Somalia to depose the Islamic Courts Union, an Islamist outfit that had seized power in Mogadishu. Ethiopia, Somaliland and Somalia should strive to de-escalate tensions. Despite aggressive rhetoric, all three parties have so far avoided rash decisions. They should continue to show restraint. All the external actors trying to mediate, including IGAD and the AU, should make sure to coordinate efforts so that they do not work at cross-purposes. As a first step, regional and other actors with influence should work toward a conciliatory step from Ethiopia that could pave the way for direct talks. For instance, Ethiopia could issue a clear statement acknowledging its respect for Somalia’s territorial integrity. Meanwhile, despite the stance taken by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, now is the best time for Mogadishu to engage, because the memorandum is a preliminary accord whose formal contractual obligations still need to be negotiated. A failure to talk now could result in a missed opportunity before the deal gets fleshed out. Given Somalia’s preference for multilateral engagement, the two heads of state can meet in the company of fellow IGAD heads of state, such as Ruto and current IGAD chair Guelleh. For Addis Ababa, the moment is likewise opportune: its economy is in deep distress and relations with many neighbours are deteriorating. Pushing ahead with the deal amid such stiff regional opposition would carry major risks. Outside actors should encourage the parties to engage in such discussions rather than use the dispute to further their own interests. Mogadishu and Hargeisa will also need to resume direct dialogue, since no other path to resolving Somaliland’s limbo status is apparent and since spiralling tensions risk harming both. Such talks look unlikely until the present crisis dies down. The memorandum of understanding has brought two of the Horn’s enduring questions to the fore: Ethiopia’s long-held desire for sea access and Somaliland’s uncertain status. Dealing with both simultaneously will be tricky indeed, especially given the regional and geopolitical posturing at play. The priority today must be to prevent further escalation of the crisis. Still, regional diplomats should ensure that addressing these core disputes in a manner that all can live with and benefit from remains firmly on their agenda. Failure to do so means that the disputes will inevitably resurface down the road, as will the tensions that come with them. Notes

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