You rarely see Harriers flying. The last vestiges of the Cold War. That's actually why I went there. An amazing aircraft and the spirit of British engineering at its best

#NATOdays

Yeah, same here. Personally, very sceptical towards the (cap)ability to prosecute left of launch effort. It actually isn’t seen as a main priority of COMAOs (in case of OWAs for sure), just a subset of AOs and it would depend on the priorities of the command in the designated MTW.

Addendum - I did not mean to say that things are good and sufficient. There is much to be done, and the current state of affairs is not sufficient. It is just a short (well, not that short) explanation of the approach and a thought.

The conflict phase only means that the deterrence failed (in which case both defensive (AD/ABM) and offensive means would be employed).
FIN
14/14

For this discussion, it is IMO important that a) the approach is based on denial and b) it is flexible and calibrated and conventional (and nuclear) deterrence are an integral part of it, and the execution of the mission begins already in the competitive phase.
13/14

All that combined with offensive counterstrikes led by air and ground based units, and passive measures to minimise the impact of SVNO.
12/14

Note that brigades and battalions must be capable of operating fully independently (being fully autonomous) for relatively short periods of time - it is doctrinally designed for a high degree of saturation for a relatively short period of time.
11/14

GBAD-BDE-HQ must be able to operate without support or replenishment for at least 5 days, and sustaining attached units during the same period, GBAD-BN-HQ must be capable of operating without support or replenishment for at least 3 days.
10/14

NATO IAMD is essentially focused on two tasks: defending military related infrastructure and protecting manoeuvring forces. The dispersion (and hardening) in the event of crises would significantly reduce Russia's ability to guarantee the destruction of targets.
9/14

That is why there is such an emphasis on strengthening IAMD. This was reflected in the adoption of new CTs in June this year (already exceeding the already strengthened targets for 2023 and 2024).
8/14

The goal would be to completely paralyse NATO's defence, disrupt command and control chain, and disrupt communications. In the second echelon, there is manned tactical and strategic aviation, airborne operations, and similar fun.
7/14

SVNO is another matter. A ***huge*** mass of drones would be used to saturate and suppress NATO's IAMD in the strategic theatre of operation in the first echelon, combines with a use of ballistic, cruise (and various hypersonic) missiles and other PGMs for killing.
6/14

The strategic depth of the European part of NATO is relatively large, and Russia's campaign in Ukraine has not proved very effective. SODCIT is also scalable and iterative in nature (it really depends on the scenario)
5/14

When discussing this type of threat, it is necessary to define it – SODCIT, which is the focus of the almost entire debate (how we would survive continuous all-azimuth (drone and missile) raids with a mass similar to or greater than that in UA), is not the primary concern.
4/14

At the same time, during the war the Russia would launch another strategic operation - SODCIT (Strategic Operation for the Destruction of Critically Important Targets). Russia's campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure targets is SODCIT.
3/14

Countering SAO/SVKO (Strategic Air Operation/стратегическая воздушно-космическая операция) is one of the most serious problems NATO faces. The operation formally consists of SOOVKN (repelling a NATO's MRAU) and the SVNO (strategic air offensive operation).
2/14

There was a discussion on Twitter about how would NATO counter mass,droned (100s-1000s OWA UAVs) all-azimuth raids,so I’m copy pasting what I wrote there. In short,the answer is dispersion,hardening,and taking decisive action but the devil is in the details
A short thread (well not that short)
1/14

*(plausible deniability means “navigational errors” in Romania’s and Moldova’s cases)

They have been doing this for a long time with Shaheds to Romania and Moldova, where plausible deniability can be easily claimed though. Here it is not possible and it is rather crystal clear.
3/3
FIN

…the UAV crash (which Gerberas launched against Ukraine have), these are 100% without any doubt deliberate incidents to test NATINADS (and Lithuanian defences) and to annoy Lithuania.
2/3

IIRC it’s a third such incident that has been publicised, I know of at least one other incident that has not been publicised. Considering the range of Gerbera (600km) and the fact that drones that fell on Lithuanian territory were found without explosives activated kinetically after…
1/3

Improved KILO class, a Russian design. Safe move for China, not revealing their more advanced Type-039B/C Yuan (or coming Type-041 Zhou)

Suggests both countries still guarded on sub tech

Absolutely no change of US posture has happened. (Based on only unclass reports) there are always two or more subs at sea and a change of a launch zones to maximise Trident’s PTPs and strike effectiveness on selected targets is a known form of signalling that was used in the past.