Nicholas Stephanopoulos
@profnickstephan.bsky.social
1.5K followers 2.4K following 79 posts
Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Aligning Election Law: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/aligning-election-law-9780197662151.
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profnickstephan.bsky.social
In this zone, disputes must be resolved on grounds other than the constitutional text's original meaning. Alignment could be a factor that courts consider in the construction zone, pushing them to further, not to frustrate, this value.
profnickstephan.bsky.social
Likewise, American constitutional law could appreciate the full arrays of misaligning threats and potential judicial responses to them. Lastly, one of the key concepts of modern originalism is the construction zone.
profnickstephan.bsky.social
So doctrines analogous to those that implement federalism could be crafted to operationalize alignment. Second, comparative constitutional law recognizes democratic malfunctions that involve misalignment as well as innovative judicial remedies for these problems.
profnickstephan.bsky.social
In this symposium contribution, I outline three ways in which constitutional law could incorporate alignment. First, alignment resembles federalism in that it's a principle implied by the Constitution's text, structure, and history.
profnickstephan.bsky.social
Here's the abstract:

At present, American constitutional law gives short shrift to the democratic value of alignment (congruence between governmental outputs and popular preferences). But it doesn't have to be this way.
profnickstephan.bsky.social
I just posted a new paper, "Aligning Constitutional Law," exploring how the alignment principle could be incorporated into constitutional (not just election) law.

I'll be giving the Constitution Day Lecture at Drake University today on the same subject.

papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....
Aligning Constitutional Law
At present, American constitutional law gives short shrift to the democratic value of alignment (congruence between governmental outputs and popular preferences
papers.ssrn.com
profnickstephan.bsky.social
@nedfoley.bsky.social has written this insightful article on Bracket Voting as a method of achieving what I call "alignment" between voters' preferences and elections' winners.
profnickstephan.bsky.social
The brief also argues that Section 2 differs from the policies on which the Court has previously imposed time limits; and that, if the Court wants to further curb Section 2's reach, it has many other options.
profnickstephan.bsky.social
I filed this amicus brief in Callais today. The main argument is that Section 2 doesn't require a court-imposed time limit because -- thanks to the Gingles framework -- it's already inherently self-limiting.

www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24...
www.supremecourt.gov
profnickstephan.bsky.social
This Article is the first to explore the implications of the new electorate for election policy and law. As to policy, the parties’ longstanding positions on numerous electoral issues have become obsolete. As to law, an array of electoral claims and defenses now operate differently than in the past.
profnickstephan.bsky.social
These shifts include the disappearance of income as a partisan cleavage, the emergence of education as a new partisan axis, a decline in racially polarized voting, and a more neutral political geography.
profnickstephan.bsky.social
My article, "Election Law for the New Electorate," is out in the Journal of Legal Analysis.

academic.oup.com/jla/article/...

Here's the abstract:

The American electorate is transforming—undergoing its most sweeping changes in half a century.
Election law for the new electorate
Abstract. The American electorate is transforming—undergoing its most sweeping changes in half a century. These shifts include the disappearance of income
academic.oup.com
profnickstephan.bsky.social
My new article, "Redistricting Without Tradeoffs," has found a home in @columlrev.bsky.social.

Here's the abstract; I'll be posting the piece soon.
profnickstephan.bsky.social
It's striking that members of the CA commission now agree that CA's congressional map should be redrawn if other states enact mid-decade gerrymanders.

The goal here should be national partisan fairness. A redrawn CA map can serve that goal by offsetting gerrymanders elsewhere.
profnickstephan.bsky.social
We filed this brief defending the constitutionality of the NY Voting Rights Act. I'll be arguing the case in the NY Court of Appeals in October.

The issue is pretty important: If the NYVRA somehow violates the Equal Protection Clause, then so do all disparate-impact laws.

t.co/3A2Vy4JvB4
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/60a559b59cfc63389f67f892/t/689600d4885354540e6d3a4d/1754661076451/Clarke+v+Newburgh-RespBrf.pdf
t.co
Reposted by Nicholas Stephanopoulos
mikealbertus.bsky.social
My interview with election law expert
@profnickstephan.bsky.social on #Texas Republicans' extreme partisan #Gerrymandering. Why the rare move threatens representation and the balance in the US House – and could spark widespread partisan redistricting. 👇
profnickstephan.bsky.social
“The mugger asked for a billion dollars, the keys to my house, and my first-born. I got him to agree to $200M (for now). I’m such a savvy negotiator.”

www.nytimes.com/2025/07/23/n...
Columbia Agrees to $200 Million Fine to Settle Fight With Trump
www.nytimes.com
profnickstephan.bsky.social
The decision to reargue Callais is confusing. The most plausible rationale for reargument is getting into the Section 2 merits of the preceding lawsuit.

But this case simply isn't about Section 2. So it's a terrible vehicle for a blockbuster ruling about the VRA.
profnickstephan.bsky.social
My reaction to the HLR leak is that they take article selection extraordinarily seriously.

400+ memos totaling 2000+ pages? And that’s just one stage of their process?

Geesh. When I ran YLS’s international law journal, we just met and talked about submissions.
profnickstephan.bsky.social
In a highly polarized environment, whichever party is in power tends to pursue policies that are too liberal or conservative for the electorate as a whole.

So we often get a combination of partisan alignment with policy misalignment.
profnickstephan.bsky.social
Yet voters hate the unified Republican government's main agenda item, by a margin of about 2-to-1. So if this bill is approved, stark policy *misalignment* will ensue.

Unfortunately, this is a common pattern in modern American politics.
profnickstephan.bsky.social
The unpopularity of the Republican megabill highlights the distinctions between different kinds of alignment (the subject of my recent book).

In partisan terms, the unified Republican government aligns with voters' preferences. Voters wanted a Republican President and Congress.