_RastaMouse
@rastamouse.me
750 followers 57 following 63 posts
Wannabe security guy. Director @ Zero-Point Security.
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rastamouse.me
My motivation behind this is to hook & spoof APIs that aren't supported by BeaconGate, such as CreateProcessA. Passing the PICO memory allocation data to Beacon via BUD also ensures that a custom Sleepmask can free it after ExitThread is called.
rastamouse.me
Working on a fun Crystal Palace loader that hooks APIs and pushes them through a call stack spoofing PICO.
rastamouse.me
And probably more that I'm missing right now. Just dismissing the issue entirely is pure folly.
rastamouse.me
What's the domain password policy (e.g. what's the theoretical worst-case crack time)? Does the svc account need to be that privileged? Is there a process for changing svc account passwords? Can the business detect/respond in the event the account is compromised?
rastamouse.me
Reporting it as informational just because they couldn't crack it would be an egregious error on their part, imo. Many factors would elevate the risk. Most testers only use shitty laptops, but what level of threat/resources is the business defending against?
rastamouse.me
Could MS do better in how they communicate issues with product security? Absolutely. But this isn't just a 'them' problem. I don't see how this letter to the FTC will foster a positive attitude within MS towards participation in good, open security conversations.
rastamouse.me
So why doesn't he also criticise businesses, including his own government, for not building in accordance with industry-recognised standards and for not carrying out security due diligence to ensure compliance against those standards?
rastamouse.me
The message he puts across is pretty much "everyone is too lazy or stupid to change the defaults, so let's blame MS". The first time I saw 'disable RC4 guidance' was in the CIS benchmark for 2012 R2 in 2018.
rastamouse.me
I cannot conceive of a scenario where a vulnerability this old goes unknown or unmitigated for this long, where the business is completely absolved of all responsibility. The Senator's letter willfully ignores the failures made by businesses.
rastamouse.me
A CISO doesn't need to understand the technical details of any vulnerability; they pay for security assessments that communicate issues to them in ways they do understand.
rastamouse.me
I can't really wrap my head around it tbh. I find it totally far-fetched that they didn't know this issue existed, and bitching that "MS didn't tell us about it" is deflecting their own negligence.
raphaelmudge.bsky.social
My case study tries to show: cybersecurity does NOT have systemic ground truth discussion. It's almost all unproductive blame with omission of details to keep some away from blame (e.g., failed compensating controls, facilitating ransomware payments) w/ strategic messaging that leads to offsec blame
rastamouse.me
I'm not victim-blaming, but I've been on that side of the conference door too many times. It's literally the reason why I quit.
rastamouse.me
I do think that Ascension and others that get roasted like this do need to take some accountability though. I'd be willing to bet Kerberoasting was raised in one if not multiple pentest reports prior to the breach, but they chose not to do anything about it.
raphaelmudge.bsky.social
Analysis of a Ransomware Breach

aff-wg.org/2025/09/26/a...

Breach analysis? Breach intelligence? Industry critique? Fee-only ransomware negotiator? 100% efficacy? The story of how Microsoft worked an old problem, fucked it up, we malign the guy who told us, they fixed it, and it wasn't fixed? PtH?
Reposted by _RastaMouse
raphaelmudge.bsky.social
Analysis of a Ransomware Breach

aff-wg.org/2025/09/26/a...

Breach analysis? Breach intelligence? Industry critique? Fee-only ransomware negotiator? 100% efficacy? The story of how Microsoft worked an old problem, fucked it up, we malign the guy who told us, they fixed it, and it wasn't fixed? PtH?
rastamouse.me
But if the entire call stack is logged, it would be easy for an analyst at least to see if a call did indeed originate from some unbacked memory, even if a product didn't outright alert on it.
rastamouse.me
I initially wondered if that could be a substitute for needing to fake your call stack to hide the origin of an API call. How many security products would walk the stack and give up as soon as it saw wininet.dll? Or would they would further back and analyse as much of the stack as possible?
rastamouse.me
While smoking my pipe (yes, I do that now), I thought it interesting to keep PICOs seperate so you could stomp them into different modules; e.g. stomp your HTTP C2 PICO into wininet.dll.
rastamouse.me
Playing with @raphaelmudge.bsky.social's latest CP update (it's very cool). I have mixed feelings about merging COFFs though. It simplifies overall development and gives the loader fewer jobs to do, but on the other hand you lose some flexibility about where each "part" goes in memory.
rastamouse.me
Very cool!
raphaelmudge.bsky.social
COFFing out the Night Soil

aff-wg.org/2025/09/10/c...

A COFF-focused Crystal Palace update:

* internal COFF normalization & section group merging
* Crystal Palace can now export COFF
* I added COFF merging to the spec language too

Linker stuff.
COFFing out the Night Soil
I’m back with another update to the Tradecraft Garden project. Again, this release is focused on the Crystal Palace linker. My priority in this young project is to build the foundation first, then …
aff-wg.org
Reposted by _RastaMouse
raphaelmudge.bsky.social
If you're in London, Will Burgess (x.com/joehowwolf) is speaking at Beacon %25 on "Linkers and Loaders: Experiments with Crystal Palace" this Thursday.

www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/beacon-25-...

beac0n.org

From his X: "If you enjoy filthy PIC tradecraft it may be of interest!"
Beacon %25
The fourth year of Beacon: London's home of hackers, hunters and EDR dodgers.
www.eventbrite.co.uk