Timothy Lyons's Scientific Realism (2025) is a book in the Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Science series. Like all books in this series, its purported aim is to provide an extensive overview of a topic or debate in philosophy of science. In the case of Lyons, the debate is the scientific realism/antirealism debate in philosophy of science, which is philosophically rich with various positions and arguments (Chakravartty 2017).

Abstract I examine whether Generative AI systems such as ChatGPT can transmit knowledge and, if so, how epistemic responsibility for their outputs should be distributed. To address these issues, the discussion proceeds in three stages. First, I situate John Greco’s notion of massively shared agency within the recent literature on AI testimony, showing how it challenges the widespread assumption that AI cannot testify due to its lack of intentions.

While generally being on board with my arguments for the existence of logic-based epistemic injustice, Colin Caret (2025) argues that “logic teaching is the epicenter of these problems”, and doubts “whether the typical approach to logic teaching significantly stifles the flexibility that is needed to understand and reflect on logically revisionary, emancipatory strategies’’ (31). While I think Caret is correct in pointing out that the problem doesn’t necessarily…

I am grateful to Charles Lassiter (2025) for his commentary on my article “The Rejected Expert and the Knowledge’s Half-Blood” (Censon 2025), and I am also extremely pleased to see that he accepts several points of my argument. Previously, I had seen in his paper “Reading the Signs: From Dyadic to Triadic Views for Identifying Experts” (2024) a confirmation of my thesis on the crisis of expert recognition.

I want to start this reply by thanking Youssef Aguisoul (2025) for such a clear and engaging reply to my paper. I am honoured that my work is discussed in such detail, allowing me to be a part of a much-needed conversation about the meta-philosophy of hinge epistemology. In what follows, I will do my best to recap the current discussion and attempt to answer some of the concerns raised by Aguisoul.

In a world increasingly defined by rapid scientific advances, pervasive technologies, and engineered systems that mediate nearly every aspect of human life, we face an urgent need to critically engage with science and technology. From artificial intelligence and climate engineering to biomedical innovation and surveillance infrastructures, the challenges of our time are deeply intertwined with scientific and technological developments. These developments do not arise in a value–neutral vacuum; human choices, institutional power, and cultural assumptions shape them at every stage.

In “Deep Disagreement, Gradability, and Dialectical Neglect: Comments on Serebrinsky” (2025), Scott Aikin and Alison Emery analyze and respond to my “How Deep is your Disagreement” (2025). They offer a precise reading and make very good points. I agree with Aikin and Emery on many of those points and have nothing substantial to say about them. Nonetheless, I feel the need to address one of their objections: that my view on deep disagreement could lead to the acceptability of dialectical neglect.

I would like to thank Benjamin McCraw for his very thoughtful response (see McCraw 2025b) to my reply (see Baumann 2025) to his original article “A Reidian Transcendental Argument against Skepticism” (see McCraw 2025a). I can see what speaks in favor of his view. I don’t have much to add to the two main points I made in my initial reply (first, that there might be a second-order escape route for the skeptic and, second, that one might have reasons to doubt McCraw’s justification of trusting others).

I worked recently with colleagues to develop a new lens, the Mind-Technology Problem (MTP),[1] to look at what a mind could be. We argue that in light of smart technology and Generative AI (GenAI), we need to re-think what minds are. The MTP appears potentially capable of changing our biased perspectives regarding mind. I hasten to add that we developed the MTP as a successor framework, not a replacement, of the Mind-Body Problem (MBP).

Over the past decade, I have been reading Davide Panagia’s contributions to the political theory of technology and finding his work a profound instigator to thinking. I am grateful for this opportunity to further engage his insights concerning the politics of data technology as well as his criticisms of perceived limitations of my views on the same. A large part of why I continue to learn so much from Panagia’s work is that we simultaneously agree on many of the most important questions concerning the political philosophy of technology whilst nevertheless maintaining a small but significant set of crucial points of disagreement.

Volume 14, Issue 10, 1–127, October 2025 ❧ McCraw, Benjamin W. 2025. “No Escape Route to the Radical Skeptic: A Reply to Baumann.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 14 (10): 1–7. ❧ Radenovic, Ljiljana. 2025. “Knut Hamsun’s Pan: Cosmic Connections from Within.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 14 (10): 8–13. ❧ Erdt, Agnieszka. 2025. “Islamization of Philosophy? Why Ṣadrā Won’t Do the Work.”

Susan Schneider (2025) argues that AI chatbots pose a threat to human autonomy that is difficult for users to detect. Like the proverbial frog in the pot of water that is slowly heating to a deadly boil, we are unaware of the developing threat to our autonomy. Schneider characterizes this threat to our autonomy both in terms of knowledge (such as cases where a chatbot provides its users with unreliable information) and freedom from manipulation (such as cases where a chatbot incentivizes its users to act against their interests).

Abstract It is difficult to engage in a constructive dialogue with philosophers who dismiss their fellow philosophers’ work as “philosophically irrelevant.” In Mizrahi (2025a), I conducted a mixed-method study of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962/1996). The qualitative and quantitative evidence detailed in Mizrahi (2025a) suggest that Kuhn (1962/1996) perpetuates “Great Man” of science historiography. “Great Man” of science historiography paints a picture of the history of science as the biography of “great men.” For Politi (2025, 8), however, quantitative evidence is not “philosophically relevant.” He…

Conspiracy theories have a prominent role in politics, but what is that role and why are conspiracy theories deployed to play it? M. Giulia Napolitano’s (2025) “Conspiracy Theories, Resistance to Evidence, and Propaganda: How Conspiracy Theories Advance Political Causes” discusses the source and extent of the political utility of conspiracy theories. Although I agree with much of the substance of Napolitano’s argument, there are a few points where I’d like to push back or expand on Napolitano’s analysis.

Recently, Francesca Pongiglione (2025, 92) introduced the concept of epistemic hubris as an epistemic flaw that is behind “the anonymous layperson who believes that a couple of afternoons doing online research suffice for gaining expertise even on complex topics.” She claims that it underlies the increasingly frequent phenomenon of “improvised expertise,” where nonexperts publicly claim epistemic authority on complex issues such as vaccines, climate change, or geopolitics.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank Carl Mitcham for his kind review of Post-Europe (2024), a book which is at the same time intimate to me and polemic to the current political situation. It is a small book which accompanies a much bigger book (368 pages) titled Machine and Sovereignty: For a Planetary Thinking (2024), one that is much harder (and certainly takes longer) to read because it partly details my interpretation of the history of modern political philosophy from Hobbes to Schmitt, and partly elaborating on an agenda based on my work in the past decade.

African philosophy is no longer debated in terms of its existence, yet it still engages with several metaphilosophical questions. These questions include: What is African philosophy? What are the appropriate trends within African philosophy? Which school of thought should be considered the most suitable for African philosophy? In which language should authentic African philosophy be articulated? What is criterion of African philosophy?

Gloria Andrada and Adam J. Carter—"Mind-Technology Problems for Know-How Anti-Intellectualism," 2025—use the Mind-Technology problem (MTP) framework (Clowes, Gärtner, and Hipólito 2021) as a basis for theorizing about skills and know-how. More specifically, they focus on anti-intellectualism about know-how, so the view that S knows how to do X in virtue of S having the ability to intentionally X. Anti-intellectualism is contrasted with intellectualism about know-how, so the view that S knows how to do X in virtue of knowing that something is the case or knowing some fact (Stanley and Williamson 2011; Bengson and Moffett 2007).

Lee Basham’s essay—“Sky Pilot Epistemology: Heaven’s Gate and Masada” (2025)— proposes that the self-destructions at Masada and of the Heaven’s Gate community may be judged “epistemically sound” insofar as, from within those communities’ shared background assumptions, their decisions were rational. One may grant, arguendo, that agents sometimes act with a kind of internal coherence without thereby conceding the question that matters in a halakhic frame: whether the actions in question are permitted by Torah as interpreted through the rabbinic jurisprudence that constitutes Judaism’s normative order.

It is particularly hard to write a critical response to an argument one overall agrees with. In “Hinge Epistemology: Why Choose?” (2025) Jordi Fairhurst shows his readers that hinge epistemology—a theory that holds that epistemic practices are based on unquestioned presuppositions called hinges—is stuck in a stalemate that prevents advancements. This paralysis, Fairhurst argues, is caused by a couple of assumption: a theoretical one that takes the presuppositions—hinges—to have some essentially common catachrestic and a methodological one that insists on building a global unified theory of hinges.

Juha Räikkä’s paper (2025) challenges a widely held assumption in the literature on compromise: that compromises involving principles, judgments, or deep values are inherently more difficult to achieve than compromises involving interests, preferences, commitments, or personal values.[1] Against this “traditional” view, the author argues that while conflicts of principles and judgments do differ from conflicts of interests, the greater difficulty of the former is contingent rather than systematic.

TThe advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is not inherently problematic. Indeed, Generative AI (AI that can creatively generate outputs, like images, poems, and music) and Large Language Models (AI-powered systems trained on vast amounts of data and capable of performing natural language tasks) promise valuable boons. However, such kinds of AI pose medium to long-term challenges for the UK welfare system.

This interview with Professor Michael A. Peters is conceived as a direct response to a recent dialogue with Steve Fuller, published under the title “Knowledge Socialism and/or Capitalism? An Interview with Steve Fuller” (Yang 2025). While Fuller suggested blurring or even abandoning the distinction between knowledge socialism and knowledge capitalism—and highlighted the relevance of pre-Marxist figures such as Saint-Simon and Proudhon—Peters engages these provocations critically and constructively, offering both theoretical clarifications and extensions.

Initially, we want to thank the editors of Techné and the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective and Anette Forss for her insightful work on nursing education. Forss presents a compelling argument for reflexively learning from technological breakdowns. She works through three cases that are generous and kind in their ability to see beyond instrumentalist uses of technology and education. Technology is not neutral and does not ensure better teaching or learning.

II want to thank Taylor Matthews for their thoughtful and detailed engagement with my paper. Their commentary not only reconstructs the main commitments of Act First Responsibilism (AFR) with admirable clarity, but it also raises several important challenges that help to sharpen and clarify the view. … . Article Citation: Müller, Nastasia. 2025. “A Reply to Matthews on ‘Taking Virtuous Acts, not Virtuous Traits, as Evaluatively and Conceptually Primary’.” …