If the battlefield is the space where two substances — two armies — meet, the density of atoms on the enemy’s side is clearly higher. And their goal is not to mix but to destroy each other. We somehow have to solve that problem. 18/
Waiting for contact from every side. And, of course, in the radio‑electronic spectrum. Diffusion. Only instead of atoms — soldiers and drones. There is one nuance.Usually the transfer of matter happens from a region of high concentration to a region of low concentration. 17/
Thus the two armies penetrate one another’s ranks. In the air, by controlling a certain depth with drones and killing from above. On the ground, by moving behind the enemy’s forward positions and cutting them off. 16/
If the enemy succeeds in unblocking the route, then they reactivate. The Russians’ numerical superiority gives them the simple ability to employ many crews to deliver supplies to their cut‑off comrades, form special crews to fight Ukrainian drones, and so on. 15/
Where it succeeds — for example, by cutting off the approach route into a zone and annihilating the flow of reinforcements and supplies — the enemy fighters, isolated from their own, freeze and seek shelter. They minimize activity. Supplies arrive by drone. 14/
It seems our command decided to show that this is a tango for two, and is trying to mirror‑push back the rear areas for the enemy forward units that are penetrating between our ranks. Maybe cutting them off instead of running around in their rear and trying to find them all actually makes sense. 13/
You can’t properly plan and run a strike drone unit if you know that some bastards are running around in the area of your positions. Whatever else, the type of work and the movements it requires constrain you when you realize the group must take up defense, not fly. 12/
This affects the pilots’ work, who must be distracted from surveilling the next enemy group that managed to slip through. Of course everyone must be ready for contact, but then pilots lose the ability to perform their direct duties. From that we all lose on our side. 11/
Just as the volume of information the human brain is forced to process in this war is constantly increasing, so the number of actions and the concentration needed to carry them out require ever greater effort and ever more complex planning. That is an additional factor of exhaustion. 10/
From there the russians advance into the drone hunting ground — both theirs and ours. In that same space, relief and rotation to positions that are not cut off have become hundreds of special operations every day. Complex and nerve‑wracking. They take more and more manpower and time. 9/
It is into that gap that russian soldiers begin to operate; they have to get in and consolidate. They know they are leaving positions behind them where our fighters remain. Those fighters hesitate before opening fire on those trying to bypass, because they understand - positions will be overrun. 8/
Beyond the contact line — the line we still call that out of inertia — they have room to do this. That is already caused by pressure from the air. The mass use of drones and the improvement in how they are employed created a gap between forward positions and their rear. 7/
The idea itself is interesting. Maybe this is how the Russians hope to increase the cumulative effect of growing pressure along the front. They send fighters not merely to storm. Enemy fighters bypass our forward positions and push deeper. 6/
Maybe some bright mind on the other side (and I’d like to knock that head off) came up with an idea. “Let’s try to cut the enemy’s positions off from logistics and reinforcement not only with drones from the air. Let’s try to do it on the ground.” 5/
When I first described the situation near Rodynske, where we had to search for the enemy in our own rear, this was not a one‑off action. Similar situations recurred systematically. It wasn’t the first time I had to make a surface autopsy of Russian tactics, but this case is in some ways special. 4/
In places these are entire zones where Ukrainian positions and Russian positions have become mixed together. Of course, this is a state of affairs the enemy has imposed. He needs to disorganize our defense, making that process harder for us. 3/
Everyone is used to the idea that someone, having the relevant information about the disposition of Ukrainian and Russian forces on the battlefield, can draw a line on a map and we’ll all clearly see the situation. On some parts of the front that has lost its relevance. 2/
Diffusion. It’s that phenomenon from physics that remotely resembles the current state of the battlefield. The penetration of atoms of one substance between the atoms of another. The penetration of one side’s combat units into the ranks of the other and vice versa. A mutual process. 1/
«фронтова” схема і гіпотетичні розширені її варіації - наочний приклад того, що ніхто в світі не хотів би брати участь в такій війні, яку ведуть проти нас. Проте, вона вже тут, вона реальна. Набагато більш реальна, ніж гіпотетичний обмін ядерними ударами, яким залякують суспільства у світі. 14/
Це зумовлене збільшенням дальності засобів ураження, розширенням їх номенклатури, банальним збільшенням кількості. Противник досягає кумулятивного ефекту збільшення кількості всього, що може кидати нам на голови. І ми звісно по можливості нарощуємо свої спроможності та модернізуємо свої засоби. 13/
