Adi Ćerimagić
@adicerimagic.bsky.social
420 followers 220 following 880 posts
Senior analyst at ESI. Western Balkans, EU, human rights, democracy & rule of law. Bridging the Western Balkans-EU gap.
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adicerimagic.bsky.social
Dear young leaders from 🇷🇸🇧🇦🇲🇪,

Applications are now open for #BOLD25 Balkan Regional Youth Leadership Workshop: Community Engagement in the 21st Century, organised by Bard College’s Center for Civic Engagement.

📅 Deadline: 25 October 2025
🔗 Learn more and apply via the links below ⬇️
adicerimagic.bsky.social
This would unlock genuine reforms. Not all would join at the same time, but the momentum would return. That is what matters.
adicerimagic.bsky.social
🇪🇺 therefore needs to set a clear date by which it will be ready to welcome the prepared candidates, whether as full members or as fully part of the single market – just as it set 2002 as a target year in 1999 for the 10 + 2 enlargement.
adicerimagic.bsky.social
My answer:

Without a clear, concrete, and achievable goal, no Western Balkan country will be ready or join in this decade.
adicerimagic.bsky.social
The Spanish daily El Mundo where according to last month’s #Eurobarometer 67 percent of 🇪🇸 citizens support enlargement [including 🇽🇰: 53 percent], asked how to turn this talk of new momentum into a real process that leads to genuine reforms and full membership.
adicerimagic.bsky.social
And yes, according to the last Commission report from October 2024, some candidates like [🇲🇩 and] 🇦🇱 have made progress not seen in years in their level of preparedness for 🇪🇺 membership, at this pace no candidate – including 🇲🇪 – will be ready to join by 2030.
adicerimagic.bsky.social
Indeed, the journey towards 🇪🇺 membership has, for the six Western Balkan states, turned into a decades-long walk through the desert.

Since 2022, many have spoken of new momentum. And while, yes, the #EU27 have taken more decisions and done so more quickly.
adicerimagic.bsky.social
Furthermore, support in 🇬🇷 for 🇽🇰’s bid (44 percent) exceeds that for 🇺🇦 (41), 🇦🇱 (39), 🇲🇰 (37), and 🇹🇷 (22), and equals 🇬🇪 (44).

In 🇨🇾, support for 🇽🇰 (40 percent) is higher than for 🇦🇱 (34) and 🇹🇷 (13), and equals 🇬🇪 (40).

Could this help 🇽🇰's bid? It should.
adicerimagic.bsky.social
In 🇪🇸 and 🇷🇴 – over half support 🇽🇰’s membership.
In 🇸🇰 – more support than opposition.
In 🇬🇷 & 🇨🇾 – opposition higher, but support remains above 40 percent.
adicerimagic.bsky.social
The last month's #Eurobarometer shows how citizens in these five countries view #Kosovo’s #EU bid:

Across the #EU5 non-recognisers, 47 percent are in favour and 40 percent against Kosovo’s accession — higher support than the #EU27 average (43 percent in favour, 46 percent against).
adicerimagic.bsky.social
🇽🇰 applied for 🇪🇺 membership is December 2022.
It has now been 33 months since then — and the next step, for the Council to ask the European Commission for its opinion, is still pending.

One reason: 5 members don't recognise 🇽🇰.

The latest #Eurobarometer shows how citizens view #Kosovo’s #EU bid 👇
adicerimagic.bsky.social
“…the importance of #accountability for #attacks on #KFOR and violence in #Banjska.”

🇷🇸
adicerimagic.bsky.social
Besides the fact that such an approach is, for Dodik, “absolutely unacceptable,” in his view 🇩🇪 “traditionally shows its hostility or its bad intentions towards Serbs. And today I must say that 🇩🇪 continues to do this persistently and rehabilitates it in the territory of 🇧🇦.”
adicerimagic.bsky.social
He added that the 🇩🇪 government “behaves like the old 🇺🇸 administrations, choosing with whom they want to talk and with whom they do not.”
adicerimagic.bsky.social
“I believed that in [president Vladimir #Putin’s] talks with other powerful partners in the world, above all the 🇺🇸, it would be good not to let the #Balkans slip away and be left to the 🇩🇪,” said Milorad #Dodik after yesterday’s meeting with Putin.
adicerimagic.bsky.social
The Berlin Playbook’s Gordon Repinski sums it up:

“Resistance to moving away from unanimity raises questions about how ready the 🇪🇺 really is for reform – and whether the accession promise for countries such as 🇺🇦, 🇲🇩 or the #WesternBalkans is realistic at all.”

www.politico.eu/newsletter/b...
Merz in Europa: (Etwas) Germany first
Präsentiert von Amazon Von GORDON REPINSKI Mit CARLOTTA DIEDERICH PRÄSENTIERT VON Schicken Sie uns Ihre Tipps hier, hier oder hier | X @GordonRepinski @vonderburchard @R_Buchsteiner | Das Playbook …
www.politico.eu
adicerimagic.bsky.social
It is no secret that 🇪🇺 Council president António #Costa wants accession talks to be decided by qualified majority rather than unanimity. Foremost to bypass 🇭🇺. Yet, as #POLITICOEurope reports this morning, several 🇪🇺 states – including 🇫🇷, 🇬🇷 and the 🇳🇱 – oppose this move.
adicerimagic.bsky.social
Holders of 🇧🇦 [and other Western Balkans] passports who plan to travel to Schengen countries from 12 October will no longer be able to cross the border as before.

For #Oslobođenje, on the changes this new European system will will bring.

oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/...
adicerimagic.bsky.social
However, in order to actually benefit from the Growth Plan funds, 🇧🇦 will have to implement reforms. Whether the reforms listed in the document, shrouded in secrecy, are sufficient will be determined by the European Commission and the member states.
adicerimagic.bsky.social
The most important consequence of adopting the revised Reform Agenda is that the 🇪🇺 could now stop cutting the total amount of money allocated to 🇧🇦.
Reposted by Adi Ćerimagić
newunionpost.bsky.social
#Bosnia adopted the Reform Agenda for the EU Growth Plan on 30 September, the very last day available to prevent another 10% from being lost. But "the country must now deliver reforms in order to unlock the funds," warns Senior Analyst @adicerimagic.bsky.social

newunionpost.eu/2025/10/01/b...
Bosnia will not lose any more EU Growth Plan funds—for now
With €100 million already wasted, the Bosnian Council of Ministers adopted the Reform Agenda on the very last day to prevent a further 10% loss
newunionpost.eu
adicerimagic.bsky.social
What does this mean for the future role of the #OHR and the Bonn Powers? And what else—or instead—should be pursued in the coming period?
adicerimagic.bsky.social
This also raises a larger question for the international community: was the decision to shift responsibility for defending the so-called Bonn Powers onto 🇧🇦’s judiciary and local institutions worth the effort?