@apeironph.bsky.social
19/ The mind-body problem is not just about solving consciousness—it’s about challenging our deepest assumptions about reality.
Is the world purely physical?
Is consciousness an illusion?
Or is it a fundamental part of the universe?
Is the world purely physical?
Is consciousness an illusion?
Or is it a fundamental part of the universe?
November 24, 2024 at 11:25 AM
19/ The mind-body problem is not just about solving consciousness—it’s about challenging our deepest assumptions about reality.
Is the world purely physical?
Is consciousness an illusion?
Or is it a fundamental part of the universe?
Is the world purely physical?
Is consciousness an illusion?
Or is it a fundamental part of the universe?
18/ Anomalous monism raises important questions about the causal role of consciousness:
Is consciousness just along for the ride, with no real impact on the world?
Or is it integral to understanding human behavior?
These are questions any theory of mind must confront.
Is consciousness just along for the ride, with no real impact on the world?
Or is it integral to understanding human behavior?
These are questions any theory of mind must confront.
November 24, 2024 at 11:25 AM
18/ Anomalous monism raises important questions about the causal role of consciousness:
Is consciousness just along for the ride, with no real impact on the world?
Or is it integral to understanding human behavior?
These are questions any theory of mind must confront.
Is consciousness just along for the ride, with no real impact on the world?
Or is it integral to understanding human behavior?
These are questions any theory of mind must confront.
17/ Anomalous monism’s reliance on epiphenomenalism:
If mental properties don’t have causal power, what role do they play?
Does this position explain consciousness, or does it sidestep the issue by labeling it "anomalous"?
If mental properties don’t have causal power, what role do they play?
Does this position explain consciousness, or does it sidestep the issue by labeling it "anomalous"?
November 24, 2024 at 11:25 AM
17/ Anomalous monism’s reliance on epiphenomenalism:
If mental properties don’t have causal power, what role do they play?
Does this position explain consciousness, or does it sidestep the issue by labeling it "anomalous"?
If mental properties don’t have causal power, what role do they play?
Does this position explain consciousness, or does it sidestep the issue by labeling it "anomalous"?
16/ In anomalous monism:
Mental events are caused by physical events.
However, mental properties are not governed by strict physical laws.
This allows for a connection between mind and body without reducing one to the other.
Mental events are caused by physical events.
However, mental properties are not governed by strict physical laws.
This allows for a connection between mind and body without reducing one to the other.
November 24, 2024 at 11:25 AM
16/ In anomalous monism:
Mental events are caused by physical events.
However, mental properties are not governed by strict physical laws.
This allows for a connection between mind and body without reducing one to the other.
Mental events are caused by physical events.
However, mental properties are not governed by strict physical laws.
This allows for a connection between mind and body without reducing one to the other.
15/ Anomalous Monism, developed by Donald Davidson, is another intriguing perspective. It claims:
Mental states are identical to physical states but cannot be reduced to physical laws.
This makes it a non-reductive form of physicalism.
Mental states are identical to physical states but cannot be reduced to physical laws.
This makes it a non-reductive form of physicalism.
November 24, 2024 at 11:25 AM
15/ Anomalous Monism, developed by Donald Davidson, is another intriguing perspective. It claims:
Mental states are identical to physical states but cannot be reduced to physical laws.
This makes it a non-reductive form of physicalism.
Mental states are identical to physical states but cannot be reduced to physical laws.
This makes it a non-reductive form of physicalism.
14/ However, panpsychism highlights the limits of reductionism:
If we can’t explain consciousness in purely physical terms, perhaps we need to rethink our metaphysical assumptions.
Even if it’s not the final answer, panpsychism pushes the boundaries of the debate.
If we can’t explain consciousness in purely physical terms, perhaps we need to rethink our metaphysical assumptions.
Even if it’s not the final answer, panpsychism pushes the boundaries of the debate.
November 24, 2024 at 11:25 AM
14/ However, panpsychism highlights the limits of reductionism:
If we can’t explain consciousness in purely physical terms, perhaps we need to rethink our metaphysical assumptions.
Even if it’s not the final answer, panpsychism pushes the boundaries of the debate.
If we can’t explain consciousness in purely physical terms, perhaps we need to rethink our metaphysical assumptions.
Even if it’s not the final answer, panpsychism pushes the boundaries of the debate.
13/ Another issue is the combination problem:
If particles have "micro-consciousness," how do these combine to form the rich, unified consciousness we experience as humans?
Without a clear answer, panpsychism remains speculative.
If particles have "micro-consciousness," how do these combine to form the rich, unified consciousness we experience as humans?
Without a clear answer, panpsychism remains speculative.
November 24, 2024 at 11:25 AM
13/ Another issue is the combination problem:
If particles have "micro-consciousness," how do these combine to form the rich, unified consciousness we experience as humans?
Without a clear answer, panpsychism remains speculative.
If particles have "micro-consciousness," how do these combine to form the rich, unified consciousness we experience as humans?
Without a clear answer, panpsychism remains speculative.
12/ So in this respect our introspection gets the metaphysical picture exactly right? For some, this seems too trigger the incredulous gaze.
November 24, 2024 at 11:25 AM
12/ So in this respect our introspection gets the metaphysical picture exactly right? For some, this seems too trigger the incredulous gaze.
11/ My dissertation critiques panpsychism’s reliance on intuition:
Proponents often claim we must take consciousness as a "hard datum."
But this assumes our introspections about consciousness are reliable—a point illusionists challenge.
Proponents often claim we must take consciousness as a "hard datum."
But this assumes our introspections about consciousness are reliable—a point illusionists challenge.
November 24, 2024 at 11:25 AM
11/ My dissertation critiques panpsychism’s reliance on intuition:
Proponents often claim we must take consciousness as a "hard datum."
But this assumes our introspections about consciousness are reliable—a point illusionists challenge.
Proponents often claim we must take consciousness as a "hard datum."
But this assumes our introspections about consciousness are reliable—a point illusionists challenge.
10/ Advocates like Philip Goff argue that panpsychism bridges the gap between physical and mental properties:
If consciousness is fundamental, it’s no longer a mystery how it emerges from matter.
Instead, it’s a basic building block of the universe.
If consciousness is fundamental, it’s no longer a mystery how it emerges from matter.
Instead, it’s a basic building block of the universe.
November 24, 2024 at 11:25 AM
10/ Advocates like Philip Goff argue that panpsychism bridges the gap between physical and mental properties:
If consciousness is fundamental, it’s no longer a mystery how it emerges from matter.
Instead, it’s a basic building block of the universe.
If consciousness is fundamental, it’s no longer a mystery how it emerges from matter.
Instead, it’s a basic building block of the universe.
9/ Panpsychism and Consciousness
Panpsychism is a radical alternative to physicalism and dualism. It holds that:
Consciousness is a fundamental feature of reality, present even in the smallest particles.
In this view, everything—from atoms to humans—has some degree of consciousness.
Panpsychism is a radical alternative to physicalism and dualism. It holds that:
Consciousness is a fundamental feature of reality, present even in the smallest particles.
In this view, everything—from atoms to humans—has some degree of consciousness.
November 24, 2024 at 11:25 AM
9/ Panpsychism and Consciousness
Panpsychism is a radical alternative to physicalism and dualism. It holds that:
Consciousness is a fundamental feature of reality, present even in the smallest particles.
In this view, everything—from atoms to humans—has some degree of consciousness.
Panpsychism is a radical alternative to physicalism and dualism. It holds that:
Consciousness is a fundamental feature of reality, present even in the smallest particles.
In this view, everything—from atoms to humans—has some degree of consciousness.
8/
Realists often assume qualia are transparent—what we experience is what they are. But is this assumption justified?
Illusionists dismiss qualia but struggle to explain why they appear so vivid and undeniable.
Realists often assume qualia are transparent—what we experience is what they are. But is this assumption justified?
Illusionists dismiss qualia but struggle to explain why they appear so vivid and undeniable.
November 24, 2024 at 11:25 AM
8/
Realists often assume qualia are transparent—what we experience is what they are. But is this assumption justified?
Illusionists dismiss qualia but struggle to explain why they appear so vivid and undeniable.
Realists often assume qualia are transparent—what we experience is what they are. But is this assumption justified?
Illusionists dismiss qualia but struggle to explain why they appear so vivid and undeniable.
7/ For example:
Realists argue qualia are irreducible aspects of reality.
Illusionists deny their existence, claiming they’re misrepresentations of physical states.
Functionalists try to explain qualia in terms of computational roles.
No consensus has been reached.
Realists argue qualia are irreducible aspects of reality.
Illusionists deny their existence, claiming they’re misrepresentations of physical states.
Functionalists try to explain qualia in terms of computational roles.
No consensus has been reached.
November 24, 2024 at 11:25 AM
7/ For example:
Realists argue qualia are irreducible aspects of reality.
Illusionists deny their existence, claiming they’re misrepresentations of physical states.
Functionalists try to explain qualia in terms of computational roles.
No consensus has been reached.
Realists argue qualia are irreducible aspects of reality.
Illusionists deny their existence, claiming they’re misrepresentations of physical states.
Functionalists try to explain qualia in terms of computational roles.
No consensus has been reached.
6/ There’s a paradox in discussions of qualia:
They’re described as intrinsic, private, and ineffable, yet philosophers argue endlessly about what they are.
If qualia were so obvious, why is their nature so contested?
This paradox points to deeper conceptual issues.
They’re described as intrinsic, private, and ineffable, yet philosophers argue endlessly about what they are.
If qualia were so obvious, why is their nature so contested?
This paradox points to deeper conceptual issues.
November 24, 2024 at 11:25 AM
6/ There’s a paradox in discussions of qualia:
They’re described as intrinsic, private, and ineffable, yet philosophers argue endlessly about what they are.
If qualia were so obvious, why is their nature so contested?
This paradox points to deeper conceptual issues.
They’re described as intrinsic, private, and ineffable, yet philosophers argue endlessly about what they are.
If qualia were so obvious, why is their nature so contested?
This paradox points to deeper conceptual issues.
5/ The Challenge of Defining Qualia
A central issue in the philosophy of mind is defining qualia: the raw, subjective "what it is like" aspects of experience (e.g., the redness of red or the bitterness of coffee).
On the surface, qualia seem self-evident—but are they?
A central issue in the philosophy of mind is defining qualia: the raw, subjective "what it is like" aspects of experience (e.g., the redness of red or the bitterness of coffee).
On the surface, qualia seem self-evident—but are they?
November 24, 2024 at 11:25 AM
5/ The Challenge of Defining Qualia
A central issue in the philosophy of mind is defining qualia: the raw, subjective "what it is like" aspects of experience (e.g., the redness of red or the bitterness of coffee).
On the surface, qualia seem self-evident—but are they?
A central issue in the philosophy of mind is defining qualia: the raw, subjective "what it is like" aspects of experience (e.g., the redness of red or the bitterness of coffee).
On the surface, qualia seem self-evident—but are they?
4/ Mereological fallacy complicates the hard problem of consciousness:
By focusing exclusively on the brain, we risk ignoring the broader systemic, embodied, and environmental factors that contribute to mental states.
A holistic perspective is essential.
By focusing exclusively on the brain, we risk ignoring the broader systemic, embodied, and environmental factors that contribute to mental states.
A holistic perspective is essential.
November 24, 2024 at 11:25 AM
4/ Mereological fallacy complicates the hard problem of consciousness:
By focusing exclusively on the brain, we risk ignoring the broader systemic, embodied, and environmental factors that contribute to mental states.
A holistic perspective is essential.
By focusing exclusively on the brain, we risk ignoring the broader systemic, embodied, and environmental factors that contribute to mental states.
A holistic perspective is essential.
3/ Bennett and Hacker argue that:
It’s not brains that perceive, think, or feel—it’s people.
The brain is a necessary organ for thought, but it’s a mistake to equate the brain’s activity with the entirety of mental life.
This error creates confusion in how we understand consciousness.
It’s not brains that perceive, think, or feel—it’s people.
The brain is a necessary organ for thought, but it’s a mistake to equate the brain’s activity with the entirety of mental life.
This error creates confusion in how we understand consciousness.
November 24, 2024 at 11:25 AM
3/ Bennett and Hacker argue that:
It’s not brains that perceive, think, or feel—it’s people.
The brain is a necessary organ for thought, but it’s a mistake to equate the brain’s activity with the entirety of mental life.
This error creates confusion in how we understand consciousness.
It’s not brains that perceive, think, or feel—it’s people.
The brain is a necessary organ for thought, but it’s a mistake to equate the brain’s activity with the entirety of mental life.
This error creates confusion in how we understand consciousness.
2/ The Mereological Fallacy
The mereological fallacy occurs when we attribute the properties of a whole (like a person) to its parts (like the brain).
For example:
Saying "the brain thinks" or "the brain feels pain" assigns agency to an organ rather than to the person as a whole.
The mereological fallacy occurs when we attribute the properties of a whole (like a person) to its parts (like the brain).
For example:
Saying "the brain thinks" or "the brain feels pain" assigns agency to an organ rather than to the person as a whole.
November 24, 2024 at 11:25 AM
2/ The Mereological Fallacy
The mereological fallacy occurs when we attribute the properties of a whole (like a person) to its parts (like the brain).
For example:
Saying "the brain thinks" or "the brain feels pain" assigns agency to an organ rather than to the person as a whole.
The mereological fallacy occurs when we attribute the properties of a whole (like a person) to its parts (like the brain).
For example:
Saying "the brain thinks" or "the brain feels pain" assigns agency to an organ rather than to the person as a whole.
23/ For illusionism to advance, it must confront this tension and offer a coherent explanation for:
Why consciousness appears the way it does.
How physical systems generate the illusion of phenomenality without invoking the reality of qualia.
Why consciousness appears the way it does.
How physical systems generate the illusion of phenomenality without invoking the reality of qualia.
November 24, 2024 at 11:15 AM
23/ For illusionism to advance, it must confront this tension and offer a coherent explanation for:
Why consciousness appears the way it does.
How physical systems generate the illusion of phenomenality without invoking the reality of qualia.
Why consciousness appears the way it does.
How physical systems generate the illusion of phenomenality without invoking the reality of qualia.
22/ The problem is this: Illusionists can only argue against consciousness by relying on the very concepts they aim to disprove.
This undermines their argument and reveals an unresolved tension in their framework.
This undermines their argument and reveals an unresolved tension in their framework.
November 24, 2024 at 11:15 AM
22/ The problem is this: Illusionists can only argue against consciousness by relying on the very concepts they aim to disprove.
This undermines their argument and reveals an unresolved tension in their framework.
This undermines their argument and reveals an unresolved tension in their framework.
21/ Illusionism is problematic:
To deny phenomenal consciousness, illusionists must first define it in terms they later reject. This risks either:
Circularity: Illusionists rely on what they aim to deny.
Dogmatism: They dismiss phenomenality without fully addressing its explanatory demands.
To deny phenomenal consciousness, illusionists must first define it in terms they later reject. This risks either:
Circularity: Illusionists rely on what they aim to deny.
Dogmatism: They dismiss phenomenality without fully addressing its explanatory demands.
November 24, 2024 at 11:15 AM
21/ Illusionism is problematic:
To deny phenomenal consciousness, illusionists must first define it in terms they later reject. This risks either:
Circularity: Illusionists rely on what they aim to deny.
Dogmatism: They dismiss phenomenality without fully addressing its explanatory demands.
To deny phenomenal consciousness, illusionists must first define it in terms they later reject. This risks either:
Circularity: Illusionists rely on what they aim to deny.
Dogmatism: They dismiss phenomenality without fully addressing its explanatory demands.
Part 6: Critiquing Illusionism
20/ Illusionism offers a radical way to resolve the problem:
It denies that phenomenal consciousness reality = appearance assumption.
Instead, what we think of as consciousness is a misrepresentation—a cognitive illusion created by introspection.
20/ Illusionism offers a radical way to resolve the problem:
It denies that phenomenal consciousness reality = appearance assumption.
Instead, what we think of as consciousness is a misrepresentation—a cognitive illusion created by introspection.
November 24, 2024 at 11:15 AM
Part 6: Critiquing Illusionism
20/ Illusionism offers a radical way to resolve the problem:
It denies that phenomenal consciousness reality = appearance assumption.
Instead, what we think of as consciousness is a misrepresentation—a cognitive illusion created by introspection.
20/ Illusionism offers a radical way to resolve the problem:
It denies that phenomenal consciousness reality = appearance assumption.
Instead, what we think of as consciousness is a misrepresentation—a cognitive illusion created by introspection.
19/ The cost of these assumptions is what I call a theoretical tax:
They make the problem harder than it might need to be.
If we uncritically accept these assumptions, we risk building theories on shaky foundations.
They make the problem harder than it might need to be.
If we uncritically accept these assumptions, we risk building theories on shaky foundations.
November 24, 2024 at 11:15 AM
19/ The cost of these assumptions is what I call a theoretical tax:
They make the problem harder than it might need to be.
If we uncritically accept these assumptions, we risk building theories on shaky foundations.
They make the problem harder than it might need to be.
If we uncritically accept these assumptions, we risk building theories on shaky foundations.
18/ For example, the appearance/reality distinction:
In most domains, we recognize a gap between how things appear and their deeper reality.
Yet, with consciousness, we often assume the two are identical. Why? This assumption shapes both the problem and our intuitions about its "difficulty."
In most domains, we recognize a gap between how things appear and their deeper reality.
Yet, with consciousness, we often assume the two are identical. Why? This assumption shapes both the problem and our intuitions about its "difficulty."
November 24, 2024 at 11:15 AM
18/ For example, the appearance/reality distinction:
In most domains, we recognize a gap between how things appear and their deeper reality.
Yet, with consciousness, we often assume the two are identical. Why? This assumption shapes both the problem and our intuitions about its "difficulty."
In most domains, we recognize a gap between how things appear and their deeper reality.
Yet, with consciousness, we often assume the two are identical. Why? This assumption shapes both the problem and our intuitions about its "difficulty."