The mild weather has led to ground conditions becoming soft. This greatly limits off-road traverse further complicating withdrawal.

The Ukrainians will likely attempt to delay the Russian advance with rearguard battles to secure a large scale withdrawal from the salient.
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The Russian advance on Wednesday and Thursday has likely denied the use of a Secondary Supply Route west of Kurilovka to the Ukrainians.

Meanwhile the Main Supply Route from Sumy to Sudzha is under Russian drone surveillance making traverse extremely dangerous.

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Currently the situation in the salient is extremely difficult. Ukrainian defense is currently being established around Kasachya Lochnaya and Sudzha.

Multiple bridges in the area have been destroyed, leaving some Ukrainian defenders with rivers behind their backs.

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Russian actions throughout the area of operations seem coordinated, further reinforcing the assessment that instead of reacting to a sudden Ukrainian withdrawal, the Russians have the initiative and are forcing the Ukrainians to react to their operations.

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According to Russian sources the Ukrainians had rotated some units out of the salient earlier. It's possible that the Ukrainians were preparing for larger withdrawals.

Recent Russian operations may have started as an pre-emptive attempt to disrupt any Ukrainian withdrawal.

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That's what we'll be elaborating on in the future!

Black Bird Group will be taking a further look at the North Korean attack tactics soon.

As always our activity is made possible by Jenni and Antti Wihurin Rahasto and their generous grant.

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Nevertheless the term "human waves" conjures up imagery of reckless, suicidal assaults. What we see in Kursk aligns more with light infantry doctrine. The losses? Heavy, yes. But that's expected when light infantry attacks prepared positions.

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The terrain also restricts infantry maneuver.

However, we see a lack of supporting fires and other fire-support elements. It's unclear why North Koreans don't seem to receive upper-echelon artillery support, although drones seem to be hunting their organic mortars.

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Why does this matter?

Reports of North Korean troops in Kursk often mention “human wave” tactics. This narrative oversimplifies what’s likely happening: They’re employing basic, scalable infantry drills. These are rooted in fire and movement, not mindless rushing.

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Although modern environment differs from the WW2 the infantry fundamentals haven't greatly changed.

Western forces have rarely had to fight in a near-peer environment post-WW2, and have almost always had the superiority of fires and other supporting elements.

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Succesful or unsuccesful, infantry assaults have usually led to high casualties.

Notable examples include Coles Charge at Carentan in 1944 and the Finnish assault at Äyräpää Church in 1940.

Also pictured: Warfare History Network on the Battle of Best, Holland, September 1944

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Light infantry doesn’t operate in isolation.

Success often depends on:
Support from higher-echelon weapons (artillery, mortars, drones).
Coordination with heavier forces (if available).

But when resources are limited, light infantry must rely solely on organic weapons.

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Frontal assaults :These are a last resort, risky and bloody but sometimes necessary if:

There’s no viable flanking route.
Terrain is open
Time is of the essence.

Light infantry attacking prepared positions will likely take heavy losses—it’s the nature of the fight.

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Movement in the attack

When advancing, infantry ideally uses cover and concealment to:
Avoid being seen.
Minimize casualties while closing the distance. Maneuver to the enemy's flank or weak point.

But the terrain and situation don't always allow this.

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