1/4 We acquired the concept of "alive" by observing and learning about instances of living beings around us. Our intuition (partly subconsciously) captured the commonalities of these instances. If a new instance is presented, we recognize it as alive based on whether it

My belief that I am the same.

4/4 then the difference is still there. But if you consider that our physical Universe could be also simulated, the difference disappears again. If we zoom out, there is no fact about the matter. It is a matter of convention, and both could work if applied consistently.

3/4 the difference between the training instances and this test instance. If you imagine yourself as being also part of the simulation, then there is no difference subjectively. But if you look objectively and being physically instantiated is part of your intuitive 'definition',

2/4 instantiates enough commonalities for recognition. A simulated being is tricky, because it clearly deviates in one respect from our training set. Whether we ignore this or not depends on our subjective intuition. Maybe there are ways of looking at the problem that eliminate

1/4 We acquired the concept of "alive" by observing and learning about instances of living beings around us. Our intuition (partly subconsciously) captured the commonalities of these instances. If a new instance is presented, we recognize it as alive based on whether it

I guess this is the recipe Musk follows with X: youtu.be/IBlNuZzwG4o?...

Philip's God is not omnipotent. God's C can be different than ours (e.g. timeless). Either God's C also requires structure (expected under pantheism, but Philip is panentheist) or not. If not, then structureless C is possible. Altough I am not sure why should we call it C, if it is that different.

I believe structure is needed even under panpsychism, but it should be 'underlied' by conscious bits that can be combined into macro-consciousnesses. And the properties of the macro-C depends on the structure of the bits. So, if Philip believes C is possible without structure, I am suprised.

4/4 As philosophers conceptualize a problem, they will refer to other concepts. Defining all concepts cannot be done without circularity. What is interesting is the whole structure of the conceptualization and the roles certain referred concepts play.

3/4 The meaning of a word and the concept it signifies is derived from the (multimodal) environments in which the word is employed. Everyone has seen that word in different environments, so even a single person shares competing meanings and different levels of vagueness for the concept(s) behind it.

2/4 We cannot expect these attempts to be coherent with each other. But they should be coherent in themselves and be informed by and coherent with empirical findings.

I cannot imagine consciousness without it having some kind of structure (including unconscious structures that support it) that changes over time. So, maybe God (or a kid working on his homework one universe up) needed to create a fine-tuned physical world in order to create consciousness.

2/2 Maybe other variables would allow life in wider range. Is the architecture of the world fine-tuned for the need for fine-tuning for life? But what does a narrow range even mean? Every range from an infinite continuum could be seen as narrow or wide, depending on how much we zoom in or out.

Intelligence is the ability to solve problems (given time and resources). If problems can be ordered by their complexity, then general intelligence can solve all problems below a certain threshold. It is either the theoretical maximum (can solve all problems) or the maximum possible by any human.

For me it means that microphysical entities have private properties, so when we report redness, it can be caused not only by organization + public properties (=illusionism, even if there are passive private properties), but can be caused also by causally active private properties via SE laws.

I try to understand what is the benefit in supposing that the entities are conscious. In this case the rule cannot be deduced (so strongly emergent), but still acts on public properties of the entities + their organization. I guess the answer is that SE laws can depend on private properties as well.

So I guess the strongly emergent laws supervene on objectively describable properties of the entities + their organization + their private (unobservable) properties. But those properties are not really private anymore, we can guess them based on the observed behaviour.

The additional macro-behaviour should 'move around' micro entities, changing the organization that originally activated the macro-behaviour. Kind of like a feedback-loop between micro and macro-levels. But is starts from the micro (by its organization enabling the process), is not it?