ChrisO_wiki
@chriso-wiki.bsky.social
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Independent military history author and researcher. If you find my writings interesting or useful, any tips are appreciated: http://ko-fi.com/chrisowiki
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chriso-wiki.bsky.social
18/ "• There is a pool of "here and now" measures: fixed contracts, protection of military specialisms, anti-drone training, material support, commander's responsibility – this does not require "miracles", but political will and managerial resources.
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
17/ "• One "illustrative" case can "zero out" [destroy] a recruitment campaign; for the current wave, the symbol is Puzik. Until there is a fair outcome, trust cannot be restored.
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
16/ "• Intra-system practices ("deception", "all-out assault", false reporting, failure of the "small sky") are the key barrier; this is an organizational, not a "PR" problem.
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
15/ "Conclusions:

• Money has ceased to be convertible into recruitment : without legal certainty, fairness and “meaning”, the increase in payments will not be transformed into contracts.
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
14/ "• Strategic alternative: recognition of the limits of volunteerism for the infantry and the choice of a recruitment model (if voluntary, then “fix it”, if not, openly change it).
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
13/ "• Communication and “common sacrifice”: direct conversation with society; demonstration of elite participation; formulation of clear goals.
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
12/ "• Personnel and institutional purges/control: the fight against corruption and false reporting; the promotion of “frontline” commanders; external control loops.
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
11/ "• Justice and “symbolic” cases: public and fair decisions on high-profile episodes (including “Puzik” [notorious commander who sent two UAV pilots to their deaths for reporting his drug-dealing activities]), witness protection.
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
10/ "• Command responsibility for losses: The fighter is a “valuable asset”; material and personnel liability for “excessive/avoidable” losses; retraining in the case of serious miscalculations.
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
9/ "• Provision and reduction of "cashback from personal salaries": communications, medical kits, UAVs, building materials - at the expense of the state; ending the "monopolisation of humanitarian aid".
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
8/ "• Reforming training with a focus on the "small sky" [low altitudes]: mass anti-drone training; integration of EW/SIGINT/"drone operators"; targeted fire/tactical training against UAVs.
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
7/ "• Guarantees of service in a specialism (VUS): protection of UAV/EW/communications operators and technicians from "dissolving" in assaults; securing positions when transferring mobilised personnel to a contract.
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
6/ "Constructive proposals:

• Transparent and fixed contracts: refusal of automatic renewal; option of smaller bonuses in exchange for a strictly fixed term; "honest" communication of conditions (regional cases, where the campaign was built in a humane manner).
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
5/ In this thread, Kartavykh gives what he calls a number of "constructive proposals" that the Russian authorities to take to improve recruitment. It's doubtful that any of this would happen, though, as it would require military structures and attitudes to change drastically:
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
4/ In the third instalment, Kartavykh analyses the themes and trends behind the comments, and draws a number of conclusions.
bsky.app/profile/did:...
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
1/ 'HELL NO WE WON'T GO', part 3: why many Russians don't want to go to war any more. ⬇️
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
3/ The second part highlights representative examples collated by Kartavykh into a number of categories.
bsky.app/profile/chri...
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
1/ 'HELL NO WE WON'T GO', part 2: why many Russians don't want to go to war any more. ⬇️
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
2/ Russian warblogger Alex Kartavykh received thousands of responses to his question of why his followers are "still not storming Pokrovsk". The first thread in this series summarises what respondents gave as their reasons for not joining the army:
bsky.app/profile/chri...
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
1/ Recruitment to fight in Ukraine is drying up to the rate of "a teaspoon a day," despite very generous salaries and bonuses, according to a Russian government official. Thousands of Russian Telegram users have responded to explain why they don't want to join the army. ⬇️
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
1/ 'HELL NO WE WON'T GO', part 4: what can be done to make going to war more attractive for increasingly sceptical Russians? ⬇️
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
21/ "[Respondents] propose direct conversation with citizens and a "shared burden" (participation of the children of the elite / leading by example).
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
20/ "6️⃣ A gap between the elite and the "deep people."

The authorities are not listening to the "grassroots"; there is a demand for direct conversation and a "shared burden."
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
19/ "5️⃣ Public markers of mistrust: the "Puzik" case [a commander who sent two UAV operators to their deaths as a punishment for reporting his drug dealing].

The lack of a fair resolution to high-profile episodes explains the failure of recruitment in the eyes of some audiences.
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
18/ "4️⃣ Financial motivation does not work without an idea and fairness.

"Life is more valuable," and without meaning and "common sacrifice," money does not convert into contracts. Money ≠ motivation to die.
chriso-wiki.bsky.social
17/ "3️⃣ Unacceptable conditions of employment: "assault is expendable."

"The average assault life expectancy is 12 days," the lack of sustainable superiority in the "lower sky," weak counter-drone defence, and errors due to false reporting are the key to refusal.