Christian Mott
LightNews LightNews
banner
cjmott.bsky.social
Christian Mott
@cjmott.bsky.social
960 followers 1.3K following 1.9K posts
Moral psychology & experimental jurisprudence. Interested in mental state attributions, risk, punishment, personal identity, criminal law & procedure, constitutional & statutory interpretation, statistics, etc., etc., etc. christianmott.com
Posts Replies Media Videos
cjmott.bsky.social
This reporting is quite disturbing. If it's true, it is easy to imagine how any strikes could spiral into a boots-on-the-ground invasion.
Text from the Dropsite article: In a recent interview, Dr. Foad Izadi, a professor at the University of Tehran, told Drop Site that in the past “a number of high-ranking military officials … made the decision to inform the United States when they were attacking the U.S. bases.” “The idea was basically trying to ride out the Trump administration, not to confront him in a serious manner, respond to him, but respond in a very limited style so they don’t start a huge war with the United States,” he said. “This was their decision. And they were killed in June,” during the 12-day bombing campaign unleashed against Iran by the U.S. and Israel. Izadi said that the new leadership of the military in Iran has determined that the previous policy failed to deter U.S. and Israeli aggression. “The number that I hear is the goal is to get at least 500 American soldiers. The casualties that they need to have if Iran is attacked again is at least 500,” Izadi said. “I think the Iranian government, the Iranian military has decided to respond quite harshly this time because you cannot have a country when that country is threatened to be attacked militarily every other week.”
January 30, 2026 at 9:38 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
There's also a statute that allows civil actions against any person for violations of rights secured by the federal constitution, "whether or not acting under color of law."

Could be a test case for the view that the FTCA exception for constitutional violations isn't limited to Bivens actions.
Text of sec. 4682 of the Maine Civil Rights Act: Interference with rights; private actions. A person whose exercise or enjoyment of the rights secured by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States or of the rights secured by the Constitution of Maine or the laws of the State has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, may institute and prosecute in that person's own name and on that person's own behalf a civil action for legal or equitable relief whenever any person, whether or not acting under color of law: A. Violates section 4684‑B; or [PL 2023, c. 287, §2 (NEW).] B. Intentionally interferes or attempts to intentionally interfere with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person of those secured rights by: (1) Physical force or violence against a person; (2) Damage or destruction of property or trespass on property; (3) Threatening physical force or violence against a person; (4) Threatening damage or destruction of property or trespass on property; or (5) Engaging in any conduct that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress or to fear death or bodily injury to that person or to a close relation. For purposes of this subparagraph, "close relation" and "emotional distress" have the same meanings as in Title 17‑A, section 210‑A, subsection 2, paragraph B and paragraph D, respectively.
January 27, 2026 at 3:58 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Would be interested to read some more reporting about this part of the declaration.
Paragraphs 15-17 of a declaration by an unnamed witness to the murder of Alex Pretti: 15. The video I recorded of what happened accurately depicts the events leading up to the agents shooting [Pretti] and several minutes afterwards. The video is attached as Exhibit I. 16. I have read the statement from DHS about what happened and it is wrong. The man did not approach the agents with a gun. He approached them with a camera. He was just trying to help a woman get up and they took him to the ground. 17. I feel afraid. Only hours have passed since they shot a man right in front [of] me and I don't feel like I can go home because I heard agents were looking for me. I don't know what the agents will do when they find me. I do know that they're not telling the truth about what happened. I've heard that other witnesses might have been arrested and taken to the Whipple Building.
January 25, 2026 at 1:19 AM
cjmott.bsky.social
Created the below in ggplot2, just using geom_line and geom_point, after reshaping long using pivot_longer, so each row is id on person#-stint#. Happy to send code if helpful.
Example graph
January 14, 2026 at 11:51 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Directly violates Epstein Files Transparency Act, Section 2(b).
Text of Epstein Files Transparency Act Section 2(b)-(c): (b) Prohibited Grounds for Withholding.— (1) No record shall be withheld, delayed, or redacted on the basis of embarrassment, reputational harm, or political sensitivity, including to any government official, public figure, or foreign dignitary. (c) Permitted Withholdings.— (1) The Attorney general may withhold or redact the segregable portions of records that— (A) contain personally identifiable information of victims or victims’ personal and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (B) depict or contain child sexual abuse materials (CSAM) as defined under 18 U.S.C. 2256 and prohibited under 18 U.S.C. 2252–2252A; (C) would jeopardize an active federal investigation or ongoing prosecution, provided that such withholding is narrowly tailored and temporary; (D) depict or contain images of death, physical abuse, or injury of any person; or (E) contain information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order. (2) All redactions must be accompanied by a written justification published in the Federal Register and submitted to Congress. (3) To the extent that any covered information would otherwise be redacted or withheld as classified information under this section, the Attorney General shall declassify that classified information to the maximum extent possible.
December 19, 2025 at 10:06 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Going back to 2017 in that data, here are some graphs. First is the number of 1Ls who identify as Black by school by year. In this data, there is a clear drop at two schools (Harvard and Georgetown) in 2024. Second is overall percentage of Black 1Ls at all 14 schools over this time frame.
Graph of number of Black 1Ls by school by year for 14 schools Prof. Kerr tabulated. There is a noticeable drop in the number at Harvard and Georgetown in 2024. Graph of the percentage of 1Ls who are Black at the 14 schools Prof. Kerr identified from 2017 to 2025. Shows an upward trend until 2023 then a sharp drop.
December 18, 2025 at 10:07 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Per this February 2020 NYT story on signed Trump memorabilia, Trump has two different signatures.
NYT Excerpt from February 2020 story: "Steve Grad, principal authenticator for Beckett, keeps a file of Mr. Trump’s signature going back to the 1980s for comparison. He said that Mr. Trump had two: one that resembles 'a seismogram reading after an earthquake,' and another that is more legible."
September 8, 2025 at 7:49 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Probably the guidance in the image, which appears at the linked BOP document at p. 51 of the pdf: www.bop.gov/policy/progs...

Maxwell's offenses of conviction fall into category (6), per this: www.bop.gov/policy/progs...

Maxwell is now in a Minimum security facility, which is lower than Low.
BOP guidance on Inmate Security Designation and Custody Classification, passage from p. 51. Sex Offender. A male or female inmate whose behavior in the current term of confinement or prior history includes one or more of the following elements will be housed in at least a Low security level institution, unless the PSF has been waived. A conviction is not required for application of this PSF if the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), or other official documentation, clearly indicates the following behavior occurred in the current term of confinement or prior criminal history. If the case was dismissed or nolle prosequi, application of this PSF cannot be entered.
August 6, 2025 at 2:30 AM
cjmott.bsky.social
Seems like JD Vance should have some words with John Roberts.
Passage from Rucho v. Common Cause, slip op. at 16: Partisan gerrymandering claims invariably sound in a desire for proportional representation. As Justice O’Connor put it, such claims are based on “a conviction that the greater the departure from proportionality, the more suspect an apportionment plan becomes.” Ibid. “Our cases, however, clearly foreclose any claim that the Constitution requires proportional representation or that legislatures in reapportioning must draw district lines to come as near as possible to allocating seats to the contending parties in proportion to what their anticipated statewide vote will be.” Id., at 130 (plurality opinion). See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 75–76 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require proportional representation as an imperative of political organization.”).
July 30, 2025 at 4:40 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Couldn't this fall into the the newly passed double jeopardy exception at CPL 40.51(4) or (5)? (Seems like it would depend on whether there's potential civil or criminal liability for anything Maxwell knows, which seems possible given the possibility of future statute of limitations extension laws.)
CPL 40.51 says that double jeopardy does not bar successive prosecution of someone federally convicted if that person was pardoned and 4. the president who granted such reprieve, pardon or other form of clemency to such person (a) was thereby aided in avoiding potential prosecution or conviction; (b) knowingly obtained a benefit from such offense; or (c) knowingly obtained a tangible, material benefit from or on behalf of such person; or 5. such person possessed or possesses information material to the determination of any criminal or civil investigation, enforcement action or prosecution of the president granting such reprieve, pardon or other form of clemency, or of one or more persons described in subdivision one, two or three of this section.
July 26, 2025 at 2:45 AM
cjmott.bsky.social
Take also this argument. SCOTUS only feels "forced" to resolve those "significant and difficult" questions of law on the shadow docket because it refuses to apply its normal stay factors to government stay petitions. If they did, they wouldn't always need to reach the merits.
Passage from pp. 20-21 of the majority opinion in Trump v. CASA: "When a district court issues a universal injunction, thereby halting the enforcement of federal policy the Government says that it has little recourse but to proceed to the court of appeals for an emergency stay. The loser int he court of appeals will then seek a stay from this Court. This process forces courts to resolve significant and difficult questions of law on a highly expedited basis and without full briefing." (citations omitted)
June 27, 2025 at 3:31 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
If what Matt says is true, it will just make people on the left want to make every union more like @uaw.org.
UAW Region 9A graphic reading: Fill out your ballot 1. Zohran Mamdani 2. Brad Lander 3. Zellnor Myrie 4. Adrienne Adams 5. Michael Blake and Don't rank Cuomo!
June 21, 2025 at 1:05 AM
cjmott.bsky.social
First, the court says the "through the governor" language could not require the governor's consent because another section of title 10 requires the governor's consent more explicitly. The problem? 10 USC 12301 was enacted in 1952. The "through to governor" language was enacted in 1908.
Section from p. 32 of the Ninth Circuit order in Newsom v. Trump: "First, the text of § 12406 does not give governors any veto power over the President’s federalization decision. The omission of an express consent requirement is telling, as Congress provided governors with veto power in another section of Title 10. See 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d) ('However, a member of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States may not be ordered to active duty under this subsection without the consent of the governor or other appropriate authority of the State concerned.' (emphasis added))."
June 20, 2025 at 3:34 AM
cjmott.bsky.social
The opinion ends with this puzzling paragraph, which appears to argue that religious discrimination falls outside Title VI entirely... and infers that the President must therefore have some unspecified other authority, outside Title VI, to withdraw funding from schools for religious discrimination.
Passage from AAUP v. DOJ, ECF 148 at 29-30. "[A]ll of Plaintiffs' arguments that Defendants violated the APA (and the separation of powers) by failing to comply with procedural requirements for cutting funding pursuant to Title VI simply presuppose that Title VI is the exclusive vehicle by which the Executive Branch may withdraw financial support for an institution that allows religious discrimination. "The Court urges Plaintiffs, and the amici who decry Defendants' alleged failure to follow Title VI to the letter, to review the text of that statute. Title VI does not mention religion. As such, it strikes the Court as unlikely that Title VI is the sole and exclusive 'legal tool[]' available to a President who instructs executive agencies to prioritize 'combat[ting] anti-Semitism . . . on university and college campuses.'" (citations omitted)
June 16, 2025 at 10:52 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Surprisingly, the injury-in-fact analysis is even worse.

This paragraph finds that all the grant terminations at Columbia can be fully covered by Columbia's endowment, private donations, and tuition payments, despite there being no evidence that's true and plenty of evidence to the contrary.
Passage from p. 24 of AAUP v. DOJ, ECF 148 at 24-25: "Turning to representational standing, Plaintiffs fail to establish that any injuries their members may have suffered are fairly traceable to Defendants. As noted above, the Court does find that some of Plaintiffs [sic] members used federal grants to Columbia for their academic work. The loss of professional opportunities or income may certainly constitute an injury in some cases. However, here, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that it makes a difference to their members whether the funding for their research and salaries comes from American taxpayers, non-party Columbia's multi-billion-dollar endowment, the largess of Columbia's donors, or the eye-popping tuition bills paid by Columbia students, including the Jewish students who apparently paid for the privilege of being threatened with violence on their way to class." (citations omitted)
June 16, 2025 at 9:40 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Unfortunately, now I can't think about it without also thinking about Justice Gorsuch's considerably less elegant rewrite in 303 Creative.
Passage from Justice Gorsuch's opinion for the Court in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 21-476, slip op. at 7 (June 30, 2023): "For all these reasons '[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,' West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), it is the principle that the government may not interfere with 'an uninhibited marketplace of ideas,' McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014)."
June 14, 2025 at 7:02 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Instead, DOJ argues that its position follows from the plain meaning of "though." DOJ also makes a policy argument: It would have been bad if 10 USC 12406 allowed a governor to veto a President's order because then Governor Faubus could have vetoed President Eisenhower's order during Little Rock.
Passage from p. 18 of DOJ's filing. In short, Section 12406 affords no veto to Governor Newsom over the President's decision to call forth the guard, just as it afforded no veto to Governor Faubus when President Eisenhower last invoked the predecessor to Section 12406 to ensure that the enforcement of federal law was not obstructed.
June 11, 2025 at 7:07 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
In 1911, the Army Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Wood, made the same point, arguing that the 1903 and 1908 Militia Acts had restricted the President's power over the militia (which he thought was bad).

There may be arguments why this historical interpretation was wrong; DOJ doesn't offer any.
Excerpt from a hearing transcript of the Committee on Militia, House of Representatives, February 9, 1911, pp. 12-13. Mr. LLOYD. What do you think of the constitutional authority of Congress passing a law allowing the War Department to call these men in the service directly from the militia without the authority of the governor of the State, without calling on the governor of the State first? Gen. WOOD. The President will call on the governor for troops, but in case the governor fails to respond he can then call upon the troops themselves. They must come. They can not evade the call on the ground that it has not come through the governor of the State, or on any other ground. The present militia law, known as the "Dick law," provides that the militia can only be called by a call issued through the governor of the State. This seems to be a dangerous limitation of the powers of the Chief Executive, and might lead to embarrassment. The old militia law was better: The President could call every man of arms-bearing age; he could call everybody who was sound and within the age limit, who was not exempted by law. The CHAIRMAN. Without reference to what the governor would do? Gen. WOOD. Yes. Mr. LLOYD. He did not call you as a militiaman, though did he? Gen. WOOD. He was called as part of the militia. Capt. HAGOOD. Yes: He had the right to call everybody directly up to the time of the Dick law in 1903. Up to that time there was no provision as to calling the governor: it was only a matter of courtesy that that was done. Gen. WOOD. We now have no direct way of reaching the men, and the present conditions would lead to confusion. We know that in New England and other States farther south, on account of wars bearing unpopular, governors have not always responded when calls were made by the President.... Excerpt from the Congressional Record, February 28, 1911, p. 3701. Passage from a memorandum submitted by Maj. Gen. Wood, the Chief of Staff of the Army. "The militia organized under the old laws and the National Guard of today, however, are very different; so different, in fact, that it may not be considered altogether fair to class them together. But the improvement goes only so far as the defects in the old laws have been remedied, and the two are identically the same so far as the defects in the old laws have not been remedied. "The principal defects in the old militia laws were as follows: "1. Divided responsibility between the Federal Government and the States: Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas have, through their governors, refused to turn out the militia when called upon by the President to do so. Other States have greatly interfered with the Federal Government in its use of militia either by raising objections and obstacles or by forcing the service of troops not desired. "The modern existing law instead of remedying this defect has intensified it. The old law did not require the President to consult the governors with reference to turning out the militia. He could issue the call direct. As a matter of courtesy, the call was made through the governors. But now it is required by law. There is no way for the Federal Government to coerce the governors, and if any governor should refuse or fail to transmit it to the militia of his State it is easy to see that the whole matter could be thrown into confusion...."
June 11, 2025 at 7:07 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
During the House debate over the 1908 Militia Act, an opponent of the bill, Rep. Parker, argued against the bill, in part, on the grounds that the "through the governor" language *would* give the governor a veto over a presidential order to a state militia.
Excerpt from the May 25, 1908 Congressional Record, p. 6942: Part of a statement from Representative Parker, of New Jersey: "Now, Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Committee on the Militia years ago we refused to bring up that law for revision for fear that by some mistake or amendment this power should be taken away from the President. "This bill, strange to say, without intending to do so, does take away that power; for in the first section, after saying that all males of a certain age belong to the militia, the bill divides them into two classes, the organized militia and the reserve militia, and with a proviso that the provisions of this act shall apply only to the militia organized as a land force. As a result the subsequent section 4, in which the authority for calling out the militia is reenacted, only applies to the organized militia, and the power of the President over every able-bodied citizen is taken away by this act. I consider that to be a matter that goes back to all questions of finance. "The old law of 1795 gave the President direct authority over every citizen of this land, and in this bill, in the section which provides that in case of rebellion or invasion, or threatened invasion, the President may issue a call, it is not provided that he may call out every able-bodied man, through their officers, but it provides that he may issue his orders for that purpose through the governor of the respective State or Territory, or through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which State, Territory, or District such troops may be called, to such officers of the militia as he may deem proper. Why, we remember a time, at the beginning of the civil war, when some of the governors did not desire to have the militia called out, but we got our militia from West Virginia, and eastern Tennessee and Kentucky by the orders of the President direct."
June 11, 2025 at 7:07 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
10 USC 12406 is a recodification of 10 USC secs. 3500 (Army NG) and 8500 (Air NG), which were themselves codifications of the 1903 Militia Act (the "Dick Act"), as amended by the 1908 Militia Act. The 1908 Militia Act added the "through the governor" language to this statute.
1908 Militia Act text from 35 Stat. 400: "Sec. 3. That section four of said Act as amended be, and the same is hereby amended and reenacted so as to read as follows: 'Sec. 4. That whenever the United States is invaded or in danger of invasion from any foreign nation, or of rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States, or the President is unable with the regular forces at his command to execute the laws of the Union, it shall be lawful for the President to call forth such number of the militia of the State or of the States or Territories or of the District of Columbia as he may deem necessary to repel such invasion, suppress such rebellion, or to enable him to execute such laws, and to issue his orders for that purpose, through the governor of the respective State or Territory, or through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which State, Territory, or District such troops may be called, to such officers of the militia as he may think proper."
June 11, 2025 at 7:07 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
DOJ has filed its opposition to Newsom's motion for a TRO in the National Guard case. They argue that the "through the governor" language in 10 USC 12406 does not allow the governor to veto a President's order to a state NG.

Historical evidence about the law's original meaning trends the other way.
Passage from p. 17 of DOJ's opposition to the motion for a TRO in Newsom v. Trump. 3. Section 12406 does not require a governor's consent or input. Defendants also acted lawfully in the processes they used to federalize Guardsmen. Section 12406's first sentence establishes the President's unilateral authority to federalize Guardsmen. Again, it reads: "[T]he President may call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State . . . ." The next sentence adds that "[o]rders for these purposes shall be issued through the governors of the States." 10 U.S.C. sec. 12406. The statute is thus clear that the orders are issued by the President, and they are conveyed through State officials. Nothing in the statute entitles a Governor to veto or impede a valid presidential order.
June 11, 2025 at 7:07 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Maj. Gen. Wood submitted a memo, in connection with debate over a 1911 bill, that made similar points about his understanding of the role of the governor under the Dick law (that is, the 1903 Militia Act as amended by the 1908 Militia Act).

Suggests the governor's role is not merely "ministerial."
Excerpt from the Congressional Record, February 28, 1911, p. 3701. Passage from a memorandum submitted by Maj. Gen. Dick, the Chief of Staff of the Army. "The militia organized under the old laws and the National Guard of today, however, are very different; so different, in fact, that it may not be considered altogether fair to class them together. But the improvement goes only so far as the defects in the old laws have been remedied, and the two are identically the same so far as the defects in the old laws have not been remedied. "The principal defects in the old militia laws were as follows: "1. Divided responsibility between the Federal Government and the States: Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas have, through their governors, refused to turn out the militia when called upon by the President to do so. Other States have greatly interfered with the Federal Government in its use of militia either by raising objections and obstacles or by forcing hte service of troops not desired. "The modern existing law instead of remedying this defect has intensified it. The old law did not require the President to consult the governors with reference to turning out the militia. He could issue the call direct. As a matter of courtesy, the call was made through the governors. But now it is required by law. There is no way for the Federal Government to coerce the governors, and if any governor should refuse or fail to transmit it to the militia of his State it is easy to see that the whole matter could be thrown into confusion...."
June 11, 2025 at 3:57 AM
cjmott.bsky.social
Here's some interesting subsequent history, from a 1911 hearing by the House Committee on Militia, in which Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, at the time the Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed with the interpretation that the 1908 Act required the cooperation of the governor to call up the militia.
Excerpt from a hearing transcript of the Committee on Militia, House of Representatives, February 9, 1911, pp. 12-13. Mr. LLOYD. What do you think of the constitutional authority of Congress passing a law allowing the War Department to call these men in the service directly from the militia without the authority of the governor of the State, without calling on the governor of the State first? Gen. WOOD. The President will call on the governor for troops, but in case the governor fails to respond he can then call upon the troops themselves. They must come. They can not evade the call on the ground that it has not come through the governor of the State, or on any other ground. The present militia law, known as the "Dick law," provides that the militia can only be called by a call issued through the governor of the State. This seems to be a dangerous limitation of the powers of the Chief Executive, and might lead to embarrassment. The old militia law was better: The President could call every man of arms-bearing age; he could call everybody who was sound and within the age limit, who was not exempted by law. The CHAIRMAN. Without reference to what the governor would do? Gen. WOOD. Yes. Mr. LLOYD. He did not call you as a militiaman, though did he? Gen. WOOD. He was called as part of the militia. Capt. HAGOOD. Yes: He had the right to call everybody directly up to the time of the Dick law in 1903. Up to that time there was no provision as to calling the governor: it was only a matter of courtesy that that was done. Gen. WOOD. We now have no direct way of reaching the men, and the present conditions would lead to confusion. We know that in New England and other States farther south, on account of wars bearing unpopular, governors have not always responded when calls were made by the President.... Excerpt from a hearing transcript of the Committee on Militia, House of Representatives, February 9, 1911, p. 14. Mr. LLOYD. That is the point I make, that the militia must be called through the governor. Therefore, I question the propriety of putting in this law that the War Department may call them independent of the governor. Capt. HAGOOD. The old act of 1795, which stood through all the intermediate wars, which authorized the President to make the call direct to any officer or enlisted man of the militia, was specifically repealed by the Dick law, and it was prescribed the call must be made through the governor. During the War of 1812, during the Mexican War, and during the Civil War the call could be made direct, and where the governors of some States--for instance, Pennsylvania--refused to issue the call, the question was brought up and went through the courts. The members of the militia of the State of Pennsylvania were court-martialed, and it was held by the courts that they could be court-martialed. But the Dick law has repealed that and makes it go through the governor.
June 11, 2025 at 3:29 AM
cjmott.bsky.social
One person (after Rep. Parker) who read this statute to require that presidential orders to a state NG go via the governor, who could veto, is Sen. Herman Talmadge, who in 1958 relied on this understanding to argue that this statute could not have allowed Eisenhower's use of the NG in Little Rock.
Excerpt from the Congressional Record, August 18, 1958, p. 18230: "Even in cases where the President is within his authority to call forth the militia to enforce the 'laws of the United States,' the law expressly provides that orders federalizing National Guard units 'shall be issued through the governors of the States.' "This is made plain in section 3500 of title 10 of the United States Code [the prior codification of 10 USC 12406], from which I quote: [Quoting the language of 10 USC 3500, which is materially identical to 10 USC 12406]. "None of the three conditions set forth in this section was met in the Little Rock case. There was no danger of invasion, there was no rebellion or danger of rebellion." Excerpt from the Congressional Record, August 18, 1958, p. 18231: "There was no pretense that the President was unable to execute the laws of the United States 'with the regular forces' of the Nation. "And even those factors to the contrary notwithstanding, the orders bringing the National Guard of Arkansas into Federal service wer enot issued through the Governor of that State as is required by code section 3500 above stated. "The President not only violated the provisions o that statute by his failure or refusal to act through the Governor of the State but he also violated another act of Congress which forbids the use of the Armed Forces as a posse comitatus."
June 9, 2025 at 2:14 PM
cjmott.bsky.social
Though one of the bill's opponents, Mr. Parker, opposed it on the grounds it was taking away the President's power to command the militia directly. He assumed this new law would require the cooperation of a state's governor.
Excerpt from the May 25, 1908 Congressional Record, p. 6942: Part of a statement from Representative Parker, of New Jersey: "Now, Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Committee on the Militia years ago we refused to bring up that law for revision for fear that by some mistake or amendment this power should be taken away from the President. "This bill, strange to say, without intending to do so, does take away that power; for in the first section, after saying that all males of a certain age belong to the militia, the bill divides them into two classes, the organized militia and the reserve militia, and with a proviso that the provisions of this act shall apply only to the militia organized as a land force. As a result the subsequent section 4, in which the authority for calling out the militia is reenacted, only applies to the organized militia, and the power of the President over every able-bodied citizen is taken away by this act. I consider that to be a matter that goes back to all questions of finance. "The old law of 1795 gave the President direct authority over every citizen of this land, and in this bill, in the section which provides that in case of rebellion or invasion, or threatened invasion, the President may issue a call, it is not provided that he may call out every able-bodied man, through their officers, but it provides that he may issue his orders for that purpose through the governor of the respective State or Territory, or through the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, from which State, Territory, or District such troops may be called, to such officers of the militia as he may deem proper. Why, we remember a time, at the beginning of the civil war, when some of the governors did not desire to have the militia called out, but we got our militia from West Virginia, and eastern Tennessee and Kentucky by the orders of the President direct."
June 8, 2025 at 9:29 PM