Trump won’t teach the public why Trumpism is bad; that’s your job, and YouTube victory laps aren’t that job.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=KMpQ...

많은 유권자들이 빡쳤죠. 네, 그건 사실일 겁니다. 근데 그건 트럼프의 실패에게 빡친 거지 트럼피즘의 악덕이나 오류에 빡친 게 아닐거라는 건 좀 보셔야죠?

그걸 자각시키는 건 트럼프가 해주지 않을 거기 때문에 님들이 지금 해야 하는 일이고 당장 시작해야하는 작업이거든요? Senate 과반이 파란색일 거라는 예측에 흥분하는 유튜브 올리는 건 적어도 그 작업에 해당하지 않을 거.

The open question isn’t whether there is an argument about what should happen. The open question is whether the people who can make things happen will be forced to live inside that argument—or whether they will simply route around it. (9/9)

They’re precisely the kind of exception people invoke as a requirement—and precisely the kind of exception that tends not to arrive on schedule. An extraordinary intervention of civic will or institutional backbone that defies the current momentum. (8/n)

If we want the 21st century to prove itself different, we need an unusually concrete, unusually “special” result: not just outrage, but durable constraints; not just mobilization, but enforceable accountability; not just symbolic condemnation, but institutional outcomes that change incentives. (7/n)

Moral language becomes a form of witness, not a form of control. It describes what is being violated; it rarely prevents the violation. <break> (6/n)

When the actor with sufficient power decides to define the rules by force of initiative, did that moral chorus actually bite? Unfortunately, the answer was mostly no at least historically. Korean(A minor power) emissary to the Hague, was not even allowed to enter the place. (5/n)

If an actor has the power to redefine the rules of the game simply because they possess the means of enforcement, then "ought" becomes an empty concept. In other worlds, “ought” is loud but structurally weak in this game. “Could” is quiet but decisive on the other hand. (4/n)

The logic currently driving U.S. domestic politics looks uncomfortably similar to the logic that drove early 20th-century great-power decision-making. During that era, the international order was defined not by what a state ought to do (norms and rules), but by what it could do (raw capacity). (3/n)

Or does coercive capacity simply redefine the boundaries of what is normal and permissible, and then dare the rest of society to catch up? I think I have a reference in the textbook of history. (2/n)

If the system needs that profile as a trigger for mass outrage, that should leave a bad taste in your mouth. It does in mine. (4/4)

A victim who is legible to the default American imaginary—white, male, professional, “respectable,” with cultural cues that cross partisan lines—works differently. It pierces through the compartmentalization. It recruits people who have trained themselves not to be recruitable. (3/n)

Pretti represented the demographic that the system is theoretically designed to protect. His death at the hands of federal agents created a cognitive dissonance that the administration's "domestic terrorist" narrative could not bridge. (2/n)