Chris
@csteinbach.bsky.social
The kind of questions experts are happy to answer are exactly those they disagree on among themselves
January 14, 2026 at 5:36 PM
The kind of questions experts are happy to answer are exactly those they disagree on among themselves
It's frustrating how easily we relinquish control of ideas to guilt by association.
January 5, 2026 at 11:15 PM
It's frustrating how easily we relinquish control of ideas to guilt by association.
Yeah, you would think two trans- movements that lean so heavily on bodily autonomy might see eye to eye.
January 5, 2026 at 10:37 PM
Yeah, you would think two trans- movements that lean so heavily on bodily autonomy might see eye to eye.
If Gillis wants compression to underwrite ontology, he owes a bridge principle, otherwise it’s methodological success dressed up as metaphysical entitlement. [22/22]
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
If Gillis wants compression to underwrite ontology, he owes a bridge principle, otherwise it’s methodological success dressed up as metaphysical entitlement. [22/22]
The modest lesson of Laudan’s induction is that even our best theories may be off the mark in ways we cannot currently see. To assume instead that one of them simply must be (nearly) correct in ontology is an article of faith, not an inevitable logical inference from scientific success. [21/22]
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
The modest lesson of Laudan’s induction is that even our best theories may be off the mark in ways we cannot currently see. To assume instead that one of them simply must be (nearly) correct in ontology is an article of faith, not an inevitable logical inference from scientific success. [21/22]
The underdetermination problem was never a demand that every possible contrivance be taken seriously, but the sober historical point that that empirical fit typically fails to select a unique theory. Science repeatedly fails to even imagine serious rivals until later. [20/22]
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
The underdetermination problem was never a demand that every possible contrivance be taken seriously, but the sober historical point that that empirical fit typically fails to select a unique theory. Science repeatedly fails to even imagine serious rivals until later. [20/22]
The rhetorical upshot is: if you insist on keeping the field completely open, you forfeit the right even to provisional theory preference. You are effectively demanding an infinite bag to hold all candidates and infinite time to inspect them. Yet this move risks winning by caricature. [19/22]
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
The rhetorical upshot is: if you insist on keeping the field completely open, you forfeit the right even to provisional theory preference. You are effectively demanding an infinite bag to hold all candidates and infinite time to inspect them. Yet this move risks winning by caricature. [19/22]
He grants that infinitely many underlying structures can fit finite data, but insists this only holds if we are willing to let the complexity of the postulated structure go "to infinity very fast"; absent that indulgence, there are very few alternatives not “severely messy and convoluted.” [18/22]
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
He grants that infinitely many underlying structures can fit finite data, but insists this only holds if we are willing to let the complexity of the postulated structure go "to infinity very fast"; absent that indulgence, there are very few alternatives not “severely messy and convoluted.” [18/22]
But when he comes to underdetermination, he redescribes it as melodrama: if theory construction is “mere random grasping” in an infinite space of possible underlying structures, one can always imagine “far better theories lurking, like a lovecraftian god, far beyond our capacity to grasp.” [17/22]
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
But when he comes to underdetermination, he redescribes it as melodrama: if theory construction is “mere random grasping” in an infinite space of possible underlying structures, one can always imagine “far better theories lurking, like a lovecraftian god, far beyond our capacity to grasp.” [17/22]
In more technical terms, success *underdetermines* metaphysics. In Gillis's narrative, the extraordinary compression achieved by physics is portrayed as fundamentally new—so qualitatively different from past successes that it warrants renewed realist confidence. [16/22]
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
In more technical terms, success *underdetermines* metaphysics. In Gillis's narrative, the extraordinary compression achieved by physics is portrayed as fundamentally new—so qualitatively different from past successes that it warrants renewed realist confidence. [16/22]
Gillis’s radical realism, however, tends to downplay these historical cautionary tales. The point of those episodes is not merely that scientists have been wrong before; it is that they have been spectacularly successful while being wrong. That is the worry realists must answer. [15/22]
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
Gillis’s radical realism, however, tends to downplay these historical cautionary tales. The point of those episodes is not merely that scientists have been wrong before; it is that they have been spectacularly successful while being wrong. That is the worry realists must answer. [15/22]
This forces a realist rethink: if we insist our current best theories must be (approximately) true, we must explain why our erstwhile best theories were not. [14/22]
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
This forces a realist rethink: if we insist our current best theories must be (approximately) true, we must explain why our erstwhile best theories were not. [14/22]
It risks trivializing the realist thesis, or making it untestable, since any embarrassing failure can be dismissed as premature science. Moreover, restricting realism to only physics means abandoning the original intent of explaining the success of science in general. [13/22]
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
It risks trivializing the realist thesis, or making it untestable, since any embarrassing failure can be dismissed as premature science. Moreover, restricting realism to only physics means abandoning the original intent of explaining the success of science in general. [13/22]
Some have grappled with this "pessimistic induction" by claiming realism only applies to mature or fundamental theories. Laudan anticipating this, points out its circularity. Labeling a science mature after the fact to exclude counterexamples is heads-I-win, tails-you-lose reasoning. [12/22]
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
Some have grappled with this "pessimistic induction" by claiming realism only applies to mature or fundamental theories. Laudan anticipating this, points out its circularity. Labeling a science mature after the fact to exclude counterexamples is heads-I-win, tails-you-lose reasoning. [12/22]
The key Laudan paper on this is worth reading in full: www.sfu.ca/~jillmc/Laud...
The point is that the link between scientific success and ontological truth is empirically unsupported. [11/22]
The point is that the link between scientific success and ontological truth is empirically unsupported. [11/22]
www.sfu.ca
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
The key Laudan paper on this is worth reading in full: www.sfu.ca/~jillmc/Laud...
The point is that the link between scientific success and ontological truth is empirically unsupported. [11/22]
The point is that the link between scientific success and ontological truth is empirically unsupported. [11/22]
Theories successful and well confirmed by empirical standards turned out to have central assumptions about the world that were wrong. As Laudan observes, anyone who thinks empirical success guarantees that a theory’s key terms genuinely refer has been reading a whiggish history of science. [10/22]
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
Theories successful and well confirmed by empirical standards turned out to have central assumptions about the world that were wrong. As Laudan observes, anyone who thinks empirical success guarantees that a theory’s key terms genuinely refer has been reading a whiggish history of science. [10/22]
Similarly, the Ptolemaic theory of planetary motion, with its epicycles, made accurate predictions of planetary positions for centuries, yet its cosmology was deeply mistaken. Laudan's list of success-turned-failure is long: the phlogiston theory of chemistry, the ether theories of light etc [9/22]
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
Similarly, the Ptolemaic theory of planetary motion, with its epicycles, made accurate predictions of planetary positions for centuries, yet its cosmology was deeply mistaken. Laudan's list of success-turned-failure is long: the phlogiston theory of chemistry, the ether theories of light etc [9/22]
Laudan noted many past theories enjoyed considerable empirical success yet were ultimately discarded. These undermine the realist assumption. For example, the caloric theory of heat explained a wide range of thermal phenomena, but it treated heat as a fluid, an ontology we now reject. [8/22]
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
Laudan noted many past theories enjoyed considerable empirical success yet were ultimately discarded. These undermine the realist assumption. For example, the caloric theory of heat explained a wide range of thermal phenomena, but it treated heat as a fluid, an ontology we now reject. [8/22]
Gillis’s inference from scientific success to metaphysical truth is unreliable and insufficient, even when we grant the considerable achievements of modern science.
One of the strongest challenges to the notion that scientific success implies truth comes from the philosopher Larry Laudan. [7/22]
One of the strongest challenges to the notion that scientific success implies truth comes from the philosopher Larry Laudan. [7/22]
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
Gillis’s inference from scientific success to metaphysical truth is unreliable and insufficient, even when we grant the considerable achievements of modern science.
One of the strongest challenges to the notion that scientific success implies truth comes from the philosopher Larry Laudan. [7/22]
One of the strongest challenges to the notion that scientific success implies truth comes from the philosopher Larry Laudan. [7/22]
Put bluntly: a theory can be extraordinarily good at organising and forecasting experience without thereby earning carte blanche in metaphysics. History shows that science’s graveyard is littered with once-successful frameworks whose interpretations of what "must be there" did not survive. [6/22]
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
Put bluntly: a theory can be extraordinarily good at organising and forecasting experience without thereby earning carte blanche in metaphysics. History shows that science’s graveyard is littered with once-successful frameworks whose interpretations of what "must be there" did not survive. [6/22]
Gillis’s move is to let compression do that warranting: methodological power is asked to underwrite metaphysical license. I would argue that methodological power does not by itself confer the right to read off mind-independent ontology from a compression achievement. [5/22]
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
Gillis’s move is to let compression do that warranting: methodological power is asked to underwrite metaphysical license. I would argue that methodological power does not by itself confer the right to read off mind-independent ontology from a compression achievement. [5/22]
For my part, I agree that the success of science demands explanation, but challenge the leap from success to ontological entitlement. It's one thing to say external physical reality constrains our theorizing but quite another to treat compression as a warrant for metaphysical commitment. [4/22]
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
For my part, I agree that the success of science demands explanation, but challenge the leap from success to ontological entitlement. It's one thing to say external physical reality constrains our theorizing but quite another to treat compression as a warrant for metaphysical commitment. [4/22]
The book operates in two registers: inferential (success → truth) and disciplinary (realism as the only ‘adult’ posture). The former is a classic “No Miracles” argument for realism: it would be a miracle if a false theory predicted so well, so the best explanation is that the theory is true. [3/22]
January 5, 2026 at 9:58 PM
The book operates in two registers: inferential (success → truth) and disciplinary (realism as the only ‘adult’ posture). The former is a classic “No Miracles” argument for realism: it would be a miracle if a false theory predicted so well, so the best explanation is that the theory is true. [3/22]