Visiting Distinguished Fellow Daniel Byman in conversation with Dickey Center Director Victoria Holt about America's future role in the Middle East. Daniel B...

The globe is seeing the most significant spike in dissent since the Arab Spring all led by young people.

Left-wing terrorism is up; right-wing violence down. What's going on?

The White House is offering the Qataris an unusual pledge of NATO-like protection.

Emma talks with Michael Poznansky, a professor at the Naval War College.* Emma and Mike discuss how U.S. policy leaders can use lessons from the cold war in today’s strategic environment, how the rules-based order might provide some guidance in the US-China strategic competition, and what future U.S. engagement in multilateral institutions going forward might look like.

The global health system is facing a looming crisis. By 2030, the world is projected to be short 11 million health workers. But this isn’t just a numbers problem. It’s […]

Emma and Jennifer Lind discuss prioritization, burden shifting, and how a strong progressive grand strategy can benefit the wider U.S. foreign policy debate.

Trade in War is an urgent, insightful study of a puzzling wartime phenomenon: states doing business with their enemies. Trade between belligerents during wartime should not occur. After all, exchanged...

Earlier this week, the Great Issues Scholars were introduced to the critical topics of Security and Peace Building by Ambassador Erica Barks Ruggles, Obenshain Family Distinguished Visitor and Diplomat in […]

Will the US-led technology control regime against China have a meaningful impact on the emerging great power competition? Supporters praise the effort’s targeted approach and optimistically see the case as a prime example of weaponized interdependence. But we identify three lessons from the Cold War “CoCom” technology control regime that show the problems and costs associated with the current US effort, particularly over the long haul: (1) The size of the export control regime expands over time, weakening enforcement and encouraging defection. (2) CoCom did not prevent the USSR from accessing key technologies. The current regime is similarly porous, and China is a more adept target. (3) CoCom had more favorable conditions for partner cooperation, yet was rife with tensions and jealousies that disrupted US alliances. Partner conflicts are likely to recur as controls expand and enforcement weakens. These findings have important implications for US economic security policy, US alliances, and arguments about weaponized interdependence.