Deep Democracy
@deepdemocracy.bsky.social
I cover POLITICS 🏛️, SCIENCE 🔬, SOCIETY 🌍, PSYCHOLOGY 🧠, and more
Dedicated to REAL RESEARCH 📚 and RIGOROUS THINKING 🤔
Biased but sincere in the PURSUIT OF TRUTH
#Politics #Science #Society #Psychology #Truth
Dedicated to REAL RESEARCH 📚 and RIGOROUS THINKING 🤔
Biased but sincere in the PURSUIT OF TRUTH
#Politics #Science #Society #Psychology #Truth
When possible leaders prefer to lessen the size of their coalition and increase the size of their selectorate. When possible those outside the coalition want to increase the coalition's size.
This is not only a descriptive but prescriptive it exains the people's interests.
This is not only a descriptive but prescriptive it exains the people's interests.
January 24, 2026 at 12:28 AM
When possible leaders prefer to lessen the size of their coalition and increase the size of their selectorate. When possible those outside the coalition want to increase the coalition's size.
This is not only a descriptive but prescriptive it exains the people's interests.
This is not only a descriptive but prescriptive it exains the people's interests.
Smaller coalitions tends to lead to corruption and kleptocracy
Smaller coalitions leads to foreign policies driven by enrichment rather than enforcing compliance the inverse is true for larger coalitions
Smaller coalitions leads to foreign policies driven by enrichment rather than enforcing compliance the inverse is true for larger coalitions
January 24, 2026 at 12:28 AM
Smaller coalitions tends to lead to corruption and kleptocracy
Smaller coalitions leads to foreign policies driven by enrichment rather than enforcing compliance the inverse is true for larger coalitions
Smaller coalitions leads to foreign policies driven by enrichment rather than enforcing compliance the inverse is true for larger coalitions
Larger in W/S small systems like military dictatorships.
Selectorate Theories Most Import Principles
Larger coalition systems produce better polices
Smaller coalitions tolerate failed policies more
Leaders with smaller coalitions and larger selectorates have more excess money than the inverses.
Selectorate Theories Most Import Principles
Larger coalition systems produce better polices
Smaller coalitions tolerate failed policies more
Leaders with smaller coalitions and larger selectorates have more excess money than the inverses.
January 24, 2026 at 12:28 AM
Larger in W/S small systems like military dictatorships.
Selectorate Theories Most Import Principles
Larger coalition systems produce better polices
Smaller coalitions tolerate failed policies more
Leaders with smaller coalitions and larger selectorates have more excess money than the inverses.
Selectorate Theories Most Import Principles
Larger coalition systems produce better polices
Smaller coalitions tolerate failed policies more
Leaders with smaller coalitions and larger selectorates have more excess money than the inverses.
because the rewards are provided to nonmembers.
Leader Survival
Leaders will spend the minimum that is required to maintain their winning coalition because surplus funds will further their aim of maintaining power. The surplus is typically smaller in large W/S systems e.g. democracies
Leader Survival
Leaders will spend the minimum that is required to maintain their winning coalition because surplus funds will further their aim of maintaining power. The surplus is typically smaller in large W/S systems e.g. democracies
January 24, 2026 at 12:28 AM
because the rewards are provided to nonmembers.
Leader Survival
Leaders will spend the minimum that is required to maintain their winning coalition because surplus funds will further their aim of maintaining power. The surplus is typically smaller in large W/S systems e.g. democracies
Leader Survival
Leaders will spend the minimum that is required to maintain their winning coalition because surplus funds will further their aim of maintaining power. The surplus is typically smaller in large W/S systems e.g. democracies
The loyalty Norm (W/S) and Conventional Regime Types
Democracies tend to have larger winning coalitions, resulting in less strong private goods, and tend to provide benefits. In the form of public goods which completely remove the incentive to remain in the winning coalition.
Democracies tend to have larger winning coalitions, resulting in less strong private goods, and tend to provide benefits. In the form of public goods which completely remove the incentive to remain in the winning coalition.
January 24, 2026 at 12:28 AM
The loyalty Norm (W/S) and Conventional Regime Types
Democracies tend to have larger winning coalitions, resulting in less strong private goods, and tend to provide benefits. In the form of public goods which completely remove the incentive to remain in the winning coalition.
Democracies tend to have larger winning coalitions, resulting in less strong private goods, and tend to provide benefits. In the form of public goods which completely remove the incentive to remain in the winning coalition.
A larger selectorate means more choices about whom the challenger may choose as their winning coalition, and an incumbent cannot offer the same private benefits to their opposition coalition that their opposition can and maintain their own coalition.
January 24, 2026 at 12:28 AM
A larger selectorate means more choices about whom the challenger may choose as their winning coalition, and an incumbent cannot offer the same private benefits to their opposition coalition that their opposition can and maintain their own coalition.
The Value of Being Needed When W/S Is Small
If the winning coalition is smaller the reward for being in the in-group and cost for being in the out-group are both greater. thus increasing the loyalty of the winning coalition and thus that leaders incumbency advantage.
If the winning coalition is smaller the reward for being in the in-group and cost for being in the out-group are both greater. thus increasing the loyalty of the winning coalition and thus that leaders incumbency advantage.
January 24, 2026 at 12:28 AM
The Value of Being Needed When W/S Is Small
If the winning coalition is smaller the reward for being in the in-group and cost for being in the out-group are both greater. thus increasing the loyalty of the winning coalition and thus that leaders incumbency advantage.
If the winning coalition is smaller the reward for being in the in-group and cost for being in the out-group are both greater. thus increasing the loyalty of the winning coalition and thus that leaders incumbency advantage.
A larger selectorate means more choices about whom the challenger may choose as their winning coalition, and an incumbent cannot offer the same private benefits to their opposition coalition that their opposition can and maintain their own coalition.
January 24, 2026 at 12:28 AM
A larger selectorate means more choices about whom the challenger may choose as their winning coalition, and an incumbent cannot offer the same private benefits to their opposition coalition that their opposition can and maintain their own coalition.
Given this is true through algebra we can calculate either the private goods z = (R – pg)/W or the (R-Wz)/p= Public goods per person.
Given the former z = (R – pg)/W as W increases, the quantity of private goods decreases.
Given the former z = (R – pg)/W as W increases, the quantity of private goods decreases.
January 24, 2026 at 12:28 AM
Given this is true through algebra we can calculate either the private goods z = (R – pg)/W or the (R-Wz)/p= Public goods per person.
Given the former z = (R – pg)/W as W increases, the quantity of private goods decreases.
Given the former z = (R – pg)/W as W increases, the quantity of private goods decreases.
and a nation cannot exceed their budget of R then R ≥ pg + Wz or the total revenue must be equal to or exceed the total cost of the public good multiplied by the population plus the private good multiplied by the winning coalition.
January 24, 2026 at 12:28 AM
and a nation cannot exceed their budget of R then R ≥ pg + Wz or the total revenue must be equal to or exceed the total cost of the public good multiplied by the population plus the private good multiplied by the winning coalition.
is greatly affected by domestic political institutions. Monarchies and military dictatorships have both small selectorates and small winning coalitions. If Private goods=z Public goods=g Total Revenue=R the public=p and the winning coalition=W
January 24, 2026 at 12:28 AM
is greatly affected by domestic political institutions. Monarchies and military dictatorships have both small selectorates and small winning coalitions. If Private goods=z Public goods=g Total Revenue=R the public=p and the winning coalition=W
In Democracies private benefits are ineffective compared to public benefits. However, in autocracies the winning coalition is smaller therefore private benefits are more effective. Therefore, resource allocation or distribution, one of the Four Categories of International conflict and cooperation:
January 24, 2026 at 12:28 AM
In Democracies private benefits are ineffective compared to public benefits. However, in autocracies the winning coalition is smaller therefore private benefits are more effective. Therefore, resource allocation or distribution, one of the Four Categories of International conflict and cooperation:
Do not spend money on public goods if you require it to maintain the loyalty of your winning coalition through private goods.
All of the aforementioned rules related to the following:
Winning Coalition & Selectorate size
Tax rate
Public & and Private benefit spending
All of the aforementioned rules related to the following:
Winning Coalition & Selectorate size
Tax rate
Public & and Private benefit spending
January 24, 2026 at 12:28 AM
Do not spend money on public goods if you require it to maintain the loyalty of your winning coalition through private goods.
All of the aforementioned rules related to the following:
Winning Coalition & Selectorate size
Tax rate
Public & and Private benefit spending
All of the aforementioned rules related to the following:
Winning Coalition & Selectorate size
Tax rate
Public & and Private benefit spending
Draw you winning coalition from a big group
Tax as much as possible provided the population does not revolt or stop working
Provide the least amount necessary to maintain loyalty to your winning coalition
Tax as much as possible provided the population does not revolt or stop working
Provide the least amount necessary to maintain loyalty to your winning coalition
January 24, 2026 at 12:28 AM
Draw you winning coalition from a big group
Tax as much as possible provided the population does not revolt or stop working
Provide the least amount necessary to maintain loyalty to your winning coalition
Tax as much as possible provided the population does not revolt or stop working
Provide the least amount necessary to maintain loyalty to your winning coalition
Money that a leader does not require to maintain W’s support can be:
Spent
Saved
Invested
The more money a leader can invest in the aforementioned 3 the better off they are.
The five rules of Selectorate Theory leader survival:
Depend on as few key people as possible
Spent
Saved
Invested
The more money a leader can invest in the aforementioned 3 the better off they are.
The five rules of Selectorate Theory leader survival:
Depend on as few key people as possible
January 24, 2026 at 12:28 AM
Money that a leader does not require to maintain W’s support can be:
Spent
Saved
Invested
The more money a leader can invest in the aforementioned 3 the better off they are.
The five rules of Selectorate Theory leader survival:
Depend on as few key people as possible
Spent
Saved
Invested
The more money a leader can invest in the aforementioned 3 the better off they are.
The five rules of Selectorate Theory leader survival:
Depend on as few key people as possible
Leaders try to remain in power by giving W benefits of two kinds:
Private good: benefit certain groups generally W.
Public goods: Governmental policies and programs that all people benefit from.
Paid for by
Taxing labor
Natural resource wealth
Foreign economic assistance.
Private good: benefit certain groups generally W.
Public goods: Governmental policies and programs that all people benefit from.
Paid for by
Taxing labor
Natural resource wealth
Foreign economic assistance.
January 24, 2026 at 12:28 AM
Leaders try to remain in power by giving W benefits of two kinds:
Private good: benefit certain groups generally W.
Public goods: Governmental policies and programs that all people benefit from.
Paid for by
Taxing labor
Natural resource wealth
Foreign economic assistance.
Private good: benefit certain groups generally W.
Public goods: Governmental policies and programs that all people benefit from.
Paid for by
Taxing labor
Natural resource wealth
Foreign economic assistance.
In monarchies both W and S are small, resulting in weak loyalty to leaders because the odds of being in the successor’s winning coalition (the ratio W/S) is high. When W/S is small, as in a rigged like autocracy, then that makes it easy for leaders to survive in power.
January 24, 2026 at 12:28 AM
In monarchies both W and S are small, resulting in weak loyalty to leaders because the odds of being in the successor’s winning coalition (the ratio W/S) is high. When W/S is small, as in a rigged like autocracy, then that makes it easy for leaders to survive in power.
The selectorate (S) are those who affect the winning coalition (W). W is whose support is required for an incumbent to stay in office. If the winning coalition's size falls below W then the leader will be removed.
When W/S is large, as in democracies in which both W and S are relatively large.
When W/S is large, as in democracies in which both W and S are relatively large.
January 24, 2026 at 12:28 AM
The selectorate (S) are those who affect the winning coalition (W). W is whose support is required for an incumbent to stay in office. If the winning coalition's size falls below W then the leader will be removed.
When W/S is large, as in democracies in which both W and S are relatively large.
When W/S is large, as in democracies in which both W and S are relatively large.
🗣️🤝This discrepency between in-group out-group persuasion tactics exists amoung many policy issues and within different policial groups.
It is derived because everyone argues the point which is easiest to describe and support rather than their actual beliefs. 🏛️⚖️
#SecondAmendment #SocietalGood
It is derived because everyone argues the point which is easiest to describe and support rather than their actual beliefs. 🏛️⚖️
#SecondAmendment #SocietalGood
December 22, 2025 at 9:36 PM
🗣️🤝This discrepency between in-group out-group persuasion tactics exists amoung many policy issues and within different policial groups.
It is derived because everyone argues the point which is easiest to describe and support rather than their actual beliefs. 🏛️⚖️
#SecondAmendment #SocietalGood
It is derived because everyone argues the point which is easiest to describe and support rather than their actual beliefs. 🏛️⚖️
#SecondAmendment #SocietalGood
Therefore, attempts to persuade Conservatives by appealing to the common good is irrelavent just as arguing away the right to vote for most Democrats by appealing to sociatal wellbeing is ultimately irrelavent.
Because human beings have a foundational right to representation.
Because human beings have a foundational right to representation.
December 22, 2025 at 9:36 PM
Therefore, attempts to persuade Conservatives by appealing to the common good is irrelavent just as arguing away the right to vote for most Democrats by appealing to sociatal wellbeing is ultimately irrelavent.
Because human beings have a foundational right to representation.
Because human beings have a foundational right to representation.
Therefore, instead they appeal to the coomon good although it is not the foundation of their belief. This exsplains the disregard for the statistics surrounding gun rights. Conservatives who align with the aformentioned rational will search for any statisitcal justification, for preexisting beliefs.
December 22, 2025 at 9:36 PM
Therefore, instead they appeal to the coomon good although it is not the foundation of their belief. This exsplains the disregard for the statistics surrounding gun rights. Conservatives who align with the aformentioned rational will search for any statisitcal justification, for preexisting beliefs.