CSO collaboration: The EU is also pushing for collaboration with civil society to improve marking and detection methods. DRI’s recommendation: Establish a formal stakeholder group to make this collaboration more concrete.

Read more about the full contributions👉 bit.ly/4t7A47i

Standardised Compliance: Companies must create their own frameworks to explain how they mark AI content. DRI’s recommendation: Standardise reporting formats to avoid fragmentation and ensure accountability of said frameworks.

Public Detection Tools: The #EU wants companies to offer free tools for users and researchers to verify AI-generated content. DRI’s recommendation: Add safeguards (e.g. rate limiting, query logging) to prevent malicious actors from reverse-engineering these tools.

Marking and Labelling - Combining watermarks, metadata, & digital signatures to label AI-generated content. DRI’s recommendation: The Code should provide concrete examples of what makes these methods "robust" to avoid vague implementation.

At DRI we contributed with expert input to the 1st draft of the EU’s Code of Practice on Transparent #AI. Our goal? Ensuring the Code includes practical standards to make transparency work in real life. Here some of the Code’s new rules⤵️

Links to all articles!

Levitsky and Ziblatt's original article: www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/whe...

Michael's response: www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/wha...

The scholars' response to Michael: www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gua...

4️⃣ Finally, Michael stresses that international law does not make majority decision its defining element.

It is grounded in political participation through elections and in other forms.

3️⃣ Michael also criticises assessing every institution under the label of “majoritarian” or “counter-majoritarian”, because institutions can have many different functions.

This logic would make a Central Bank problematic.

This also affects how we assess second chambers.

Our director suggests that the democratic legitimacy of the Canadian Senate, appointed by the executive, is more questionable than that of the US Senate

2️⃣ Michael argues that the scholars overemphasise majorities expressed by ballots.

Democracies can legitimately integrate other concerns into institutional design, such as government stability or, in federal systems, equal representation of states.

Let’s look at the main points of controversy:

1️⃣ Levitsky & Ziblatt question systems of representation, such as first-past-the-post electoral systems or federal chambers, that are legitimate choices of democracies.

This is why, despite its importance, this ruling is not the last thing you’ll hear on the Polish rule of law crisis.

Read the full analysis by Jakub Jaraczewski and Laurent Pech at @verfassungsblog.de 👇

verfassungsblog.de/commission-v...

And implementation is yet another real challenge.

Poland’s rule-of-law restoration process is stalled, with the President blocking reform efforts. Future obstruction could even include refusing to swear in new judges, an unprecedented situation.

Another shortcoming: It's not clear how CJEU's findings regarding the defective appointment of the previous president of the Tribunal, Julia Przyłębska, would apply to the current president, Bogdan Święczkowski.

Instead, addressing the Polish Constitutional Court’s unlawful status from the get-go would have made it more clear that the body was being used to undermine EU law and the Polish Constitution.

This is a step in the right direction, but not the concluding chapter in the Polish rule of law saga, according to the experts.

Their core critique: the Court made a conceptual error by first engaging seriously with the Tribunal’s previous “rulings” before declaring the body itself illegitimate.

Hear the answer directly from our research coordinator @jakubjaraczewski.bsky.social ⤵️
www.youtube.com/watch?v=72kb...