Earlier this year, Alexander With and I wrote a chapter in an anthology about the Russian military following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. We focused on the maritime aspect, while colleagues from the Royal Danish Defence College and other Danish academic institutions contributed chapters on other topics. The book was released in Danish in the spring, and now it's available in English as well. The good news is that the English version is an ebook and completely free (unlike the Danish edition, which is in print and quite expensive). So if you're interested in reading it, you can download it right here. Best, Anders Russia at warEbook about the Russian military after the invasion of UkraineRussia at war.pdf16 MBdownload-circle

In this video, I discuss President Zelensky's announcement that attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure this winter will be met with similar attacks on the Russian power grid. This is interesting because it means that Ukraine is venturing into the area of military deterrence rather than just ongoing warfighting, and it indicates that the power balance may be shifting in Ukraine's favor. It may also explain why we haven't seen Ukraine's powerful Flamingo missiles in more extensive use since they were originally announced back in August. Watch the video here or read the transcript below. Best, Anders * * * ### _Transcript:_ For a while, there's been a focus on Ukraine's long-range strike capabilities, including their drones and long-range missiles, and how they've been using these to target Russia's war economy, particularly the oil production facilities. Recently, however, we've seen Ukraine start to leverage this capability in a different and in an interesting way that actually resembles what in military terms would be called deterrence by punishment. This is fascinating, not only in terms of what Ukraine is trying to achieve, but also in what it says about how Ukraine perceives its own strength and that they feel confident in the power that they now have. So let's talk about it. The development of Ukraine's long-range strike capabilities is one of the most fascinating advancements throughout the war, particularly in terms of military production and how it changes the dynamics of the conflict. This is not a type of capability that Ukraine had when the full-scale invasion began in 2022. Russia's had this ability to strike wherever they wanted on Ukrainian territory throughout the entire war. But Ukraine has only achieved that within the last year or two. And it's something that they've achieved because they recognized early on that this would be crucial for their long-term ability to end the war on favorable terms. They knew that this would be necessary to bring Russia to the negotiating table with a realistic mindset. So, they put in the necessary resources to make it happen. Over the summer here of 2025, it's really become clear that Ukraine now possesses this capability and that they have it in sufficient quantity to also really start putting pressure on Russia. So, we've seen Ukraine start to more systematically target Russia's war economy, especially by going after the fuel production facilities in Russia. So we've seen many repeated attacks on oil refineries in particular. But over the last couple of weeks, we've also seen another use of these long-range missiles that I think is interesting. It's especially tied to the development of the Flamingo missile, which was officially announced initially back in August, and it's attracted a lot of attention in the media. The Flamingo missile is a large cruise missile and it has a range of about 3,000 kilometers and it carries a warhead that is weighing about 1,000 kilograms. So it's a very big and powerful missile. In many ways, it could actually be compared to the American Tomahawk missile, which many people are probably familiar with. It has many similar characteristics. The Flamingo missile has been used in real life. We've seen a single strike with it that we know for sure involved the Flamingo missile, but there might also be others where it's been used where we're not quite sure that that's it. But in any case, it's safe to say that when it comes to actual combat use, the use of this missile has been limited. And that is interesting because at the same time, Ukraine claims that they are producing about 50 of these missiles per month and that they are ramping up production so that by January, they expect to reach about 200 Flamingo missiles every month. Now, it's been about two months since August. So, what are they actually doing with all these missiles? Where are they? With the very limited number of strikes we've seen, it's easy to get the idea that perhaps Ukraine is saving them for something. And then, last week, President Zelensky made an interesting announcement. He said that now that we are approaching winter, if Russia again, this winter, as they've done the last three winters, tries to target Ukraine's critical infrastructure, then Ukraine is going to do the same to Russia. So if Russia forces the lights in Kyiv to go out, then Ukraine is going to turn off the lights in Moscow. So he's indicating that there's going to be sort of an eye-for-an-eye approach when it comes to attacks on energy infrastructure this winter. Then, more or less the next day, Russia actually launched an attack on a Ukrainian power plant, and Ukraine responded immediately with an attack on a Russian power plant in the city of Belgorod. So, that disrupted the electricity for, I think, about 100,000 people. I'm not here going to go deep into the legal questions of what it means to target energy infrastructure. That's not actually something you're allowed to do. So, when Ukraine does it, that is against the conventions. But I think at the same time, it's really hard to judge the Ukrainians on this issue when you consider that they're up against an enemy that's been doing this for the last three years. And now it looks like they're going to do it for the fourth year in a row. So there just comes a point when enough is enough and you do what you can to try to make it stop. And then again, it also ties into the question of what is it actually that Ukraine is trying to achieve with this. Ukraine is not doing this because they want ordinary Russians to be without power or fresh water or sanitation or all the other things that you miss when you don't have electricity in a city. That's not the goal. It's not actually the goal to make ordinary Russians suffer. What Ukraine seems to be doing is to ensure that Russia does not target their energy infrastructure. And that means that we are now actually in the realm of deterrence rather than actual warfighting. What Ukraine is trying to create here is a deterrent effect, that the Russians will look at this and know that if they target specific things in Ukraine, then they will be hit with something else that they would rather avoid. And therefore, they're not going to do it. That's the idea. And this is, I think, fascinating. It's actually quite a power move from the Ukrainians to make this statement because it shows that they now feel that they have the power not only to be fighting Russia, but to also deter Russia from certain actions. They have the means necessary to inflict such significant pain on Russian society that they can start playing the deterrence game. Now, I don't think it's necessarily going to work, at least not in the short term. Putin is not really the kind of guy to be deterred by Ukraine. And the problem is also that this is a very important part of the Russian strategy for how they think they're going to win the war or how they can apply pressure on Ukrainian society over time so that the Ukrainians lose the determination to continue fighting. So, I think we're going to see Russia try to take out Ukraine's energy infrastructure also this year. And in fact, since those first attacks, we have seen Russian attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure. And it will be interesting to see how the Ukrainians react to this, whether they will actually put actions behind their words, and if they will start a significant campaign against Russian energy infrastructure as a kind of retaliation for the attacks that the Russians are doing on them. But I will say that I do think it looks like Ukraine is building up stockpiles of their most powerful long-range missiles for a campaign over the winter. It's quite possible that this is exactly what they have in mind, that these new flamingo missiles are not, in fact, at this point, intended for the ongoing campaign to target the Russian war economy and their oil refineries, but rather that this is intended for this task of deterrence by punishment over the winter. Recently, there's been some talk about whether Donald Trump would be willing to sell Ukraine some Tomahawk missiles. I think that's probably not going to happen. It doesn't look likely. But this is also a type of missile that would fit neatly into this deterrence by punishment task. Ukraine's problem is that they might not have the necessary quantity of missiles at this point to actually follow through on the threats that they're making, or at least not to do it sufficiently forcefully to actually influence Russian thinking. If we say that they have made 50 missiles per month since August, then at most they would have a couple of hundred by now. And that is perhaps not enough to sufficiently deter Russia from attempting a campaign against Ukrainian power plants and other energy infrastructure. I think Ukraine would like to supplement their own supplies with some Tomahawk missiles just to make sure they have enough. But in either case, it looks like Ukraine has some quite ambitious plans with the long-range capabilities that they have now and how they're going to use that, not just for targeting significant things in the Russian war economy, but also for military coercion. Ukraine is trying to force Russia to follow their demands from a position of military strength. So, I don't know if this is going to work or if it's actually going to prevent the Russians from attacking Ukraine's energy infrastructure. I'm also unsure if Ukraine has the necessary capability to respond in this eye-for-an-eye principle. However, I do think it's interesting that Ukraine is now in a position where they are starting to act more confidently and to rely on their military strength, not just to respond to Russian aggression, but to actually start setting the agenda. So, it raises some questions about the power relationship at this point and how the war is going to develop in the future. We're now about three and a half years into the war. What's it going to look like in a year's time? Are these the early signs that the balance is tipping more permanently? These are some of the interesting questions that I think arise when we see Zelensky making statements like that. And when we observe the kinds of capabilities, such as the Flamingo missile that Ukraine is now apparently stockpiling, it puts Ukraine in a position where they can leverage other tools in the military toolbox, such as military coercion and deterrent strategies. And finally, before I finish, I also just want to raise a question or briefly discuss that there is the question about how is the Russian civilian population going to react if Ukraine actually starts responding in kind to these attacks on civilian energy infrastructure. Russian attacks on Ukraine's power grid haven't really worked in the sense that they have not significantly weakened Ukrainian morale or determination to keep fighting. But would it work the other way around? I think a good argument could actually be made that the Russian population is probably less prepared for such attacks on their energy infrastructure and that they would be less resilient. So, it could potentially weaken popular support for the war inside of Russia. And that's probably a topic for a different video. I will definitely make that video if there is a big Ukrainian campaign against Russian power plants and it actually materializes. But at this point, I will just say that I think there would be a certain irony to it if it turns out that Russia's strategy of targeting energy infrastructure didn't have the desired effect of weakening morale in Ukraine, but that it actually did work the other way around in Russia when Ukraine responded. Okay, I will end it here. If you found the video helpful or informative, then please give it a like. And also remember to subscribe to the channel and you can click the bell icon, then you will get some notifications when I publish new videos. And if you want to support the channel, you can gain access to some bonus videos if you subscribe to my newsletter on www.logicofwar.com. Thank you very much for watching, and I will see you again next time.

Creator site for Anders Puck Nielsen

In this video, I reflect on the discussions about security guarantees for Ukraine and explain why they are still immature. It's good that there is now a focus on security guarantees rather than Ukraine needing to make territorial concessions. However, it is a significant mistake to view Ukrainian security as independent of broader questions about European security as a whole. Western Europe needs Ukraine as much as Ukraine needs Western Europe. This point was illustrated quite vividly with the Russian drones flying into Poland. Watch the video here or read the transcript below. Best, Anders. * * * ### _Transcript:_ The discussion about security guarantees for Ukraine has intensified. There is a lot of talk right now about what that's going to look like, who's going to contribute what, and what will be sufficient to deter Russia from starting another war in the future. And on the one hand, it's good because the question about security guarantees is very important for the possibility of ending this war. But at the same time, I think it's still also clear that the discussion is quite immature. So let's talk about it. There is a certain irony to the fact that to a large extent it was the meeting between Trump and Putin in Alaska that sparked the current discussion about security guarantees for Ukraine. After that meeting, Trump claimed that Putin had agreed to the West providing security guarantees after the termination of the war. Putin actually never said that, but because Trump kept on saying that Putin had said it, then everyone else started to work under the assumption that this was somehow a done deal. Since then, there have been many discussions, especially among the European NATO countries, about who can contribute to these security guarantees and when that might happen. There have been talks about how the West can provide soldiers on the ground, aircraft to patrol the skies, maritime missions in the Black Sea, or what other measures that can be put in place. It's also been discussed how the Ukrainian army can be equipped so that they will be well prepared for any future Russian aggression. And finally, there's also been a very important discussion about the role of the United States in all of this. and what Trump will be willing to provide in terms of support for this effort. So, on the one hand, this is good. For far too long, the discussions about how the war in Ukraine can end have focused on the wrong issues and have neglected this issue of security guarantees, which as I see it, is probably the most important aspect to discuss in the first place. Because until this Alaska summit, what most people talked about was the issue of territory and where the border should be after a peace settlement. But now it's a much more nuanced discussion and there seems to be a broader understanding that this issue of security guarantees needs to be on the table. I have for a very long time said that it's a mistake to assume that this is a war about territory. The war in Ukraine is not primarily a territorial war, it's a war of independence. So the central issue is the question of Ukrainian independence or Russian dominance over Ukraine in the future, and to assume that you could settle a war of independence by giving some territorial concessions, that's just an absolute misunderstanding of the dynamics of the war. It was a hopeless project and in that sense, I think it's good that we are now talking about security guarantees because it means that we've moved the discussion from viewing this as a war about territory to recognizing that it's a war about Ukrainian independence. But on the other hand, I also think it's evident that it's still a quite immature discussion that we have about these security guarantees. The problem is that the war in Ukraine is still seen in isolation from the broader issues of European security. It still frames the question as an isolated Ukrainian problem that is somehow compartmentalized or distinct from the challenges that are facing the rest of Europe. But having a discussion about Ukraine's security without addressing the broader issues of European security just seems detached from reality. Ukraine has security issues, but they're not alone. The question about how to distort Russia from aggression is something that many countries in Europe are currently grappling with. And I think it's very important that we don't fall into the trap of seeing these as separate issues. And that is, unfortunately, what still seems to be happening in the discussions about the coalition of the willing and how European countries can support Ukraine. What I mean by this is that Europe is basically in a situation where the foundation of our security, which has existed since the Second World War, has fallen apart. Traditionally, it's been the United States that has provided the necessary deterrence to prevent first Soviet and then Russian aggression. Now it's pretty clear that the United States is not going to play that role going forward. We cannot trust Donald Trump, and after Donald Trump, we cannot trust the United States to again have the necessary commitment to providing this security in Europe. This means that we in Europe have a huge problem right now as we try to figure out how we can establish sufficient military deterrence to prevent a war with Russia in the coming decade. The idea that we could have this discussion among European NATO countries separately from a discussion about Ukrainian security is quite frankly absurd. Ukraine has the second largest army in Europe. Russia is number one, Ukraine is number two. So, among the countries that we could meaningfully ally with, Ukraine has the strongest army. It's much larger than the German army, the French army, and the British army. So, it's crucial that we don't fall into this trap of assuming that we in Western Europe are somehow stronger than the Ukrainians or that we would be able to do better than they can. Because we're not stronger than them. Ukraine is the only country right now in Europe that is strong enough to actually withstand the kind of pressure that Russia is putting on them. So the point I want to make is that the security order in Europe needs to be redefined. We in Western Europe must come to terms with the fact that our strongest ally, the the United States is pulling away and leaving us behind. And we obviously need to look around in our neighborhood to see what other strong potential allies can provide some of the capabilities that the Americans are no longer willing to offer. And Ukraine clearly stands out as someone who actually has what we need. The way I see it, if we want to have a chance of deterring Russia from aggression in the future and preventing war in Europe, we depend on Ukraine. We need Ukraine to be on our side. That's why it's so important for us to help Ukraine and ensure that they don't lose this war. But we also need to start thinking about how we will rely on Ukraine's position and their army for our security once this war is over. That's why I think this discussion that we're having is still not sufficiently developed. We made some progress because we've now moved from seeing the war in Ukraine as being a war about territory to recognizing that it's a war about Ukrainian independence. But we still have not made the final and necessary step of understanding that this is a war about European security as a whole. So to break this down a little bit and to make it more specific what I'm thinking, then I believe it's important that we elevate the discussion from how the Western countries can help Ukraine fight a future war that is localized in Ukraine and contained there. Both because the Ukrainian army is already the largest army in Europe, so the idea that us sending 10 or 20,000 soldiers would make a big difference is quite silly. But more importantly, because we need to have conversations about how to ensure that when Russia looks at Europe from the outside, what they see is one giant coherent front line that stretches from Norway in the north and all the way through Ukraine to the Black Sea in the south. This is the type of European security structure that I'm talking about. If we can present Russia with a front line like that, which also includes the second largest army in Europe on the other side, then we're seeing the contours of something that might actually work in terms of providing the sufficient deterrence to prevent a war. The reason why this would be intimidating is that it would make it really difficult for Putin to control escalation or to concentrate forces in a localized conflict if he starts a war. He would be facing the potential of what is called horizontal escalation, where suddenly a war can spread from one area to another. Right now, Russia is fighting a war in Ukraine. So it has prioritized its forces in this area. But if they were also facing a threat that could mean that they could be attacked from, say, airstrikes from Finland, they would need to allocate many more soldiers and resources to defending that area as well. So, this would mean that they would have fewer resources in Ukraine. That is what horizontal escalation or the threat of horizontal escalation can do. And it would also work the other way. Having Ukraine included in this type of security structure as an ally of the Western countries would make it really challenging for Putin to try something in Finland or the Baltic states. He would face the threat that the Ukrainians could suddenly start pushing Russia in another area. This might be the situation where suddenly the Ukrainians decide that now is the time to take back the Donbas. So he wouldn't be able to allocate all those forces to the invasion of Latvia that he has in mind. These are the types of dilemmas that Europe will need to figure out how we can present to Putin if we want deterrence to work. So this is what I mean, that a more mature discussion wouldn't just focus on security guarantees for Ukraine. It should be about creating an entire new security structure for Europe. This structure would recognize that it's not just Ukraine that needs help with security guarantees that the Western European countries can provide, but that Western Europe also depends on Ukraine. That our security actually depends on us being allies with Ukraine in the future if we want to deter Russia from aggression in a time when the United States is unwilling to provide that security. So, it's a good start of that discussion that it's moved from being about territorial concessions to now being about security guarantees. But it needs to move further. It needs to be about broader European security where Ukraine is also seen as a provider of security to the rest of Europe and not just the other way around. This will probably require Western European soldiers on the ground in Ukraine as a kind of tripwire force, but just as much, it would probably require Ukrainian soldiers in other European countries as well as a tripwire force there. So, there are these discussions that we need to have about how Ukraine and the current NATO countries can work together to deter Russian aggression against everyone in the future. Okay, I will end this discussion here. If you found the video helpful or informative, please give it a like. And also remember, you can subscribe to the channel and click the bell icon that you will get notifications when I upload new videos. If you want to support this channel, you can gain access also to some bonus videos if you subscribe to my newsletter at www.logicofwar.com. Thank you very much for watching, and I will see you again next time.

**_By Alexander With_** The Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020 between Armenia and Azerbaijan was an omen of things to come. Azerbaijan used Turkish-produced drones to devastating effect against Armenian tanks, securing an impressive victory in just 44 days. However, it was the war in Ukraine that truly became the world’s first large-scale “drone war.” The use of drones in this conflict has grown exponentially. In December 2023, Ukraine produced more drones than in all of 2022 combined. In 2024, Ukraine produced over one million drones, and some estimate that production could reach five million in 2025. Numbers like these have fundamentally changed the character of war - at least in Ukraine. One of the most striking changes has been the near disappearance of mechanized warfare. Gone are the days when tanks and infantry fighting vehicles could punch a hole in enemy lines, to be exploited by fresh echelons of troops until the defender could no longer fight a cohesive battle. Such attacks have been attempted many times in Ukraine, but have mostly failed. Even when initially successful—such as Ukraine’s offensive into the Kursk area - they were quickly contained by the defender. There are many reasons for the decline of the tank. Extensive minefields, the lack of clear air superiority for either side, insufficient training in combined arms operations, and precision artillery have all contributed to the demise of mechanized warfare. But above all, the tank’s greatest nemesis has been the drone. A successful offensive often depends on surprise, but achieving this is difficult in a war where every movement along their front line is observed from above. Once spotted, tanks have become increasingly vulnerable. First person view suicide drones can easily strike where armour is weakest—on the top or rear. Tank crews have experimented with countermeasures, from electronic warfare (EW) systems to awkward “turtle tank” designs with extra armour welded on top. None have been sufficiently effective. For instance, drone operators have begun using optical fibre controls, bypassing EW jamming entirely. Yet the greatest challenge for the tank is not the capability of any single drone—it is their overwhelming numbers. Cheap and easy to mass-produce, drones have outpaced tanks in the industrial arms race. The results are clear. Russian attacks have increasingly been carried out by small infantry groups or motorcyclists, supported by artillery, drones, and aircraft using glide bombs. In the current fighting around Prokovsk and other hot spots, armoured assaults have become rare as vehicles are too vulnerable. Over the summer offensive of 2025, Russian tanks were largely held in reserve; in July, Russian forces suffered just 19 confirmed tank losses—the lowest monthly total of the entire war. There are striking parallels to the First World War. A brief period of manoeuvre warfare was replaced by years of near-static trench fighting. Machine guns, artillery, and barbed wire rendered horse cavalry obsolete on the Western Front. Like Russian tanks today, cavalry units were kept in reserve, ready to exploit any breakthrough. Ironically, it was the first generation of tanks that finally created those breakthroughs, something horses could no longer achieve. The question now is how long this current situation will last. Like WWI, the war in Ukraine is one of attrition. Achieving surprise or large-scale mechanized breakthroughs is extremely difficult, and the front line has long been more or less static. But WWI did not end in stalemate—it ended with a German collapse and rapid Allied advances. Russia may hope for something similar here. If Ukraine’s determined defence were to give way to a chaotic retreat, that might be the moment for Russia to unleash its tanks once more. After all, no other weapon combines mobility, protection, and firepower quite like the tank. For NATO observers, the question is how many of the tank’s limitations would also apply if the alliance went to war—and in what ways such a conflict might differ. I will explore this further in a later blog post. As Anthony Swofford writes in _Jarhead_ : “Every war is different, every war is the same.” * * * ### About the author: Alexander With is commander (OF-3) in the Royal Danish Navy and military analyst at the Royal Danish Defence College. His website is https://www.alexanderwith.dk

In this video, I discuss the meetings in Alaska and Washington, D.C. about the peace process for Ukraine. I think many people have been too quick to declare the Alaska meeting a victory for Putin. It's interesting how Trump insists on claiming that Putin made concessions he clearly did not make. Either Trump doesn't understand the issues at all, or it's a sophisticated negotiation strategy that resembles entrapment. In either case, it might become a problem for Putin. Watch the video here or read the transcript below. If you read the transcript and want to comment, remember you can do that on the website if you are a paid subscriber. Best regards, Anders * * * ### _Transcript:_ Trump and Putin met in Alaska, and after that there was this meeting with Zelensky, Trump, and a group of European leaders in Washington DC. In this video, I want to give my quick assessment of what I think we can take from these negotiations, what's actually going on, and also how close we might be to something that could signal the end of the war. So let's talk about it. It's been strange following the discussion, starting with with the meeting between Trump and Putin, and then the one with Zelensky, Trump, and the European leaders afterwards. If you follow this war closely and you have developed an understanding of what both sides have been saying throughout, and also what their ultimate war aims are, it's pretty clear that neither side has significantly changed their position. But Trump is trying to take on the role of a mediator, and it's also quite clear that he seems to be under the impression there is actual progress and that the Russians and Ukrainians are getting closer to reaching a compromise. I think it's difficult to say whether this is a negotiation tactic for Trump or if he simply just doesn't understand the dynamics of the war that he's trying to mediate. But in either case, either he doesn't understand the nuances of the words he's being told, or he just pretends not to understand them. As an example, there is now this big discussion about Western security guarantees for Ukraine and how those might be organized because Donald Trump has claimed that Putin has accepted security guarantees for Ukraine will be part of a peace deal. The reality is that Putin has not said that. He might have said something that sounds like security guarantees, security assurances, maybe, something like that. But if he did that, then he had something else entirely in mind. It's pretty clear that Putin has never accepted the idea of NATO soldiers being stationed in Ukraine after the war. The Russian foreign ministry even came out and clarified this position, but that has all been overshadowed by the fact that Donald Trump keeps talking about it. The reason I know that Putin has not said that is that during the summit in Alaska, he also mentioned the need to address the root causes of the conflict in order to end the war. When Putin talks about addressing the "root causes", that's code speech for Western presence in Eastern Europe. That is the root cause that Putin sees as the reason why there is a war in Ukraine. So, when he says that this question needs to be addressed, what he really means is that Western countries need to leave Eastern Europe to Russia. And then there can, of course, be a debate about how much of Eastern Europe. What about the countries that are already in NATO? But it's absolutely abundantly clear that it means that NATO should not in any way, shape, or form be engaged in Ukraine, because that is, according to Putin, Russia's sphere of influence. And the root cause is that the West needs to leave that to Russia. If I could just add an anecdote here to illustrate this viewpoint and what the Russians may have in mind when they say this, then back in the fall of 2021, so about half a year before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, I was at a conference where there was an academic from the Russian think tank community. I asked him a question about the sovereignty of smaller states in Eastern Europe and their right to choose their own alliances and foreign relations. His response was that we should think of it like a restaurant. He said, "if you go into McDonald's, you cannot order sushi because that is not on the menu. It's the same with the countries in Eastern Europe and especially Ukraine." The reason there is a confrontation over Ukraine, according to him, is because the Ukrainians have gotten this idea that there is a Western option on the table. So yes, from his perspective, technically speaking, Ukraine has sovereignty and independence to choose their own foreign relations. But the only option that there should be to choose between should be Russia. His point was that the confrontation is therefore the West's fault because the West hasn't made it abundantly clear to the Ukrainians that joining Western Europe is not a viable path for them moving forward. This was the viewpoint of a Russian academic at the end of 2021, and it's essentially the same thing that Putin is saying when he talks about the need to address the root causes of the conflict. But Donald Trump does not really pick up on that. So he just hears Putin saying something about the need to address the root causes. And he's like, "yeah, that sounds like a good idea. Let's absolutely do that because we don't want this war to just begin all over again." So he's thinking, "well, I'm just going to create peace here and then you guys can figure out the root causes." That seems to be the approach that Donald Trump has to this. It's actually a little funny because it's like there are giant misunderstandings on the international scale here where politics seems to be decided by people who just have different communication styles and don't understand what the others are trying to say. Putin actually has a very vague and ambiguous way of expressing himself. It's often left up to the listener to figure out what Putin actually meant. What did he actually say? Even when he makes those very dramatic statements that sound intimidating or sound like a significant threat, then in reality, it's very often unclear what he actually meant or whether he has actually committed himself to doing anything if he doesn't get what he wants. But Trump, on the other hand, he has a much more direct style. if you want Trump to receive a message, then you have to present it to him in a straightforward way. He doesn't want to have to do too much thinking to understand the context or imagine all the subtle nuances in what you're trying to say. But these two communication styles, they just don't go well together in this case. It seems to me that that's how we end up in these situations where Trump suddenly claims that Putin has agreed to something that is extremely unlikely, such as Russia being okay with NATO's Article 5-style security guarantees for Ukraine, or that Putin is willing to meet Zelensky in person within the coming weeks. Because both of these things are highly unlikely. I don't think I've seen anyone who actually follows Russia who believes that Putin has genuinely made these concessions. So in that sense, I say that what's come out of these two high-level meetings so far has been basically nothing. But Donald Trump has been trying to play the role of a mediator. And either he has completely misunderstood what people have been saying to him, or he's pretending that he has misunderstood. So it's interesting that Donald Trump apparently keeps misunderstanding Putin and acting as if Putin has made bigger concessions concessions that he actually has. Because this is actually turning into a problem for the Russians. After the Alaska summit, I think a lot of people were very quick to call it a win for Putin and to claim that he played it really well. But I think the longer-term consequences might not be so great for Russia, because I don't really see that Putin achieved much at this summit in terms of actually addressing the problems that Russia has and the questions about Ukraine. In fact, when Trump completely misunderstands or misinterprets some of these positions that Putin comes with, then that could cause issues because it may be really hard to walk back on those comments or to clarify them to Trump afterwards. And that actually opens the door to something interesting and maybe even something promising. There is now a discussion happening about what security guarantees for Ukraine might specifically look like after this war is over, or maybe even sooner. Maybe some of these things could start taking shape already now. And the more we dig into these details, and the more the public attention is drawn to these questions, the harder it becomes for Putin to walk away from that later. So in that sense, what's happening is actually meaningful, because it puts pressure on Putin to deliver on those things that Trump thinks that Putin has already agreed to. The same actually goes for the idea of meeting Zelensky. Putin absolutely does not want to meet Zelensky because doing so would give Zelensky legitimacy. And the last thing that Putin wants is TV footage of these two wartime leaders standing side by side. One of them will be looking young and energetic and confident and courageous, and the other one will be Putin. Just imagine a press event during that meeting with Zelensky answering questions, standing next to Putin, speaking to both the international and the Russian press at the same time. That would be just a disastrous image for Putin. He absolutely does not want to be put in that situation. But now that is what Donald Trump expects from him. And that's interesting. The last thing I want to say is that I think it's also important to reflect a bit on what didn't happen. It's been a bit of a roller coaster over the last week with some very positive messages and then also some negative ones. I think it's also important to acknowledge that this has not so far turned into be a disaster for Ukraine or for the relationship between Europe and the United States. One of Putin's likely goals with holding the meeting in Alaska was to drive a wedge between the Americans and the European NATO countries. And that does not seem to have happened. There was a meeting at the White House that, judging from the outside, seemed to go OK. We haven't had any dramatic messaging or Donald Trump making ultimatums or anything like that. I still don't think that these negotiations are going to lead to anything in terms of a peace agreement in the near future. But at least it doesn't seem to be all that damaging. And I also think it's interesting to consider how whatever happens now might become a starting point when at some point in the future we will be moving into more serious negotiations about ending the war because that will happen eventually. As I've mentioned in other videos, I don't think the military conditions are in place for that yet. To put it bluntly, one of the sides has to be closer to losing the war before they're willing to make those concessions that the adversary demands. But whatever happens up until that point when that can actually happen, can serve as a basis for moving forward. So even if these diplomatic maneuvers that are happening now don't actually lead to real negotiations or to peace in the short term, that does not mean that they're pointless. It just means that the point that we're looking for might reveal itself over a longer period of time. Okay, I will end it here. If you found the video helpful or informative, please give it a like. And also remember to subscribe to the channel and click the bell icon. Then you will get notifications when I upload new videos. If you want to support the channel, you can subscribe to my newsletter at www.logicofwar.com. Thank you very much for watching, and I will see you again next time.

In this video I discuss why a number of countries are withdrawing from the Ottawa treaty that bans the use of anti-personnel mines, and why more countries probably should follow suit. It is a deeply problematic arms control arrangement that hurts the countries that are concerned about a Russian invasion. Watch the video on the website or read the transcript below. --Anders * * * ### _Transcript:_ In this video, I want to talk about land mines. A number of countries have announced that they are leaving the Ottawa Treaty that bans the use of anti-personnel mines, and this has created quite a debate. But I think there is a misunderstanding of what land mines are, why they are important in warfare, and what the problem is with landmines. So, let's talk about it. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there's been a discussion about some of the conventions that ban the use of specific types of weapons. Most recently, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have announced that they are withdrawing from the Ottawa Convention, which bans the use of anti-personnel land mines. This was followed by an announcement by Ukraine that they will also be leaving the Ottawa Convention so they can use anti-personnel mines. That's a bit of a symbolic move because Ukraine has been using them and basically breaking their commitment to the Ottawa Convention since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. But that also goes to show some of the problems with this convention. Land mines are an important weapon, and perhaps the biggest shortcoming in all this is that Russia has not signed the Ottawa Convention. It creates an asymmetry when one side can use these weapons and the other side can't. I want to start by quickly explaining the background. When we're talking about mines, then land mines are, of course, used on land as opposed to naval mines that are used at sea. There are essentially two different types of landmines. One type is anti-personnel mines, which are smaller and designed to hurt people. And the other type is anti-vehicle or anti-tank mines, which are designed to take out vehicles. The problem with landmines is that you deploy a lot of them during the war, and many of them will still be there once the war is over. It's not such a big problem with anti-vehicle mines because they are quite large, and that makes them easier to clear and also they're not particularly dangerous to humans or animals because you need to apply a significant amount of weight on them before they can detonate. But anti-personnel mines are a big problem because they will be scattered around in nature and they will be hidden and designed to be triggered by a human who passes by that land mine. This has meant that historically, many civilians have been hurt by land mines that were left after the war was over but were still active. This led to significant work and a big movement in the 1990s about achieving a global ban on anti-personnel mines to avoid these cases. The anti-land mine agenda was very strong in the 1990s. For example, Princess Diana was very engaged in this issue, and it culminated in 1997 with the Ottawa Convention. This convention states that countries that have signed it cannot use or stockpile or produce or transfer anti-personnel mines. So that's a bit about the history and why it might be a good idea to have a global ban on anti-personnel mines. Now I'm going to turn to why the Ottawa Convention is then also problematic and why we see countries withdrawing from it and why it's probably also a discussion that more countries actually should be having. The first problem is that the idea of a global ban on a specific type of weapon is good if it is actually global. The problem is that if only some countries sign the treaty, then it undermines the whole idea and it creates an unfair advantage for those countries that don't. The countries you might say are the bad actors in this are those that don't enter it in good faith, and they are rewarded for that bad behavior. In the case of the Ottawa Convention, then none of the major military powers in the world have signed it. Russia has not signed it. The United States has not signed it. Neither have China or India or Pakistan or Iran. None of these countries have signed the Ottawa Convention. So we have ended up in a situation where the strongest military powers insist on continuing to use anti-personnel mines, whereas the weaker military powers have agreed not to use them. And that is, of course, an asymmetry that is not sustainable when the stronger power then invades the smaller one, as in the case of Russia invading Ukraine. The second problem is that there's been a lot of technical development on how land mines work since the Ottawa Convention was signed. Many of the problems that led to the debate about landmines back in the 1990s are not really present with modern land mines, or at least they don't have to be if the countries that use them make sure to buy land mines with safety mechanisms. What created the uproar about anti-personnel mines back then was not really how they were used in war, but the fact that they were left all over the place when the war was over. So civilians would be hid when they accidentally stepped into a minefield that they did not know was there. But today you can solve that problem technically by designing the land mine in a way where it disables itself after a set period of time. For example, you could have a small battery inside the mine and once the battery runs out, it doesn't work anymore. That would be a very simple way of ensuring that it only works for a couple of days or a couple of months, depending on the size of the battery. Once you start having land mines with those kinds of self-neutralizing features in them, then the whole point of the Ottawa Convention actually starts becoming rather difficult to see. Because the problem that the Ottawa Convention was designed to solve doesn't exist anymore. On the contrary, and this is the third point, the technical developments have actually meant that the utility of anti-personnel mines has been expanded since the 1990s. With the development of unmanned systems, mines will get a new role on the battlefield where they will be used much more actively. It used to be that to lay a minefield, you would have to send out people somewhere and place the mines. And that meant that it was something you would do well in advance of the enemy approaching so that the minefield could be prepared and you could lay the mines without putting your soldiers in danger. Or maybe you could shoot out some mines in an area with a special artillery grenade that was designed for that, but that was not super precise. In the future, we will have unmanned ground vehicles that can lay mines. And that means that it is something that you can do much more dynamically on the battlefield. We're in fact already seeing this being implemented in some places in Ukraine. This means that you can begin thinking about mines not as just a defensive weapon that you can use as a barrier against enemy attacks, but also something that you can use offensively to support your own attacks. The military commander can, during the planning phase of an attack, decide that it would be really smart to have a barrier over here so that our attacking forces are not suddenly facing the enemy that has come around from the side. Then overnight, before the attack, you can have unmanned ground vehicles deploying those mines so that they are ready for your attack when you need it. And if you combine that with what I talked about before, that mines technically today can be designed to have a very short lifespan so that the minefield you put up could be active for, let's say, 48 hours and then it just turns itself off, you can see how it becomes possible to use this weapon very dynamically during the military operations. So instead of thinking, thinking of it as something that you put out there and then it will just be a static area for many years into the future where no one can enter, then it can be a dynamic tool in the tactical planning. So these are my three explanations of why the Ottawa Convention has become so problematic and countries are looking into leaving this convention so they can use anti-personnel mines again. The first reason is that Russia has not signed this convention and that would give Russia an unfair advantage in the case of an invasion of a European country. The second reason is that technical developments in how landmines are constructed mean that you can build self-destruction mechanisms into them and solve the problem with civilian casualties. And the third reason is that with the developments in unmanned technology, we are moving into an era where mines will play a totally different role in military operations. We're going to see them becomes something that is used dynamically to create ad hoc minefields to support not only defensive operations, but also offensive ones. So what I'm saying here is that I think that from a practical, a technical point of view, the Ottawa Convention does not really make sense anymore. It solves a problem that was very important with the weapons technology that existed 40 or 50 years ago, but it does not need to exist today because we have different technology. And it gives an unfair advantage to those countries that have not signed this convention. Those who did sign it are at a disadvantage in case of war. That leads to the obvious question, why is there then so much controversy about some countries leaving the Ottawa Convention? And I think it's, the concern is that if we start going down this path of rolling back some of these treaties about limitations on weapons technology and arms control, then one thing can lead to the other. I think that's the main argument against leaving the Ottawa Convention. I don't really think that those who criticize European countries for making this step are truly concerned about minefields lying around in Lithuania or Estonia or Finland. There will be an assumption that these countries have these things under control and can manage the technology. But the concern should be seen in a bigger perspective. It's about what kind of signal this sends and what it can incentivize other countries to do. And suddenly, some of those significant victories that were made in terms of achieving international agreements about arms control are at risk of being rolled back. More countries may leave this convention on anti-personnel mines. And if this convention is up for debate, why not other conventions? So it can suddenly lead to discussions about other weapons types as well. I think that is the big concern about all this and why it's so controversial that a number of European countries have now taken this step. These arguments against leaving the Ottawa Convention, I think they're valid. We're living in a time when international law and international cooperation are under pressure, and that is concerning. So I do think this argument of a slippery slope does have validity. It's an important discussion that we need to have about how we can preserve as much as possible of these things that have also done good for humanity. But at the same time, I think it's important in all this that we don't get into a framing of this discussion where the whole discussion about anti-personnel mines and also other weapons systems such as cluster munitions, for that matter, that it becomes a question of there being somehow a morally superior position. That the morally right thing to do is to stick to our principles and stay in the convention. Because what that argument ultimately means is that we are willing to sacrifice more of our own soldiers who will die if there is a war, and also that we're willing to risk losing some of our territory and having some of our people living under Russian occupation with all the things that that entail. So I don't buy the argument that this is somehow a discussion between military necessity on the one hand and morality on the other. If you send soldiers into battle, then you have a moral obligation to give them the tools they need to solve the task and return alive. So I also think there is a strong moral argument to be made for leaving the Ottawa Convention and giving our soldiers access to these weapons that the enemy has and that have proven to be so important in the war in Ukraine. That was my explanation about the Ottawa Convention and anti-personnel mines. I think it's a convention that has largely lost its purpose as an arms control agreement. It hasn't been adopted by enough countries, and it creates an obstacle for those countries that are afraid of a Russian invasion. And in the meantime, the technical developments in this type of weapon have more or less solved the problem that the convention was originally designed to address. But that said, I do acknowledge that we live in an age where things often go the wrong way when it comes to discussions about arms control and international law. It would be good if we could find a way to reverse that trend, or at least not make it worse. So I do understand the slippery slope argument as well. All right, I'll end it here. If you found the video helpful or informative, please give it a like. And also remember, you can subscribe to the channel and click the bell icon so you get notifications when I upload new videos. And if you want to support the channel, you can subscribe to my newsletter and get access to some bonus videos on www.logicofwar.com. Thank you very much for watching, and I will see you again next time.