Thank you!!

This result is remarkable for two reasons. First, it offers a sufficient condition for when individuals can afford to remember less than their opponent. Second, it helps identify equilibria among reactive-n strategies more efficiently, as it reduces the number of deviations that need to be checked.

We prove that in this setting there always exists a best response that only depends on the last n-1 events, thus allowing a player to remember less than their opponent without any harm to their payoff.

We consider additive games, where each player’s payoff is the sum of two components, and each component only depends on the action of a single player. Further we suppose that the opponent plays a reactive-n strategy, i.e. their moves depend on the opposing player's last n moves.

How valuable is memory? In my very first paper, now published in Economics Letters, together with @chilbe.bsky.social and @nikoletaglyn.bsky.social, we give sufficient conditions under which a player can afford to remember less than their opponent. 🧵

📜 doi.org/10.1016/j.ec...