This is just sad..

I am Yemeni.

My country’s domain (.YE) does not belong to me, or to any citizen.

It belongs to an armed group.

This is why we launched #FreeDotYE.

Join us: freethedotye.org

Houthis have detained UN staff, hacked activists, and silenced journalists.

And yet they control Yemen’s official Internet domain, .YE.

Technical governance must not normalize terrorism.

#ICANN would never allow a militia to run .fr or .uk.

So why is .YE - a national identity - left in Houthi hands?

This isn’t just Yemen’s problem. It undermines global DNS credibility.

We demand #IANA and #ICANN:
1️⃣ Review of .YE delegation (per RFC 1591, ICP-1)
2️⃣ Redelegation to a neutral trustee until stability returns
3️⃣ Protection of Yemen’s digital sovereignty

If the state won’t act, people must.
✍️ Petition: www.change.org/FreeTheDotYE

This isn’t just Yemen. If militias can hijack national domains, the credibility of the global DNS collapses.

Would the world accept a militia running .fr or .uk? Then why is .YE different?

Independent journalists in Houthi areas have been kidnapped, disappeared, or killed. UN & NGO staff have been detained.

Yet the same group runs Yemen’s national domain.
A ccTLD run by abusers is unacceptable.

#FreeDotYE #Yemen #Journalism

Control of .YE = control of Yemen’s Internet:

- Censorship

- Surveillance through TeleYemen

- Hacking of activists & NGOs

- Silencing the press

ICANN’s silence = complicity.

#FreeDotYE #HumanRights

The recognized government abandoned .YE.
They now rely on .org .com .net domains.

Result: the national domain is entirely in militia hands. Weak leadership left Yemen’s digital identity vulnerable.

We cannot wait for them. #FreeDotYE

Houthis use .YE to project false legitimacy.

Sites like saba.ye and mmy.ye pose as state outlets but are propaganda platforms. Meanwhile, real journalists are censored, silenced, or worse.

#FreeDotYE #Yemen #PressFreedom