Sam Gershman
@gershbrain.bsky.social
10K followers 66 following 670 posts
Professor, Department of Psychology and Center for Brain Science, Harvard University https://gershmanlab.com/
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gershbrain.bsky.social
"War on unicorns"
or
"War by unicorns"
?
Reposted by Sam Gershman
ashleyjthomas.bsky.social
Interested in understanding how young humans think about social relationships? I am reading PhD applications this year! **Please note**, that Harvard now requires the GRE. More information here: www.ashleyjthomas.com/workwithme
WANT TO WORK WITH ME? | Mysite
www.ashleyjthomas.com
Reposted by Sam Gershman
merriam-webster.com
We are thrilled to announce that our NEW Large Language Model will be released on 11.18.25.
Reposted by Sam Gershman
mcxfrank.bsky.social
Ever wonder how habituation works? Here's our attempt to understand:

A stimulus-computable rational model of visual habituation in infants and adults doi.org/10.7554/eLif...

This is the thesis of two wonderful students: @anjiecao.bsky.social @galraz.bsky.social, w/ @rebeccasaxe.bsky.social
infant data from experiment 1 conceptual schema for different habituation models title page results from experiment 2 with adults
gershbrain.bsky.social
I suggested that play is an example where the metric maximized by adults in the ARC games (task completion) is precisely the metric minimized by children during play: the ideal imaginative play is never completed. "Success" is failure. Learning "efficiency" in this setting is irrelevant.
gershbrain.bsky.social
In the same symposium, Junyi Chu and Laura Schulz gave wonderful talks showcasing exactly how children defy Chollet's definition and the ARC operationalization. This led to an interesting discussion of whether it's possible to devise benchmarks that capture true play.
gershbrain.bsky.social
I'm more sympathetic to a "diverse intelligences" viewpoint, where different umwelts and ecological niches require different inductive biases that lead to different patterns of skill acquisition efficiency. Each is efficient over a particular distribution of skills.
gershbrain.bsky.social
What this excludes is the possibility that you could have different intelligent agents that generalize over disjoint skill sets. You could imagine agents that are really good at generalizing over skills that humans are bad at. In fact, you don't need to look far to find examples.
gershbrain.bsky.social
Chollet responded that this was "universal" intelligence, not "general" intelligence. To summarize (if I've understood correctly): general intelligence = generalizing like humans; universal intelligence [mathematically impossible] = generalizing over all skills.
gershbrain.bsky.social
I had always assumed that "general intelligence" refers to intelligent systems that show efficiency on essentially all tasks (that's the "general" part). This is why I also always assumed that (by the NFL theorems) general intelligence is impossible.
gershbrain.bsky.social
What surprised me is that Chollet defined the reference distribution of skills as precisely those skills humans are efficient at acquiring. By this definition, general intelligence is human intelligence. I find this problematic as a definition.
gershbrain.bsky.social
I asked Chollet for what skill distribution an intelligent system was expected to be efficient. To the extent that efficiency is derived from learning (i.e., it's a form of generalization), the no free lunch theorems say that no system can be equally efficient for all skills.
gershbrain.bsky.social
Chollet famously defined general intelligence as skill-acquisition efficiency. This is the idea behind the various ARC challenges: testing how efficiently artificial agents can solve novel problems. I should say that I agree with this as an important pillar of intelligence.
gershbrain.bsky.social
I was part of an interesting panel discussion yesterday at an ARC event. Maybe everybody knows this already, but I was quite surprised by how "general" intelligence was conceptualized in relation to human intelligence and the ARC benchmarks.
gershbrain.bsky.social
@arthurpr4t.bsky.social has written another tour de force, showing how efficient coding reshapes numerosity representations in parietal cortex.
gershbrain.bsky.social
This doesn't surprise me at all, because it's basically nobody's job to defend "the highest ideals of the university." Every job optimizes some local constraint. This is why US universities are toast in the face of attacks on civil society.
gershbrain.bsky.social
And today in the @nytimes.com...

I suggest that papers stop "suggesting a link" so that reporters stop suggesting that papers are suggesting to readers that there might be a causal relationship. They could alternatively suggest that correlations are sometimes caused by latent variables.
gershbrain.bsky.social
My favorite ending of any paper I've written.
gershbrain.bsky.social
Waiting for the news report that latent variables exist and can explain correlations between two other variables.
gershbrain.bsky.social
Timely reminder that 'associative' language leads lay people to confuse correlation and causation, as @tomerullman.bsky.social and I showed a few years ago.
journals.plos.org/plosone/arti...

Snapshot from the BBC:
www.bbc.com/news/article...
gershbrain.bsky.social
Scientists have plenty of math envy, but at least we don't have to deal with discovering infinitely many counterexamples to our conjectures.
quantamagazine.bsky.social
For nearly a century, mathematicians wondered whether a conjecture about knots was true. In a paper posted in June, researchers found infinitely many counterexamples, revealing a new layer of complexity in this area of math. Leila Sloman reports: www.quantamagazine.org/a-simple-way...
A Simple Way To Measure Knots Has Come Unraveled | Quanta Magazine
Two mathematicians have proved that a straightforward question — how hard is it to untie a knot? — has a complicated answer.
www.quantamagazine.org
gershbrain.bsky.social
I agree with you that labels in themselves don't matter that much. But I would strongly contend that our descriptions of data are not theory-neutral. It's precisely because people ignore this point that we get stuck with stubborn operational definitions.
gershbrain.bsky.social
Also, I'm always hearing from neuroscientists that various cognitive constructs are old-fashioned folk psychology, but I think it's important to understand the long theoretical literature behind these terms, which is very far from folk psychology.

Psychology != Folk Psychology