Trent Hone
@honer.bsky.social
MCUF Chair of Strategic Studies at MCU and Management Consultant. Author of Learning War, Battle Line, & Mastering the Art of Command. Opinions my own.
I took brother Soren in the winter, during a term when we set a record for consecutive days (>35) without sunlight. His attitude was… relatable.
January 31, 2026 at 9:48 PM
I took brother Soren in the winter, during a term when we set a record for consecutive days (>35) without sunlight. His attitude was… relatable.
Me, recounting this post to my colleagues.
a close up of a man 's face with the words i 've seen things you people wouldn 't believe
Alt: The character Roy Batty’s final a close up in the original movie “Bladerunner” saying, “I've seen things you people wouldn't believe…”
media.tenor.com
January 28, 2026 at 11:33 PM
Me, recounting this post to my colleagues.
Indeed. I’ve been studying Navy PME practices from a century ago and it is remarkable how ill-informed some of the modern commentary is. Much completely ignores war as a *cognitive* endeavor, with all that entails regarding politics, ethics, national identity, etc.
January 24, 2026 at 2:54 PM
Indeed. I’ve been studying Navy PME practices from a century ago and it is remarkable how ill-informed some of the modern commentary is. Much completely ignores war as a *cognitive* endeavor, with all that entails regarding politics, ethics, national identity, etc.
Excellent!
You know who else drank weapons-grade coffee? This guy.
You know who else drank weapons-grade coffee? This guy.
January 23, 2026 at 10:55 AM
Excellent!
You know who else drank weapons-grade coffee? This guy.
You know who else drank weapons-grade coffee? This guy.
Love it. Thank you for writing this.
January 16, 2026 at 10:41 PM
Love it. Thank you for writing this.
Fuel economy—to project power at range—was the driving factor.
Interesting to note the degree of cohesion beginning when the General Board assumed responsibility for design (through the collaborative preliminary design process): Oil Fuel, Turbines, “all or nothing” protection. The standard type.
Interesting to note the degree of cohesion beginning when the General Board assumed responsibility for design (through the collaborative preliminary design process): Oil Fuel, Turbines, “all or nothing” protection. The standard type.
January 16, 2026 at 11:58 AM
Fuel economy—to project power at range—was the driving factor.
Interesting to note the degree of cohesion beginning when the General Board assumed responsibility for design (through the collaborative preliminary design process): Oil Fuel, Turbines, “all or nothing” protection. The standard type.
Interesting to note the degree of cohesion beginning when the General Board assumed responsibility for design (through the collaborative preliminary design process): Oil Fuel, Turbines, “all or nothing” protection. The standard type.
One of my objectives with Learning War was to provide a more holistic view of U.S. Navy tactical development during that period. Reynolds is very good but he assumes the existence of a “gun club cabal” that is unsupported by contemporary evidence.
January 13, 2026 at 2:53 AM
One of my objectives with Learning War was to provide a more holistic view of U.S. Navy tactical development during that period. Reynolds is very good but he assumes the existence of a “gun club cabal” that is unsupported by contemporary evidence.
@bafriedman.bsky.social also approached complexity directly in this excellent article: digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/v...
War Is the Storm—Clausewitz, Chaos, and Complex War Studies
Complexity theories indeed do apply to war, and Clausewitz’s theories were the first to grapple with them. War is nonlinear, but the parallels between war and complexity science, and between complexit...
digital-commons.usnwc.edu
January 7, 2026 at 6:01 PM
@bafriedman.bsky.social also approached complexity directly in this excellent article: digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/v...
That's the angle I took with Learning War. It's less about conflict itself and more about how effective tactics and doctrine emerge. I treat the Navy as a complex adaptive system and explore how it established effective constraints to induce learning and innovation. www.usni.org/press/books/...
Learning War
The U.S. Naval Institute provides an independent forum for those who seek to advance and strengthen the naval profession.
www.usni.org
January 7, 2026 at 6:00 PM
That's the angle I took with Learning War. It's less about conflict itself and more about how effective tactics and doctrine emerge. I treat the Navy as a complex adaptive system and explore how it established effective constraints to induce learning and innovation. www.usni.org/press/books/...