🧠🤖 Join us for the launch of the Center for Philosophy of AI (University of Copenhagen)!

📅 Sept 3, 13:00-17:00
📍CPH Conference

Keynotes on philosophy of LLMs by @parismarx.com, Ellie Pavlick, @dcm.social.sunet.se.ap.brid.gy, Tom Sterkenburg & @zhijingjin.bsky.social

Register: cpai.ku.dk

Similarly, current advanced chatbots exhibit some, but not all, of the capacities characteristic of full-fledged assertion. And some capacities they possess partially.

Our take? We should think of current LLM-driven chatbots as proto-asserters.

[5/5]

We need a different perspective.

Take young children: toddlers lack some of the cognitive capacities exercised by adult asserters, but many features are partially present.

In this phase, a child's speech is not (exactly) assertion but it's not *not* assertion: they are proto-asserters!

[4/5]

Some have tried to "split the difference" between the "pro" and "con" cases.

We argue that previous attempts to do this – treating chatbots as asserters in a merely fictional sense, or holding that they only make "proxy"-assertions on behalf of humans – are unsatisfactory.

[3/5]

We identify some considerations in favour of a "yes" answer, then review recent objections to the idea of chatbot assertion.

We argue that neither flat rejection nor straightforward endorsement is compelling. So how should we think about chatbot assertion?

[2/5]

My paper with Tim Bayne "Chatting with bots: AI, speech acts, and the edge of assertion" is now up at Inquiry.

Our question: can large language model powered chatbots make assertions (can they state, claim or affirm things)?

[1/5]

www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....