Plus there’s the fact the pre-1980 economy was much less open than today’s, and there are many who’d argue the Cyprus embargoes were just as destructive as mismanagement of the economy by domestic politicians, etc etc – but you already know all this! :)

Agree with all this. The original question was about inflation, which as you say isn’t enough to tip things. Turkey has had far worse inflation and for longer: my first ever salary was paid in billions of TL.

A massive fiscal crisis is another ball game altogether – but again, we’re not there yet.

Don’t have the figures to hand so happy to be corrected but surely inflation was far, far worse in the 80s and 90s than it was before the 1980 coup – when the bigger issue was political deadlock plus violence and lawlessness on the streets.

The past 40 years of Turkish elections shows chronic inflation doesn’t necessarily kill a party’s election prospects, so long as people have jobs or the right kind of handouts, and so long as there isn’t an obvious alternative.

I am as shocked as you are.

Trying to sort one out. Substack is being tricky.

‪All this makes him perhaps the closest example that DEM can point to of an elder statesman – one who is now fighting for his life in hospital.‬

‪In the Turkish parliamentary system each of the main parties nominate a deputy speaker and chairs sessions in rotation. Önder is the man who represents the pro-Kurdish DEM. ‬

‪Despite his party affiliation, he’s actually Turkish, even though he hails from the southeast of Turkey. ‬

Typo. Should have been “pro-Kurdish”. Thanks

It is.

The opposition says all this boils down to Erdoğan not wanting to face İmamoğlu in an election.

It’s not yet clear how many voters, and crucially what type of voters, agree with that.

The CHP’s challenge is to maintain momentum and channel public anger – and that won’t be easy.

Also, note posts like this by a senior pro-Kurdish MP implying Ankara mayor Mansur Yavaş, who has Turkish nationalist roots, is a fascist.

The row is about his view of a recent Kurdish rally.

It will be tough to keep an opposition alliance together.

It’s clear that a significant section of Turkish society is outraged at what’s going on. They aren’t all CHP supporters.

What is not yet clear is how deep the anger extends. How many religious conservatives, say, or Turkish nationalists think the same?

It is too early to say.

The justice minister says this is an independent judicial process and any suggestion of political influence is plainly wrong.

The opposition, and countless observers documenting an increasingly politicised judiciary in Turkey, tell a different story.

Next, there is the question of the mayoralty. Can it be taken away from İmamoğlu permanently?

Yes: the notorious kayyım process – where a mayor is removed and replaced by the government – remains an option for the interior minister.

He has chosen not to use it right now.

So: what happens next?

Most immediately, İmamoğlu will become CHP candidate for president. Party members will vote on Sunday, the result declared and the party will formalise the decision later in the week.

There is, of course, no election imminent.

The language is unusual because it is common legal practice for cases to be treated in isolation: it is highly irregular to declare a suspect is not being detained on one set of charges on the basis he is already being held on another set of charges.

On the second set of charges – relating to terrorism – he has been released pending further enquiries, even though there are "strong suspicions". In highly unusual language for a judicial document, the court decision points out he is already being held for the corruption charges.

The court decided to uphold İmamoğlu's arrest and detain him pending trial on the first set of charges – those containing allegations of fraud and corruption.

It means the suspended mayor of Istanbul will remain in prison for the foreseeable future.