John F Sullivan
@johnfsullivan.bsky.social
1.4K followers 66 following 330 posts
Former U.S. Army China Foreign Area Officer currently studying ancient Chinese military & strategic texts and arguing for the need to study and debate them more broadly within our own military PME and academic institutions.
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johnfsullivan.bsky.social
while also requiring corresponding changes in the social superstructure.”

Xi Jinping believes this is an objective truth, as described earlier by his chief ideologue, Wang Huning. We now have a complete English translation of Wang's major work on this subject:

www.amazon.com/dp/B0FNMTFK4...
Political Logic: Principles of Marxist Politics
Political Logic: Principles of Marxist Politics [Wang, Huning] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Political Logic: Principles of Marxist Politics
www.amazon.com
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
production cannot accommodate the increasingly powerful social productive forces it has created. Ultimately, the development of social productive forces will inevitably break through the capitalist mode of production, transitioning to a newer mode of production,
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
This inevitability stems from the internal contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, namely the contradiction between the private ownership of social means of production and socialized large-scale production. Capitalism has created powerful productive forces, but the capitalist mode of
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
Wang Huning (1994): “Marxism first asserts that a communist society is an objective necessity, not a subjective desire of individuals. The internal driving force of historical development & the contradictory movement of various social relations inevitably lead to realization of a communist society.
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
"If a situation arises during combat where the military commander and the political commissar have differing opinions, the responsibility falls to the one whose role pertains to the issue [and] anyone at any time has the right to report the situation to a higher organization."
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
"The division of responsibilities among commanders specifically means that, under the unified collective leadership of the Party committee, military administrative issues are handled by the mil. commander, while political work is organized and implemented by the pol. commissar."
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
“What if, during combat, the division commander orders to go east, but the political commissar orders to go west?”

An explanation of the roles of the operational commander & political commissar within PLA ranks from a 2000 book, "Heart-to-Heart Talks with Leading Cadres" ...
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
You then start seeing it seep into military doctrine. The first version of the Science of Military Strategy (1987), makes no reference to CNP, but the 1999 version starts including it, and every subsequent update to the text discusses CNP as the basis for strategic competition.
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
Or Wu Chunqiu's book on how CNP can be applied at the highest strategic levels: "Building and employing CNP to achieve grand strategy objectives is the core content of grand strategy and one of its fundamental characteristics distinguishing it from other strategies."
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
Following this text from these three members of the Academy of Military Science (AMS) you start seeing a lot more theoretical work coming out of AMS on this subject. For example, Huang Shuofeng's extensive study on both the components of CNP and the math necessary to calculate it
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
Confrontation in the CNP era, the authors argued, would primarily takes the form of competition. This includes intense military, economic, and technological wars globally, with a focus on qualitative superiority and high-tech development, not just military quantity.
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
CNP strategy places greater emphasis on the combined use of both "material weapons" (economy, technology, military) and "spiritual weapons" (politics, ideology, national spirit and will, information) to achieve deterrence goals.
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
A key function they take from Sun Tzu is "first make oneself invincible" (先为不可胜). This means adopting a long-term perspective, building comprehensive national power (including military), and emphasizing a "deterrence image" rather than just temporary military advantages.
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
The fundamental goals of CNP competition are "security and development." This strategy seeks security through national development, fostering a virtuous cycle: Development → deterrence → peace → new development → new deterrence → new peace.
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
The Comprehensive National Power (CNP) competition strategy, therefore, should be a new national strategy for China during peacetime. It advocated using political, economic, military, technological, and diplomatic forces together, rather than relying solely on military means.
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
Modern threats are comprehensive, extending beyond military to include environment, population, hunger, and economic/technological challenges. Military deterrence alone is often powerless against non-military threats like trade deficits or tech blockades.
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
Historically, the authors argue, strategic thought progressed from focusing on parts (like sea or air power) to embracing comprehensive approaches, leading to "total war" and "grand strategy" theories. But since the 1980s, the value of pure military deterrence has been challenged
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
“No rational person would believe that atomic bombs can offset trade deficits, dumping policies, or technological blockades."

There is an interesting and unique chapter in this 1989 book on deterrence: Comprehensive National Power (CNP) as a new realm of deterrence strategy ...
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
I’m prone to giving Bud Fox a pass on this one. He gives a reasonable summary of Sun Tzu’s force ratio passage from Chap. 3. I’ve seen tenured war college professors mess it up worse. Also, don’t forget the dinner table Clausewitz debate from “Crimson Tide”
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
There are also collective military writings from other prominent PLA figures not named Mao that should be translated and further studied. These figures and their writings still influence contemporary PLA thinking, but rarely get discussed in the West because we have limited ability to access them.
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
Much like in the West, there is also a ton of mediocre & uninteresting works, but there is more than enough good material produced in China that we should at least take seriously & study more systematically. To date though, there has been little demand signal to translate any.
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
China has their own equivalents to military strategy academics like Michael Howard and Colin Gray, but because we don't bother translating anything beyond a few niche texts we continue to think everything about Chinese strategy can be gleaned from Sun Tzu, Mao, and Unrestricted Warfare …
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
From one of 67 speeches delivered from 2012-2017 found in the book “Xi Jinping on Strengthening and Reviving the Military” —an internal (neibu) document meant for PLA regiment and above commanders only.
johnfsullivan.bsky.social
suffer setbacks in maritime rights how can we face our nation and our ancestors? Focus all our thoughts on warfighting, direct all our efforts toward warfighting and ensure that the troops can be summoned, fight when called, and win decisively."

-- "On the Issue of War Guidance"