Such IAEA mission needs more than a short visit of a couple of hours to the substations after they have been damaged, like in the week of 21 October. That would be unacceptable. This is not the moment to have photo-opportunities. The IAEA presence needs to be serious and on a more permanent basis.

2. IAEA DG Grossi got a mandate yesterday 12th from the Board of Governors to to immediately take additional measures if risks arise to prevent a nuclear accident.

1. immediate reaction needed from the world, not only to condemn RU but also announce stricter sanctions and increased support for UA. RU's desperate strategy is to look strong while it is weakened and this needs to be countered

Interesting step to push Grossi to do something. The risk is now that IAEA/Grossi will announce another one-off visit to UA substations, like the ones of 12Sep and week of 21Sep, which would be window dressing, especially if announced. Why is Grossi so afraid of the Russians and not doing his job?

Significant that a UN body is criticising the IAEA not doing its job: “Despite the urgency of the situation, full implementation of an expanded monitoring mission had yet to be announced by the IAEA,”

The dark strategy of Russia seems:
- since Oct 2022: attack grid infrastructure
- attack main hydro, coal and gas plants
- make UA very dependent on the 3 operational nucl plants
- 17 Nov: target key substations needed for nucl safety
- dont attack nucl plants directly
- if nucl accident: blame UA

One possible scenario is that of a longer system-wide blackout (see below). Another one is of severe damage to substations serving one of the 3 nuclear plants, needing long repair of weeks or even months. Backup electricity systems at the nuclear plant might not last that long

And this is a map with our interpretation of some of the substations in Ukraine that are most critical for nucl safety. Given the already weakened infrastructure and difficulties to re-route electricity flows, the list of such substations is getting longer...