🔔ACE Seminar:
We’re thrilled to welcome Dr. Siyang Luo from Sun Yat-sen University!

🗓 Mon, Sep 22 at 7:00 PM JST (18:00 (Perth/Singapore/Beijing), 19:00 (Tokyo/Seoul), 20:00 (Sydney))
✉️ To receive the Zoom link, send a blank email to: [email protected]

(iii) moderate diversity within groups adds flexibility to collective dynamics, improving efficiency, equity, and robustness, and
(iv) while management burden grows exponentially with group size, allowing gradual population growth shifts this scaling from exponential to a power law.

We argue that (i) the simple principle “wait when rich, harvest when below average” enables sustainability and punishes selfish cheaters,
(ii) labor division among turn-taking clusters spontaneously emerge,

We extend our evolutionary dynamical-systems game theory to multi-player settings.
In our model, each player’s harvesting decisions shape resource dynamics and depend on the resource state, the player's wealth, and the group-average wealth. Evolution of decision-making functions is simulated.

Our latest paper is on arXiv!
How can robust collective resource governance emerge without costly individual monitoring?
We theoretically demonstrate the self-organization of institutions relying only on monitoring of group-average resource use.
👉 arxiv.org/abs/2507.225...

【🚨ACE Seminar Alert🚨】We're excited to have Dr Ryutaro @uchiyama.bsky.social joining from Singapore on Tuesday 29th July at 7pm in Tokyo (6pm in Singapore/12am in Berlin)!

You can sign up for the mailing list to get the zoom link by sending a blank email to [email protected]

The 4th Asian Cultural Evolution Seminar is coming soon on 20 May!

Sign up for the mailing list to get the zoom link, by sending a blank email to [email protected]

Excited to share our latest paper published in PNAS!
We introduced a new theoretical framework, "evolutionary dynamical-systems game theory," to explain how rules for sustainable resource use self-organize.
🔗 www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1...

Our simulations show how communities spontaneously evolve norms to distinguish cooperative from defective actions, along with mechanisms to punish norm violators. This reveals the spontaneous formation of effective institutions from the bottom-up.

Traditionally, game theory has fixed strategies and payoffs. Our approach instead describes these as functions, changing dynamically based on environmental and players' states, enabling modeling of evolving institutions.

Our framework extends traditional game theory by incorporating dynamical-systems perspectives in two key ways:
1️⃣ Players’ actions affect environmental conditions dynamically.
2️⃣ Players’ strategies evolve as “decision-making functions.”

To broadly realize sustainable resource use, we must understand the mechanisms behind the emergence and sustainability of institutions. This question motivated us to develop the evolutionary dynamical-systems game theory.

Field studies have reported cases where communities spontaneously develop institutions to sustainably manage resources. However, there are also cases where the absence or failure of institutions leads to the tragedy of the commons.

Sustainable use of common-pool resources requires cooperation, meaning individuals must use resources within appropriate limits. To achieve this, communities need "institutions"—norms defining cooperation and sanctions for violators.

Excited to share our latest paper published in PNAS!
We introduced a new theoretical framework, "evolutionary dynamical-systems game theory," to explain how rules for sustainable resource use self-organize.
🔗 www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1...