Congrats! Wonderful news!!

Taken to its logical extreme, this analysis would mean that Congress could establish only near replicas of the initial set of agencies created by the First Congress. We could not have new agencies to address new problems, like the FAA. See papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.... at pp. 1052-53 /end

One can always point out that early structures were not perfectly analogous to the FTC. It seems problematic to extend a Bruen-esque historical analogue requirement to legislative structures.

In my latest study, “during pleasure” commissions extended to quasi-private or legislative officers including officials in charge of subscriptions to BUS and the Librarian of Congress. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....

I have not seen historical evidence of core executive powers (law enforcement or otherwise) over which the President would have had a greater claim to an indefeasible removal power. It is “the executive power,” period.

Early Congresses passed statutes delegating significant law enforcement powers to private and unremovable parties. The private parties were not officers who received commissions, but they are nevertheless problematic departures from unitary theory. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.... (citing Hal Krent)

Idk but it would be great if someone made pumpkin spice candy corn!

So glad you are okay! Take it easy.

Thanks Pat!

I don't think so. This removal was for cause--pretextual cause, to be sure, but the Article II argument won't be joined. The broader problem is that he's willing to use pretext in a 1001 different settings to accomplish what would otherwise be unlawful--and everyone knows it, but won't stop it.