Mikhail Khodorkovsky
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khodorkovsky.com
Mikhail Khodorkovsky
@khodorkovsky.com
A leader of the Russian opposition, reformer. Ex-political prisoner (2003–2013). Follow for insights on current events in Russia and beyond.

My book 'How to Slay a Dragon: Building a New Russia After Putin' is available here — https://a.co/d/ai95jkW
This appearance of weakness is lethal. It invites aggression. In essence, the former policeman has decided to restore order in his own backyard — where he himself is the law. Everyone else will have to defend their own law. Or live by someone else’s. [3/3]
January 5, 2026 at 8:40 PM
Yes, this is worse than a world in which international law is genuinely upheld. But it is better than the alternative we have been slowly and steadily drifting toward — a world where democracies are seen as weak, indecisive, and incapable of direct armed confrontation. [2/3]
January 5, 2026 at 8:40 PM
Militarisation, in this context, is not temporary. Even if active fighting ebbs, conflict - real or hypothetical - is becoming the organizing principle that replaces development, reform, and ambition. In other words, Putin is no longer selling progress. He is selling endurance.

[12/13]
January 5, 2026 at 6:45 PM
Without any positive vision of Russia’s future, confrontation with the West fills the void. Europe is cast as the permanent enemy, while the United States under Donald Trump is framed as a potential deal-maker

[11/13]
January 5, 2026 at 6:45 PM
Social policy is increasingly fused with the war effort. Benefits are concentrated on soldiers and their families, while the “war hero” is elevated as the ideal citizen: loyal, obedient, traditional, and willing to subordinate private life to the state

[10/13]
January 5, 2026 at 6:45 PM
With labor reserves exhausted and unemployment at record lows, the Kremlin has no credible answer to structural stagnation. Its main response - efforts to increase the birth rate - offers no relief in the short or medium term

[9/13]
January 5, 2026 at 6:45 PM
Officially, the slowdown is framed as a choice - Russia, the regime says, is sacrificing growth in favour of stability and low inflation. But in reality, the war has shifted from being marketed as an economic stimulus to an acknowledged long-term burden

[8/13]
January 5, 2026 at 6:45 PM
The economic message Putin sent was notably bleaker than in previous years. Gone was the confident talk of war-driven growth. In its place were admissions of limited resources, slower growth, and tighter fiscal constraints

[7/13]
January 5, 2026 at 6:45 PM
That model includes the rehabilitation of pro-Russian figures and projects like “The Other Ukraine”, built around exiled politicians such as Viktor Medvedchuk and presented as proof that an alternative, Kremlin-compliant Ukraine still exists

[6/13]
January 5, 2026 at 6:45 PM
Those demands now go beyond territory and limits on Ukraine's military. The Kremlin is once again questioning Ukraine’s political legitimacy, openly gesturing toward regime change and promoting its own model of what a “legitimate” election would look like in the country

[5/13]
January 5, 2026 at 6:45 PM
On the war in Ukraine, Putin signaled “readiness” to negotiate, but dismissed any incentive to compromise. As long as the Kremlin believes the battlefield balance favors Russia and Ukraine is nearing exhaustion, its demands will remain unchanged

[4/13]
January 5, 2026 at 6:45 PM
This year, over four and a half hours, he reinforced the regime’s core priorities: war, mobilization, and confrontation with the West. He pointedly avoided any meaningful discussion of long-term development

[3/13]
January 5, 2026 at 6:45 PM
Direct Line is not a conversation, but a content hub. Its messages are designed to be clipped, repeated, and amplified across state media, turning a staged Q&A into weeks of narrative reinforcement

[2/13]
January 5, 2026 at 6:45 PM
In other words, Putin's so-called justice system — like the rest of the regime — continues to prioritize self-preservation over justice even when it comes to its own wartime goals.

[19/19]
December 30, 2025 at 3:23 PM
The pattern is familiar. After major attacks in Russia, investigations frequently result in mass arrests of peripheral figures — drivers, landlords, intermediaries — while systemic failures remain unexamined.

[18/19]
December 30, 2025 at 3:23 PM
The failure was comprehensive. Assigning guilt to these men allows the security services to claim success rather than having to explain how such an attack was possible.

[17/19]
December 30, 2025 at 3:23 PM
Lawyers argue that the verdict serves an institutional purpose. The explosives crossed multiple borders and passed several inspections, including inside Russia, before reaching the bridge.

[16/19]
December 30, 2025 at 3:23 PM
The human rights organization Memorial has recognized all eight men as political prisoners. According to Memorial, the investigation may have correctly reconstructed how the explosives traveled, but failed to demonstrate that the accused knew what they were carrying.

[15/19]
Мы считаем политзаключёнными восьмерых обвиняемых по делу о подрыве Крымского моста - Поддержка политзаключённых. Мемориал
Восьмерым мужчинам грозит до пожизненного лишения свободы из-за того, что следствие считает их причастными к взрыву 8 октября 2022 года
memopzk.org
December 30, 2025 at 3:23 PM
Defense lawyers say some of this material appeared on phones after they were seized. While polygraph tests were carried out, their results "disappeared" from the case file.

[14/19]
December 30, 2025 at 3:23 PM