Marina Ohanjanyan
@marinaohan.bsky.social
880 followers 930 following 140 posts
Clingendael Institute | Russia, Eastern Europe & South Caucasus | geopolitics | human rights | democracy | politieke junkie | opinions my own
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Reposted by Marina Ohanjanyan
jelgerg.bsky.social
A little wrap up. In Tbilisi the turnout was 31.1%, the lowest throughout the country.

Despite Georgian Dream boasting the country massively supports them as proof of their legitimacy, with 70% of capital snubbing the election and GD’s darling Kaladze must hurt some pride.
civil.ge/archives/704...
CEC’s Preliminary Results: Georgian Dream Leads with 80.7% Nationwide - Civil Georgia
The Central Election Commission (CEC) released preliminary results of the October 4 municipal electi
civil.ge
marinaohan.bsky.social
🇬🇪 Na maanden (steeds kleiner) protest in Tbilisi laait het weer op n.a.v. de lokale verkiezingen. Op de beelden massa’s demonstranten maar ook erg veel politie op de been
maks23.bsky.social
🇬🇪 Protesters in Tbilisi began storming the presidential palace!
marinaohan.bsky.social
Er broeit al enige ontevredenheid in het land vwb vooruitgang op de eerste twee punten, dus is het behalen van tastbare resultaten cruciaal. Niet alleen voor de politieke toekomst van PAS maar ook voor de geloofwaardigheid en populariteit van het Europese pad. (7/7)
marinaohan.bsky.social
Op de langere termijn krijgt PAS nu vier jaar om de beloofde hervormingen door te voeren, de economische situatie te verbeteren, en de ambitie van het EU-lidmaatschap in 2028 waar te maken. www.euronews.com/my-europe/20... (6/7)
https://euronews.com/my-europe/2025…
marinaohan.bsky.social
Op de korte termijn is de vraag nu of de al aangekondigde oppositieprotesten binnen de perken blijven, en of Rusland nu nog een (nadere) poging doet tot destabilisatie. www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/09/29/m... (5/7)
The Moscow Times
https://themoscowtimes.com/2025/09/29/mol…
marinaohan.bsky.social
Waarschijnlijk ook:
-Onze Partij, van de excentrieke Renato Usatii (ca. 6%)
- Democratie Thuis, nationalistisch-populistisch, met nauwe banden met Roemeniës George Simeon (ca. 6%) (4/7)
marinaohan.bsky.social
De andere blokken in het komende parlement zijn:
- Patriottische Blok, van traditioneel pro-Russische partijen (ca. 24%)
- Blok Alternativa, wat gematigder, met de populaire burgemeester van Chisinau Ion Ceban. PAS leek ze te zien als een wolf in schaapskleren (ca. 8%) (3/7)
marinaohan.bsky.social
PAS wint een absolute meerderheid van zo’n 51% (naar schatting zo’n 55 van de 101 zetels) en heeft geen coalitiepartners nodig. Dit is ongetwijfeld een opluchting: een coalitie vormen met één van de andere partijen die in het parlement komen zou niet makkelijk zijn. (2/7)
marinaohan.bsky.social
🇲🇩 The results are in! Met bijna alle stemmen geteld (het wachten is op een tweetal stembureaus in Canada en de VS), en de winst van PAS evident, is het tijd voor wat conclusies: (1/7)
marinaohan.bsky.social
The EU tried but didn’t manage to lead in the ARM-AZB peace process, but could still play an important role in the implementation part, which will be sorely needed if (when?) US attention shifts. But this would require very skillful diplomacy and at least some US good will. (6/6)
marinaohan.bsky.social
The deals mean different things to different powers with a vested interest. Russia has been pushed out of an important regional affair. Iran will be unhappy with increased US (commercial?) presence along its border with ARM, and Türkiye gains a direct link to Central Asia. (5/6)
marinaohan.bsky.social
Biggest uncertainty is the durability of US involvement. No mechanisms or guarantors in place to ensure progress on implementation, so it all comes down to not wanting to irritate Trump, which means his attention will be needed, and we all know how fleeting that is. (4/6)
marinaohan.bsky.social
The devil is in the details though: much still to be clarified on the formulations (different interpretations) and the implementation side of things. (3/6)
marinaohan.bsky.social
The deals reflect the ARM-AZB unequal negotiating position, with AZB the stronger party in terms of military, finance and alliances. But it also allows both to claim some wins. (2/6)
marinaohan.bsky.social
Iran has consistently resisted AZB wishes for - essentially- an extraterritorial corridor through ARM, with whom Iran traditionally has good relations. I imagine Teheran will not be happy with increased US involvement in the region. What will this do to regional relations? (8/8)
marinaohan.bsky.social
Finally, how will the other key neighbors - Türkiye and Iran - respond? Is the agreement and initiallying of the ARM-AZB peace deal enough for TRK to open its border with ARM? I argue in my recent policy brief that it would be a major game-changer (7/8) www.clingendael.org/publication/...
Armenia’s Changing Relationship With Russia
Walking the Geopolitical Tightrope
www.clingendael.org
marinaohan.bsky.social
In terms of geopolitics, with the US potentially entering the region, it will be even more difficult first Russia to reassert itself, even after Ukraine. Will it react in any substantive way? (6/8)
marinaohan.bsky.social
Also: how vested is Trump in this really, now that the photo-op has taken place and his praises have been sung? (5/8)
marinaohan.bsky.social
Many questions remain though, esp. on implementation, since the declaration is not legally binding. What does “unimpeded connectivity” entail (border control? Law enforcement?)? What does “reciprocal benefits” mean? How will security along the route be managed? (4/8)
marinaohan.bsky.social
AZB gets its direct access to Nakhichevan, Armenia keeps its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Both pledge to refrain from aggression and/or revenge. (3/8)
marinaohan.bsky.social
Overall, it does look like an actual compromise, within the margins of what could be expected. Both ARM and AZB don’t get exactly what they wanted, but both also get enough points to sell it at home. The symbolism of the whole thing could also have its own positive effects. (2/8)