Mark Rubin
LightNews LightNews
banner
markrubin.bsky.social
Mark Rubin
@markrubin.bsky.social
20K followers 1.9K following 5.4K posts
social psychology ▪︎ metascience ▪︎ philosophy of science ▪︎ higher education

Professor at Durham University, UK. He/him.

Website: https://sites.google.com/site/markrubinsocialpsychresearch/

Substack: https://markrubin.substack.com/
Posts Replies Media Videos
markrubin.bsky.social
Postdoc Position in Social and Organisational Psychology at University of Cologne

Application deadline: 15 February 2026

More info: jobportal.uni-koeln.de/ausschreibun...

#SocialPsyc #PhDSky
February 2, 2026 at 10:46 PM
markrubin.bsky.social
Miloš Taliga. (2026). Adequacy of Representations as their Approximation to Truth: A Non-factive Theory of Knowledge.

Open Access: doi.org/10.1007/s121...

#PhilSci #PhilSky
The paper introduces a new non-factive theory of knowledge, employing the recent theory of verisimilitude developed by Jakob Süskind to model the relative adequacy of representations as their approximation to truth. It makes the relation of representation one of the necessary conditions of knowledge without requiring the truth condition to be satisfied. However, the relation of knowledge to truth is built at the meta-level into the notion of the adequacy of representations, which enables the proposed theory to cover any thinkable case of research yielding real knowledge, although of a non-factive kind. Despite its universality, the theory relativizes knowledge to a set of research questions, while rejecting alethic relativism, which — it is argued — does not provide a satisfactory explanation of truth in reasoning about the growth and extinction of scientific knowledge.
February 2, 2026 at 10:33 PM
markrubin.bsky.social
Non-Factive Knowledge

"The proposal to abandon the truth condition as a necessary condition of knowledge is at least worth considering."

Open Access: doi.org/10.1007/s121...
But let us return to the problem from the beginning of this section, whether the truth condition is a necessary condition of knowledge. If it were, then, according to alethic absolutism, scientific knowledge could not evolve, change, or cease to exist because a true scientific theory cannot become either truer or false. At this point, a suggestion may arise (and does arise) that instead of truth, we should speak of degrees of truth or of approximation to truth (see, e.g., Ladyman, 2002, 232–233). The problem with this proposal is that an approximately true scientific theory is false, or as proponents of the approximation account of knowledge say, ‘approximations are not strictly true’ (Buckwalter & Turri, 2020, 94). Thus, if we consider the truth condition as a necessary condition of knowledge, approximations cannot be knowledge. Given that many scientific theories are approximations, knowledge would boil down to strictly true theories. However, knowledge understood in this way could neither evolve nor disappear, which is contrary to the fact that, at least in the realm of science, the evolution and disappearance of knowledge is an everyday affair. Therefore, the proposal to abandon the truth condition as a necessary condition of knowledge is at least worth considering.
February 2, 2026 at 10:33 PM
markrubin.bsky.social
“Our findings suggest that although respondents believe that questionable research practices should not be used, they conceded there are systemic reasons some use them.”

Open Acc: doi.org/10.1098/rsos...

BSky authors: @sarahcaroleo.bsky.social, @jesse-fleming.bsky.social, @bryancook.bsky.social
Both questionable (e.g. p-hacking) and open (e.g. pre-registration) research practices are prevalent in education research. We sought to understand the explanations given by educational researchers for why either should or should not be used. Two teams of researchers independently analysed open-ended survey responses from 1488 education researchers on their feelings about questionable and open research practices. Despite using different analytic approaches, all of the major categorizations of participant responses were similar or related across teams. Our findings suggest that although respondents believe that questionable research practices should not be used, they conceded there are systemic reasons some use them. Similarly, although respondents generally support open practices, they noted situations in which they were not appropriate or necessary for education research. These findings can serve as a catalyst for training and policy initiatives. #MetaSci #Methodology #EduSky #AcademicSky #OpenSci
February 1, 2026 at 11:31 AM
markrubin.bsky.social
"Engaging with critical perspectives can also reveal hidden assumptions about operationalizations and their relationship to psychological phenomena."
A failure to engage with critical perspectives is therefore a failing on the part of psychology. A close engagement with critical and diverse perspectives can assist mainstream practitioners in addressing fundamental issues and enhance the objectivity of their research, by forcing a reassessment of the idealization of experimental psychology and a more explicit consideration of the ideals of science. Similarly, engaging with critical perspectives can also reveal hidden assumptions about operationalizations and their relationship to psychological phenomena, thus helping address the problems we discussed earlier. This openness to critical and alternative perspectives would also align psychology better with the definition of open science provided by UNESCO, which includes openness to indigenous knowledges and other ways of knowing. Whereas the open science movement in psychology has primarily focused on reinforcing a restrictive scientific ideal at the expense of epistemic diversity (Leonelli, 2022), what are needed are mechanisms to ensure that critical voices are heard and make an impact on mainstream discussions about research practices in psychology.
February 1, 2026 at 8:24 AM
markrubin.bsky.social
"The disagreement goes deeper than research practices and stems at least in part from different understandings of the ontological status of the psychic object (stable vs. flexible object)."
A similar tension has emerged in the current discussions surrounding the replication crisis. Reformers in the open science movement emphasize reproducible and stable effects, such that experimental outcomes support drawing inferences about psychological phenomena. In contrast, challengers of direct replication argue that a lack of consistent experimental effects signifies either underdevelopment in the theoretical framework or variability across time, context, setting, and procedure, hinting at a flexible construction of the object of psychological investigation (cf. Feest, 2024; Morawski, 2022). Hence, the disagreement goes deeper than research practices and stems at least in part from different understandings of the ontological status of the psychic object (stable vs. flexible object).
February 1, 2026 at 8:24 AM
markrubin.bsky.social
Recurring Crises in Psychology

"The current responses to the replication crisis, although valuable, are not ultimate solutions because they deflect fundamental questions and postpone the reconsideration of the ideals of psychology as a science."

Open Access: doi.org/10.1177/1089...
The replication crisis shook the discipline of psychology and has led to reforms such as open science and large-scale replication projects. Yet, it is not psychology’s first crisis, and it is likely not the last. In this paper, we look at three major crisis discussions in the history of psychology: discussions in the early 20th century about the possibility of psychology as a natural-scientific discipline; discussions in the 1960s–70s about the methods, relevance and scientific status of the discipline; and discussions in the 2010s about replication. We compare these crises to determine what generates crisis discussions in psychology and how they tend to unfold and be resolved. We argue that, despite differences across these crisis discussions, some fundamental questions about the object of research and proper methods of psychology recur, as do considerations related to epistemology, ontology, ethics and politics. Our analysis indicates that the current responses to the replication crisis, although valuable, are not ultimate solutions because they deflect fundamental questions and postpone the reconsideration of the ideals of psychology as a science.
February 1, 2026 at 8:24 AM
markrubin.bsky.social
P Values and Replicability

“The actual probability of reaching the same result in a repeated experiment is conditional on truth… which we do not know.”

From Cayetano & Mantero (2021): “Conditional Uncertainty: Misinterpretations of ‘Significant’ p Values”: doi.org/10.1111/jocs...
Example 3 describes common misinterpretations of p values in null hypothesis testing, with attention concerning replication probability and violation of assumptions. The authors describe the misconception that a p value informs replication probability. Thus, if the same study was repeated using a different random sample, it is erroneously interpreted as the probability of reaching significance again. This, again, arises from misunderstanding conditional probability. The actual probability of reaching the same result in a repeated experiment is conditional on truth… which we do not know. Our p values depend on what we assume to be true in setting up the experiment (the null hypothesis), which is what we are conditioning on. If the null is true, and one would reject at p = 0.05, then a repeated experiment would have a 0.05 probability of rejection. If the alternative is true, the actual probability of rejection would depend on the true population parameters, which are unknown. Thus, the probability of replication is conditional on the actual (unknown) population parameters. It is not estimated by the p value of the original experiment.
January 31, 2026 at 1:50 PM
markrubin.bsky.social
Interesting! I think it was @brianhaig.bsky.social who recommended Brush's (2015) book to me. Seems relevant here too...

global.oup.com/academic/pro...
Before we can look into the way scientists use predictions to evaluate theories, we have to take account of an unfortunate linguistic confusion. In ordinary language “predict” means “foretell” or “prophesy,” implying a statement about future events. But physicists (and many other scientists) currently use the word to mean “deduce from a theory,” whether before or after the fact is known or has occurred. Occasionally one finds the phrase “predict in advance” used to specify prediction of a future event, and sometimes the context indicates that this is what is meant, but very little use is made of terms like retrodiction” or “postdiction.” The physicist-philosopher Henry Margenau made this quite explicit: The word prediction, as used in science, does not mean “forecast” in a temporal sense. Pre implies “prior to completed knowledge”; it does not contrast with post as does ante. The counterpart to prefix is not postfix but suffix. It is therefore unnecessary to coin a new word, postdiction, to denote what we should call prediction of the past. The use of this word, though it has been suggested, would seem a bit “preposterous.”
January 29, 2026 at 6:03 PM
markrubin.bsky.social
I realise I was sort of parroting Fisher (1956, p. 108) with that last comment BTW!
"The purpose of deductive processes is to reveal, or uncover the latent consequences of the axiomatic basis adopted. Nothing essentially new can be discovered, but the coherence of the whole structure can be usefully demonstrated, and its consistency to some extent tested. In the future these processes will perhaps be carried out better by machines than by men."
January 29, 2026 at 6:46 AM
markrubin.bsky.social
Paul Meehl (1997, p. 401):

“There is an almost irresistible temptation to move from a small p value in a significance test, via a high confidence that [statistical hypothesis] H*: δ > 0, to a (similarly high) confidence that the substantive theory T...is true”

meehl.umn.edu/sites/meehl....

#Stats
To think clearly about this, one must recognize the distinction between the substantive theory T (causal, or compositional, or both) being appraised and some statistical hypothesis H* that supposedly flows from it. Hardly any statistics textbooks and, so far as I have been able to find out, hardly any statistics or psychology professors lecturing on this process bother to make that distinction, let alone emphasize it. A substantive causal theory, such as Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance or Meehl’s theory of schizotaxia, consists of a set of statements about theoretical entities that are causally connected in certain ways, and these statements are never equivalent to a mere assertion about such and such a population parameter. Despite this obvious conceptual difference between T and H*, there is an almost irresistible temptation to move from a small p value in a significance test, via a high confidence that H*: δ > 0, to a (similarly high) confidence that the substantive theory T (which entailed that nonzero directional δ) is true, or at least has high verisimilitude. The trouble is that the directional nonzero δ can be derived from other theories than T, and in the “soft” areas of psychology a sizable number of those competing theories have plausibility.
January 26, 2026 at 3:43 PM
markrubin.bsky.social
Jerzy Neyman (1950, p. 290) on the distinction between “statistical” and “nonstatistical” (primary) hypotheses.
archive.org/details/firs...

"[The] connection is frequently loose and there is the most unfortunate possibility of one being correct while the other is false."

#Stats #statstab
The second important circumstance to have in mind is that in planning an experiment, we usually have in mind the verification of a hypothesis [h] which is not a statistical hypothesis. In order to be able to use the theory of statistics, an experiment is planned and it is postulated that its outcome will determine particular values of some random variables. Regarding these random variables, a statistical hypothesis H is then formulated so as to be intimately related to the nonstatistical hypothesis [h]. However, H is never identical with [h]. In spite of efforts to achieve a close connection between the primary non-statistical hypothesis [h] and the corresponding statistical hypothesis H, this connection is frequently loose and there is the most unfortunate possibility of one being correct while the other is false. In this case the frequency of correct conclusions regarding the statistical hypothesis tested may be in perfect agreement with the predictions of the power function, but not the frequency of correct conclusions regarding the primary hypothesis [h].
January 26, 2026 at 2:53 PM
markrubin.bsky.social
Hypothesis or Model?

"Although many scientists use the term 'hypothesis' when they mean 'model,' we will maintain the distinction that the hypothesis is an unproven premise whereas the model is data derived, to discriminate between 'top-down premise/
deduction' and 'bottom-up data/induction'.”
Two terms used as frameworks for scientific experimentation—the “hypothesis” and the “model”—carry distinct philosophical assumptions, with important consequences for the practicing scientist. Glass, D. J., & Hall, N. (2008). A brief history of the hypothesis. Cell, 134(3), 378-381.
January 26, 2026 at 12:28 PM
markrubin.bsky.social
"There is an asymmetry in the study of trust in science: instead of examining the full spectrum from extreme distrust to extreme trust, it is heavily skewed towards the distrust end."

By Petar Lukić and @iriszez.bsky.social

doi.org/10.1007/s111...
This paper highlights an ideological neglect in the scientific community’s study of trust in science. While science skepticism (e.g., science denial, anti-scientific conspiracy theories, belief in pseudoscience) has deservedly received vast attention, the opposite extreme - uncritical trust in science (scientism) - is largely overlooked. Scientism idealizes science as all-powerful, capable of establishing absolute truth and solving all problems, while simultaneously exhibiting an unwillingness to accept criticism of its limitations. Despite being notably under-researched, rare findings suggest scientistic beliefs share a similar cognitive footprint with anti-scientific beliefs, being positively related to dogmatism and negatively to cognitive reflection and general cognitive abilities. Outcomes of this uncritical trust include vulnerability to “scientific signaling”, i.e., to meaningless claims using quasi-scientific language or overestimating data value due to irrelevant illustrations or formulae. Furthermore, blind trust can lead to societal polarization, with those who uncritically trust science and scientists being prone to supporting punitive measures against science skeptics. This ideological neglect is potentially driven by scientists’ self-defensive motivations, despite recognizing its contradiction to science’s core principle of organized skepticism. An integral approach to studying trust in science is proposed, with epistemic and political implications. These suggest studying similarities between trust and distrust in science, and urging for critical engagement with science, acknowledging its entanglement with economic and political interests. Practical recommendations include thorough conceptual and empirical exploration of uncritical trust, moving beyond simplistic “trust us” messaging and ensuring scientific authority remains accountable and open to scrutiny. #PhilSci #SocialPsyc #MetaSci #AcademicSky
January 21, 2026 at 5:37 PM
markrubin.bsky.social
Drawing inspiration from Allport’s classic intergroup contact theory, Paolini et al. introduce contact rupture — moments when habits are disrupted.

Lifespan and macro-level ruptures reveal when and how contact can drive change and social cohesion.
January 21, 2026 at 9:04 AM
markrubin.bsky.social
New work by Stefania Paolini & Patrick Kotzur (@durhampsych.bsky.social) and international team proposes a rupture-habit model to make sense of emerging findings in everyday intergroup contact.

Paywall: doi.org/10.1038/s441...

Free Access Link: trebuchet.public.springernature.app/get_content/...
Abstract According to intergroup contact theory, meaningful interactions between members of different social identity groups can lead to decreases in prejudice. However, the literature on intergroup contact has generally emphasized contact-based interventions that involve positive contact experiences in highly controlled environments like research laboratories or classrooms, or infrequent intimate intergroup contact experiences, like intergroup friendships. In this Perspective, we review the literature on how intergroup contact manifests in everyday settings, which challenges established views that contact is readily available, positive and leads to consistently positive within-person changes. We describe how variations in contact valence and environmental affordances for self-selection influence individual- and macro-level segregation dynamics, which create conditions for stable trajectories of contact and intergroup bias, or contact habits. We then propose a habit–rupture model of contact, according to which changes in intergroup relations through lifespan and macro-level disruptions act as ruptures, leading to the development of new contact habits. Considering contact and its effects through a habit and rupture lens identifies realistic and ecologically valid opportunities to apply intergroup contact in the service of the social good.
January 21, 2026 at 9:04 AM
markrubin.bsky.social
"Drawing on philosophy of science (e.g., Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Roy Bhaskar, Rom Harré, John Searle) and theoretical alternatives (e.g., critical realism, constructivism, Luhmannian systems theory), we welcome...[work] from psychology, philosophy, systems theory, and related disciplines."
What does the replication crisis imply about the status, structure, and validation of psychological theories? o Do recurring replication failures point primarily to measurement problems, construct problems, theory problems, or specific combinations of these? o How do methodological norms shape the kinds of theories psychology produces and the meanings those theories can (and cannot) express? o What alternative conceptions of mind/psyche (e.g., constructivist, system-theoretical, relational, critical realist) suggest different standards for explanation, evidence, and generalization? o How should psychology rethink the relationship between method and meaning when evaluating theoretical claims? #PsycSci #PhilSci #MetaSci
January 20, 2026 at 8:32 PM
markrubin.bsky.social
New Review of Activism and Mental Health

"The most commonly reported beneficial effects of activism were enhanced empowerment, wellbeing, and buffering against the impact of discrimination"

By Guanlan Mao, @profjohndrury.bsky.social, @ox-research.bsky.social et al

Preprint: osf.io/preprints/ps...
Stigmatised groups tend to suffer worse mental health. One problem faced by members of stigmatised groups is self-stigma, the internalisation of negative stereotypes. Research has shown that increased empowerment and a positive group identity can reduce self-stigma and its consequences. Research on the mental health consequences of collective action, or activism, suggests that participation in activism can improve wellbeing by providing empowerment and social identification. No review to date has looked specifically at the wellbeing effects of activism for stigmatised groups. A mixed-methods systematic review was conducted which sought to identify the consequences of participation in activism for the mental health of individuals facing stigma on the basis of race, sexuality, gender, and health status. The literature search identified 36 articles: 24 quantitative, 10 qualitative, and one using mixed methods. A convergent integrated approach was utilised and eight synthesised themes were generated covering direct associations, buffering and exacerbating effects, positive and negative mechanisms, and moderating factors. The most commonly reported beneficial effects of activism were enhanced empowerment, wellbeing, and buffering against the impact of discrimination. The most commonly reported detrimental effects of activism were burnout and increased depression. A number of promising directions for future research are identified.
January 19, 2026 at 5:16 PM
markrubin.bsky.social
"For first-generation, low-income students, ... better well-being is uniquely and consistently linked to similarity and academic support in their friend networks."

Paywall: doi.org/10.1177/0146...
College students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds often report worse well-being compared to their more privileged peers. This study investigates whether disparities in well-being are associated with relational experiences, with a focus on friendship dynamics. Using a year-long multiwave survey, we investigate key features of friend networks that are linked to well-being among first-generation, low-income (FLI) students and their continuing-generation, higher-income (CHI) peers. We find that, for FLI students, better well-being is uniquely and consistently linked to similarity and academic support in their friend networks. Furthermore, disparities in well-being between FLI and CHI students are largest when FLI students' friend networks are more socioeconomically diverse and completely mitigated when they are less diverse. These findings underscore that in socioeconomically diverse college environments, friendships are not one-size-fits-all in their ability to meet the needs of individuals.
January 17, 2026 at 8:36 AM
markrubin.bsky.social
Protective Factors

Positive psychological
character, intrinsic academic motivation, active involvement in learning, and social support.

#AcademicSky #PhDSky #UKHE #SocialPsyc #SchoolPsyc #EduSky #HigherEd #MentalHealth
Fig. 3 illustrates various protective factors that can lower the risk of burnout in students, which are divided into seven main domains: posi tive psychological character, academic engagement and motivation, social support, emotional and social well-being, coping strategies, aca demic environment, and demographic and individual factors. Psycho logical characteristics such as self-efficacy, resilience, optimism, and self-regulation skills help students manage stress more adaptively. In academic contexts, healthy motivation—both intrinsic and extrin sic—and high emotional and cognitive involvement in the learning process strengthen mental resilience. These factors are enriched by positive assignment scores, mastery goal orientation, and academic persistence. In addition to internal aspects, external support such as positive re lationships with family, peers, and lecturers has proven to be important in maintaining psychological well-being. Good sleep quality, emotional intelligence, empathy, and a balance between studies and personal life also support emotional stability. Adaptive coping strategies, participa tion in counseling services, and involvement in the campus community further strengthen protection against burnout. A supportive academic environment, adequate technical infrastructure, and satisfaction with the study program and learning interests also strengthen students' resilience. Overall, this picture confirms that the prevention of burnout requires a comprehensive approach that includes strengthening pro tective factors both from within the student and from the surrounding environment.
January 17, 2026 at 8:02 AM
markrubin.bsky.social
Risks

Academic pressure, vulnerable psychological conditions, limited social support, unhealthy lifestyles, and inadequate educational infrastructure.
Fig. 2 presents a comprehensive classification of the risk factors that contribute to student burnout, which is divided into seven main do mains: academic workload, psychological & emotional factors, tech nology & remote learning, health & lifestyle, financial & resource constraints, social & environmental support, and personal characteris tics & demographics. In the context of academic load, pressure comes from a dense curriculum, excessive workload, limited time, and a competitive learning environment. This pressure is reinforced by pro longed study load imbalances and high-performance expectations. Psychological factors such as stress, anxiety, perfectionism, and low self-efficacy significantly increase susceptibility to burnout, especially when accompanied using maladaptive coping strategies. Social prob lems such as isolation, interpersonal conflicts, and lack of support from lecturers or families also worsen students' mental conditions. In addi tion, economic pressures, inadequate educational infrastructure, and technostress due to online learning contribute as external factors that increase the risk. Personal characteristics such as age, gender, external motivations, and individual differences such as fear of missing out (FoMO) further add to the complexity of these risk factors.
January 17, 2026 at 8:02 AM
markrubin.bsky.social
New systematic review of academic burnout
(exhaustion, inadequacy, and cynicism) among students

Open Access: doi.org/10.1016/j.ss...
In the contemporary educational landscape, academic burnout (exhaustion, inadequacy, and cynicism) has emerged as an urgent psychological and educational issue that threatens various educational outcomes and academic adjustment. Understanding the risk and protective factors of burnout is also essential for developing effective strategies and more targeted interventions to prevent psychological exhaustion and promote well-being, particularly in academic and professional settings. The systematic literature review aims to synthesize the key risk and protective factors associated with burnout, drawing on evidence from diverse populations and contexts. Following PRISMA guidelines, a systematic search of databases was conducted up to July 2025 and identified a total of 1744 citations of which 50 studies were included in the qualitative analysis. The review identifies a range of interrelated risk factors—spanning academic, psychological, personal, social, and structural domains—highlighting that academic burnout among students is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. Thus, protection against burnout requires a holistic approach that includes strengthening individual character, strong social support, developing adaptive learning and coping strategies, and providing a healthy academic environment. This review seeks to inform the design of targeted interventions and guide policymakers, educators, and institutional stakeholders in mitigating burnout and fostering resilience.
January 17, 2026 at 8:02 AM
markrubin.bsky.social
"Social nothingness: A phenomenological investigation" (2022)

doi.org/10.1177/1368...
January 15, 2026 at 10:32 PM
markrubin.bsky.social
"The Psychological Emptiness Scale: a psychometric evaluation" (2024)

doi.org/10.1192/bjo....
January 15, 2026 at 10:32 PM
markrubin.bsky.social
Including teaching on critical thinking….

doi.org/10.1016/j.je...
Misplaced trust: When trust in science fosters belief in pseudoscience and the benefits of critical evaluation At a time when pseudoscience threatens the survival of communities, understanding this vulnerability, and how to reduce it, is paramount. Four preregistered experiments (N = 532, N = 472, N = 605, N = 382) with online U.S. samples introduced false claims concerning a (fictional) virus created as a bioweapon, mirroring conspiracy theories about COVID-19, and carcinogenic effects of GMOs (Genetically Modified Organisms). We identify two critical determinants of vulnerability to pseudoscience. First, participants who trust science are more likely to believe and disseminate false claims that contain scientific references than false claims that do not. Second, reminding participants of the value of critical evaluation reduces belief in false claims, whereas reminders of the value of trusting science do not. We conclude that trust in science, although desirable in many ways, makes people vulnerable to pseudoscience. These findings have implications for science broadly and the application of psychological science to curbing misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic.
January 11, 2026 at 12:49 PM