Philip Goff
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philipgoff.bsky.social
Philip Goff
@philipgoff.bsky.social
Philosophy Prof. Heretical Christian. Author of "Why? The Purpose of the Universe" & "Galileo's Error." "One of the most persuasive panpsychists" - Stephen Fry.
...mis-conceptualisation of the phenomenon. Paley, in contrast, was focusing on the same problem Darwin was.
February 17, 2026 at 7:45 PM
Let's concede with the sake of the discussion you're completely right about that, Keith, and you've correctly identified the mistake I'm making. Still, it's got nothing to do with the errors of Paley. If you're right, I'm erroneously focusing on a false problem resulting from..
February 17, 2026 at 7:45 PM
I don't think we have any direct access to the nature of life, unless you're equating it with consciousness. Otherwise, it's just a matter of explaining the complex observable structures associated with life.
February 17, 2026 at 7:41 PM
Fair enough, but I don't see how that removes the dis-analogy. Paley and Darwin had the same explanatory project, they just offered different solutions. You and I have different explanatory projects because we conceptualise the phenomenon in different ways.
February 17, 2026 at 4:54 PM
..The dispute is whether I am conceptualising consciousness correctly. I can see how you could challenge me on fine-tuning with Paley, but not consciousness.
February 17, 2026 at 12:16 PM
Exactly. Paley and Darwin were trying to explain the same thing, they just offered very different explanations, and we all prefer Darwin's. But with consciousness, the 3 of us agree that if I'm conceptualising consciousness correctly, there's a unique problem conventional science can't deal with...
February 17, 2026 at 12:15 PM
...conceptualise consciousness is correct or not. If we are, then there's a unique problem, distinct from standard scientific problems. If not, not. There's nothing analogous to this in Paley. We just focus on debating whether the way Block and I conceptualise consciousness is correct.
February 17, 2026 at 12:05 PM
But then it's not analogous. Keith: you and I agree (correct me if not) that if Block (as rep of type B) and I are right about how to conceptualise consciousness, then we can't explain consciousness in conventional scientific terms. The dispute is whether the way Block and I...
February 17, 2026 at 12:04 PM
Really? What was the corresponding conceptualisation of life for Paley?
February 17, 2026 at 10:25 AM
...and Block et al on the other, concerns our view about the nature of modality. Hence, you're committed to saying that there's some fairly recent scientific discovery that renders the view of modality held by me and Chalmers equivalent to flat earth. Doesn't seem plausible to me.
February 17, 2026 at 8:53 AM
I might post this next time someone says illusionists deny consciousness.
February 17, 2026 at 8:31 AM
To press the point slightly further, presumably you don't want to say Ned Block is in the flat Earther camp, otherwise you're stuck with saying that all philosophers except the 16% who deny the conceivability of zombies are flat earthers. But the difference between me/Chalmers on one hand...
February 17, 2026 at 8:26 AM
...and natural design were also conceived of in ways such that if those ways of conceiving of them were correct, it would be impossible to explain them in the terms of physical science?
February 17, 2026 at 8:19 AM
Fair enough, that's helpful. So we agree that Ned Block conceptualises consciousness in a way that makes it impossible to explain in the terms of physical science, even though he doesn't accept that this is so, right? But then, is the analogy to life pertinent, in that case? Do you think life...
February 17, 2026 at 8:18 AM
...we could just respectfully engage with the arguments instead of going through this silly 'You don't get the science' stuff.
February 16, 2026 at 8:44 PM
...the other tasks of physical science (or so we anti-physicalists think). It's not obvious that this is true, but it's not obvious that it's false. That's what makes it a challenging and ongoing philosophical question. I wish...
February 16, 2026 at 8:43 PM
...philosophical disagreement is that anti-physicalists think this immediate awareness reveals to us something about their nature (e.g. what it's like to see red), something that cannot be discerned from third-person science. This then sets up a unique explanatory task, very different from...
February 16, 2026 at 8:43 PM
...(due to their philosophical views on the nature of modality) infer a metaphysical gap from the conceptual gap?

Many/most philosophers agree that we have a very close epistemic relationship with our conscious states: in some sense we're immediately aware of them. The core of the...
February 16, 2026 at 8:42 PM
Which scientific advance do you think it was that rendered @davidchalmers.bsky.social equivalent to a flat-earther? Are philosophers like Ned Block who think there's a conceptual but not metaphysical distinction between consciousness and the physical flat-eathers too, or just the ones that...
February 16, 2026 at 8:41 PM
...there's got to be something that distinguishes it from a posteriori physicalism?
February 16, 2026 at 8:32 PM
I have a different thought though. Keith: Your responses here sound indiscernible from a posteriori physicalism. Where is the *illusionism* in your current position? I appreciate illusionism isn't an unqualified denial of consciousness, but surely...
February 16, 2026 at 8:32 PM
Thanks for channeling me so well Mark! If I tragically die in near future, can you take over my social media? 😂
February 16, 2026 at 8:29 PM
...but similarly, arguing against it is not anti-scientific. We've always had respectful and productive discussions before. I don't get why that's changed.
February 16, 2026 at 5:10 PM