Michael McGettigan
@pnwdisaster.bsky.social
Pain of Reason
Philosophy in Portland Oregon
Boston University
University of Tübingen
Loyola University Chicago
Philosophy in Portland Oregon
Boston University
University of Tübingen
Loyola University Chicago
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What makes philosophical concepts meaningful, as opposed to ordinary words which a context makes clear?
Philosophical concepts are not such as to be anchored in definite sensory experiences
Why are they not just poetic creations meant to be beautiful, satisfying and inspiring?
What makes philosophical concepts meaningful, as opposed to ordinary words which a context makes clear?
Philosophical concepts are not such as to be anchored in definite sensory experiences
Why are they not just poetic creations meant to be beautiful, satisfying and inspiring?
June 2, 2025 at 3:57 PM
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What makes philosophical concepts meaningful, as opposed to ordinary words which a context makes clear?
Philosophical concepts are not such as to be anchored in definite sensory experiences
Why are they not just poetic creations meant to be beautiful, satisfying and inspiring?
What makes philosophical concepts meaningful, as opposed to ordinary words which a context makes clear?
Philosophical concepts are not such as to be anchored in definite sensory experiences
Why are they not just poetic creations meant to be beautiful, satisfying and inspiring?
Bluesky might be a bust for first philosophy geeks like me.
Sad!
Sad!
May 11, 2025 at 5:01 PM
Bluesky might be a bust for first philosophy geeks like me.
Sad!
Sad!
Once we see this, we realize that "intelligibility" is just another *name* for this formal identity of thought-thing-declarative sentence. We remain within the ambit of the intelligible by forging concepts from this identity, or we eschew truth by espousing "views" outside it.
Philosophical intelligibility hinges on the formal identity of things, thoughts, and declarative sentences.
Philosophical concepts fix their meaning by originating in this structure.
Any concept not drawn from the originary structure, diminishes intelligibility by addition
Philosophical concepts fix their meaning by originating in this structure.
Any concept not drawn from the originary structure, diminishes intelligibility by addition
May 3, 2025 at 2:04 PM
Once we see this, we realize that "intelligibility" is just another *name* for this formal identity of thought-thing-declarative sentence. We remain within the ambit of the intelligible by forging concepts from this identity, or we eschew truth by espousing "views" outside it.
Philosophical intelligibility hinges on the formal identity of things, thoughts, and declarative sentences.
Philosophical concepts fix their meaning by originating in this structure.
Any concept not drawn from the originary structure, diminishes intelligibility by addition
Philosophical concepts fix their meaning by originating in this structure.
Any concept not drawn from the originary structure, diminishes intelligibility by addition
May 3, 2025 at 2:03 PM
Philosophical intelligibility hinges on the formal identity of things, thoughts, and declarative sentences.
Philosophical concepts fix their meaning by originating in this structure.
Any concept not drawn from the originary structure, diminishes intelligibility by addition
Philosophical concepts fix their meaning by originating in this structure.
Any concept not drawn from the originary structure, diminishes intelligibility by addition
Where the method of division (dihairesis) or analysis predominates, mathematics will always appear to be first philosophy.
But this is an artifact of the method, not a fact about things überhaupt.
But this is an artifact of the method, not a fact about things überhaupt.
May 1, 2025 at 5:12 PM
Where the method of division (dihairesis) or analysis predominates, mathematics will always appear to be first philosophy.
But this is an artifact of the method, not a fact about things überhaupt.
But this is an artifact of the method, not a fact about things überhaupt.
The *act* of dividing yields ultimate beings such as elements, numbers and parts *as if they were true beginnings*
These are products of the kind of understanding internal to the act of division. Aristotle finds the archai internal to the understanding of the act of *explaining* are those of things
These are products of the kind of understanding internal to the act of division. Aristotle finds the archai internal to the understanding of the act of *explaining* are those of things
In Aristotle's Metaphysics it helps to notice that
everything he opposes results from taking the method of philosophical inquiry into first things to be *division*: elements, numbers, parts are the result of the act of dividing. This act is the problem, its unity, the solution
everything he opposes results from taking the method of philosophical inquiry into first things to be *division*: elements, numbers, parts are the result of the act of dividing. This act is the problem, its unity, the solution
May 1, 2025 at 4:47 PM
The *act* of dividing yields ultimate beings such as elements, numbers and parts *as if they were true beginnings*
These are products of the kind of understanding internal to the act of division. Aristotle finds the archai internal to the understanding of the act of *explaining* are those of things
These are products of the kind of understanding internal to the act of division. Aristotle finds the archai internal to the understanding of the act of *explaining* are those of things
I'd say that philosophical concepts attained their proper interweaving determinations when Aristotle developed all the fundamental ones by disclosing the inner form of the declarative sentence: in this what a thing is, the thought of it and the linguistic expression coincide
May 1, 2025 at 4:18 PM
I'd say that philosophical concepts attained their proper interweaving determinations when Aristotle developed all the fundamental ones by disclosing the inner form of the declarative sentence: in this what a thing is, the thought of it and the linguistic expression coincide
I recommend undergoing dialectic, strenuously, for a while to see how the pressure of arguments, drawing implications, reveals the subjective character (arbitrary, conventional, not yet conceptual) of the use of terms, indirectly exposing the forms they strive to make apparent.
May 1, 2025 at 4:17 PM
I recommend undergoing dialectic, strenuously, for a while to see how the pressure of arguments, drawing implications, reveals the subjective character (arbitrary, conventional, not yet conceptual) of the use of terms, indirectly exposing the forms they strive to make apparent.
In Aristotle's Metaphysics it helps to notice that
everything he opposes results from taking the method of philosophical inquiry into first things to be *division*: elements, numbers, parts are the result of the act of dividing. This act is the problem, its unity, the solution
everything he opposes results from taking the method of philosophical inquiry into first things to be *division*: elements, numbers, parts are the result of the act of dividing. This act is the problem, its unity, the solution
May 1, 2025 at 4:17 PM
In Aristotle's Metaphysics it helps to notice that
everything he opposes results from taking the method of philosophical inquiry into first things to be *division*: elements, numbers, parts are the result of the act of dividing. This act is the problem, its unity, the solution
everything he opposes results from taking the method of philosophical inquiry into first things to be *division*: elements, numbers, parts are the result of the act of dividing. This act is the problem, its unity, the solution
Thread:
1/ Aristotle shows how the relation of teacher to learner is not two acts, but one, and is asymmetrical: the teacher teaches only if the student learns. The receiver determines whether the action happens. This retroactive conferral of activity by the recipient holds for thought:
1/ Aristotle shows how the relation of teacher to learner is not two acts, but one, and is asymmetrical: the teacher teaches only if the student learns. The receiver determines whether the action happens. This retroactive conferral of activity by the recipient holds for thought:
April 20, 2025 at 3:54 PM
Thread:
1/ Aristotle shows how the relation of teacher to learner is not two acts, but one, and is asymmetrical: the teacher teaches only if the student learns. The receiver determines whether the action happens. This retroactive conferral of activity by the recipient holds for thought:
1/ Aristotle shows how the relation of teacher to learner is not two acts, but one, and is asymmetrical: the teacher teaches only if the student learns. The receiver determines whether the action happens. This retroactive conferral of activity by the recipient holds for thought:
When I say what I think about Socrates, I say: "Socrates is pale."
When I say what Socrates is, I say "Socrates is pale."
"Socrates is pale" is both what I think and what is. It is the one form whose *own* internal formal difference is expressed as "being" and as "thinking".
When I say what Socrates is, I say "Socrates is pale."
"Socrates is pale" is both what I think and what is. It is the one form whose *own* internal formal difference is expressed as "being" and as "thinking".
April 19, 2025 at 7:17 PM
When I say what I think about Socrates, I say: "Socrates is pale."
When I say what Socrates is, I say "Socrates is pale."
"Socrates is pale" is both what I think and what is. It is the one form whose *own* internal formal difference is expressed as "being" and as "thinking".
When I say what Socrates is, I say "Socrates is pale."
"Socrates is pale" is both what I think and what is. It is the one form whose *own* internal formal difference is expressed as "being" and as "thinking".
Candidates for ousia are made evident only by considering the form of judgment.
S is P. P is said of S. If S is an independent thing (Socrates) he is a body that moves. So P is said of matter and P is form. But form is species which presupposes genus so genus must be prior. But Socrates is determinate, matter not so what it is to be Socrates comes into view.
April 5, 2025 at 5:57 PM
Candidates for ousia are made evident only by considering the form of judgment.
S is P. P is said of S. If S is an independent thing (Socrates) he is a body that moves. So P is said of matter and P is form. But form is species which presupposes genus so genus must be prior. But Socrates is determinate, matter not so what it is to be Socrates comes into view.
April 5, 2025 at 5:57 PM
S is P. P is said of S. If S is an independent thing (Socrates) he is a body that moves. So P is said of matter and P is form. But form is species which presupposes genus so genus must be prior. But Socrates is determinate, matter not so what it is to be Socrates comes into view.
In Aristotle for a thing to be independent it must be essentially the rule according to which its parts are *its* parts. In this sense it must be prior to the parts. So what independence is essentially is a rule, not a law, that circumscribes, but does not compel, its activity.
April 5, 2025 at 5:42 PM
In Aristotle for a thing to be independent it must be essentially the rule according to which its parts are *its* parts. In this sense it must be prior to the parts. So what independence is essentially is a rule, not a law, that circumscribes, but does not compel, its activity.
Thought was so transparent to the Greeks that they simply went ahead and knew the *things* κατὰ τὸν λόγον
April 2, 2025 at 4:01 PM
Thought was so transparent to the Greeks that they simply went ahead and knew the *things* κατὰ τὸν λόγον
More people should be mining the "Grenzgebiet von Logik, Ontologie und Sprachphilosophie" opened up by Josef König's "Sein und Denken"
April 2, 2025 at 4:00 PM
More people should be mining the "Grenzgebiet von Logik, Ontologie und Sprachphilosophie" opened up by Josef König's "Sein und Denken"
The method of disclosure of the being of things is not *division* that leads to elements and constituents but saying something of something (katagorein) which leads to matter as capacity, form as activity, and a purposive cosmos: capacities are directed, they are *for* something!
April 2, 2025 at 3:59 PM
The method of disclosure of the being of things is not *division* that leads to elements and constituents but saying something of something (katagorein) which leads to matter as capacity, form as activity, and a purposive cosmos: capacities are directed, they are *for* something!
One marvels that when philosophers turned to thought to discover its form, it became evident that, like Aristotle's ousia, their structure is that of predication. By 1800 it was clear that the structure of things, of assertions about things, and of thoughts of things was one and the same structure.
April 2, 2025 at 3:58 PM
One marvels that when philosophers turned to thought to discover its form, it became evident that, like Aristotle's ousia, their structure is that of predication. By 1800 it was clear that the structure of things, of assertions about things, and of thoughts of things was one and the same structure.
Aristotle was the first to explicitly recognize: saying what something is, is identical to saying what one thinks about it; so describing the thought is describing the thing: the unity of being and thinking
The form of this unity is "something belongs to something", ti kata tinos is form of being
The form of this unity is "something belongs to something", ti kata tinos is form of being
March 23, 2025 at 6:21 AM
Aristotle was the first to explicitly recognize: saying what something is, is identical to saying what one thinks about it; so describing the thought is describing the thing: the unity of being and thinking
The form of this unity is "something belongs to something", ti kata tinos is form of being
The form of this unity is "something belongs to something", ti kata tinos is form of being
The difference between mimesis and methexis is whether the craftsman's idea contains limiting material elements, making it imaginary, or contains only the purpose and the good of the thing without material elements and therefore is purely noetic, compatible with any suitable ὕλη
μίμησις: craftsman *imagines* a table she saw at Restoration Hardware and actualizes it in suitable material.
μέθεξις: craftsman *grasps* what a table is *for* and makes her own table in the light of the good table she has grasped but not imagined; she is not limited by a μορφή.
μέθεξις: craftsman *grasps* what a table is *for* and makes her own table in the light of the good table she has grasped but not imagined; she is not limited by a μορφή.
March 19, 2025 at 5:05 PM
The difference between mimesis and methexis is whether the craftsman's idea contains limiting material elements, making it imaginary, or contains only the purpose and the good of the thing without material elements and therefore is purely noetic, compatible with any suitable ὕλη
μίμησις: craftsman *imagines* a table she saw at Restoration Hardware and actualizes it in suitable material.
μέθεξις: craftsman *grasps* what a table is *for* and makes her own table in the light of the good table she has grasped but not imagined; she is not limited by a μορφή.
μέθεξις: craftsman *grasps* what a table is *for* and makes her own table in the light of the good table she has grasped but not imagined; she is not limited by a μορφή.
March 19, 2025 at 5:05 PM
μίμησις: craftsman *imagines* a table she saw at Restoration Hardware and actualizes it in suitable material.
μέθεξις: craftsman *grasps* what a table is *for* and makes her own table in the light of the good table she has grasped but not imagined; she is not limited by a μορφή.
μέθεξις: craftsman *grasps* what a table is *for* and makes her own table in the light of the good table she has grasped but not imagined; she is not limited by a μορφή.
"When we describe what is *as such*, we describe what we think or assert *as such*. Nominally speaking: the form of reality is the form of thought."
The *as such* syntactically expresses the identity of form. This is how we think the Parmenidean identity of being and thought.
The *as such* syntactically expresses the identity of form. This is how we think the Parmenidean identity of being and thought.
"Wenn man das, was ist, als solches beschreibt, beschreibt man, was man denkt oder aussagt, als solches. Nominal ausgedrückt: Die Form des Wirklichen ist die Form des Denkens."
Rödl, Zweifel Bleiben (2006)
Review of Willaschek: Der Mentale Zugang zur Welt
Rödl, Zweifel Bleiben (2006)
Review of Willaschek: Der Mentale Zugang zur Welt
March 19, 2025 at 4:28 PM
"When we describe what is *as such*, we describe what we think or assert *as such*. Nominally speaking: the form of reality is the form of thought."
The *as such* syntactically expresses the identity of form. This is how we think the Parmenidean identity of being and thought.
The *as such* syntactically expresses the identity of form. This is how we think the Parmenidean identity of being and thought.
"Wenn man das, was ist, als solches beschreibt, beschreibt man, was man denkt oder aussagt, als solches. Nominal ausgedrückt: Die Form des Wirklichen ist die Form des Denkens."
Rödl, Zweifel Bleiben (2006)
Review of Willaschek: Der Mentale Zugang zur Welt
Rödl, Zweifel Bleiben (2006)
Review of Willaschek: Der Mentale Zugang zur Welt
March 19, 2025 at 4:27 PM
"Wenn man das, was ist, als solches beschreibt, beschreibt man, was man denkt oder aussagt, als solches. Nominal ausgedrückt: Die Form des Wirklichen ist die Form des Denkens."
Rödl, Zweifel Bleiben (2006)
Review of Willaschek: Der Mentale Zugang zur Welt
Rödl, Zweifel Bleiben (2006)
Review of Willaschek: Der Mentale Zugang zur Welt
It is the scope & looseness of Greek philosophical concepts that, making us think their sense clearly and with self-discipline allows us to know what it is to grasp the purely noetic as we understand our activity to be just that
Such thought cannot be imposed but only actualized
Such thought cannot be imposed but only actualized
March 15, 2025 at 7:43 PM
It is the scope & looseness of Greek philosophical concepts that, making us think their sense clearly and with self-discipline allows us to know what it is to grasp the purely noetic as we understand our activity to be just that
Such thought cannot be imposed but only actualized
Such thought cannot be imposed but only actualized
Knowing something as something, we know its opposite as well. That is why knowing something as something includes in the very thought the possibility of its not being the case. This is the inner finitude of what is so known: the shudder of non-being in every being.
March 14, 2025 at 4:53 AM
Knowing something as something, we know its opposite as well. That is why knowing something as something includes in the very thought the possibility of its not being the case. This is the inner finitude of what is so known: the shudder of non-being in every being.