Why and how did this happen? In my new article in @ripejournal.bsky.social , I seek to answer this question.
www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YEAA9...

However, at some point, they began to support, and even demand, a deal. This fundamentally altered Mercosur’s political economy, as the main source of opposition vanished.

As representatives of distributive losers from an agreement, they used to firmly oppose it – pretty much like farmers in Europe continue doing so to this day.

The article is available here
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/share/author...

I conduct a single-case longitudinal study with three pre-specified stages: from the run-up to the 2019 ‘agreement in principle’; the paralysis within the EU (mid- 2019–2022); and the renegotiation that led to an updated agreement with uncertain prospects (2023–2024)

I focus on the evolution of three factors throughout the negotiation: the EU’s geopolitical incentives, as part of the ‘geopoliticization’ and ‘geoeconomic turn’ trend; EU’s trade negotiations ‘politicization’; domestic political economy constraints in both the EU and Mercosur

In the paper, I explore the reasons for the latest push to conclude the EU-Mercosur agreement, as well as the reasons for the challenges it still faces.

The book is available here link.springer.com/book/10.1007... If having troubles with access, send me a DM

As the European Union - Mercosur trade agreement seems to be back on the agenda, the book may be of interest for those seeking to understand the stances of Mercosur industry and its influence on the negotiation.

In addition to a novel theoretical argument, the book offers in-depth case studies of Brazil and Argentina’s peak industry organizations, CNI, FIESP, and UIA, and their preferences on north-south trade agreements

The book addresses two relevant yet understudied questions in field of IPE: 1) what explains the trade policy preferences of the organizations that represent economic producers in the political sphere? 2) how they are formed?