NEP-DES: Economic Design
repec-nep-des.bsky.social
NEP-DES: Economic Design
@repec-nep-des.bsky.social
The latest working papers from RePEc. NEP report DES (Economic Design)
https://nep.repec.org/
Bayesian Persuasion without Commitment: Itai Arieli; Colin Stewart
NEP/RePEc link
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December 2, 2025 at 4:45 AM
Rating Government Procurement Markets: Deryugina, Tatyana; Zaldokas, Alminas; Fedyk, Anastassia; Gorodnichenko, Yuriy; Hodson, James; Sologoub, Ilona
NEP/RePEc link
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December 2, 2025 at 3:45 AM
Matching Under Preference Uncertainty: Random Allocation, Informativeness, and Welfare
NEP/RePEc link
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December 2, 2025 at 2:45 AM
Zoned Out: The Long-Term Consequences of School Choice for Wealth Segregation: Georgy Artemov; Kentaro Tomoeda
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December 2, 2025 at 1:45 AM
Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences for Conditional Expected Utility Maximizers
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December 2, 2025 at 12:45 AM
Private From Whom? Minimal Information Leakage in Auctions: Eric Gao; Eric Tang
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December 1, 2025 at 11:45 PM
Peer Selection with Friends and Enemies: Francis Bloch; Bhaskar Dutta; Marcin Dziubi\'nski
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December 1, 2025 at 10:45 PM
Complete Exchange Mechanisms: Minoru Kitahara; Hiroshi Uno
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December 1, 2025 at 9:45 PM
Collusion-proof Auction Design using Side Information: Sukanya Kudva; Anil Aswani
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December 1, 2025 at 8:45 PM
Auction house pricing dynamics in the market for thoroughbred yearlings – a unique modelling approach: Humphreys, David; O'Donovan, David
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November 24, 2025 at 7:45 PM
Automated Market Making for Goods with Perishable Utility: Chengqi Zang; Gabriel P. Andrade; O\u{g}uzhan Ersoy
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November 24, 2025 at 6:45 PM
Fraud-Proof Revenue Division on Subscription Platforms: Abheek Ghosh; Tzeh Yuan Neoh; Nicholas Teh; Giannis Tyrovolas
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November 24, 2025 at 5:45 PM
Group Obvious Strategy-proofness: Definition and Characterization: Alejandro Neme; R. Pablo Arribillaga; Jordi Massó
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November 24, 2025 at 4:45 PM
Simultaneous Bidding in Sealed-bid Auctions
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November 24, 2025 at 3:45 PM
A short way to the stability
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November 24, 2025 at 2:45 PM
Screening Information
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November 17, 2025 at 11:45 PM
Automation and Task Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
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November 17, 2025 at 10:45 PM
Rating Government Procurement Markets: Tatyana Deryugina; Alminas Zaldokas; Anastassia Fedyk; Yuriy Gorodnichenko; James Hodson; Ilona Sologoub
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November 17, 2025 at 9:45 PM
The Coasean Singularity? Demand, Supply, and Market Design with AI Agents: Peyman Shahidi; Gili Rusak; Benjamin S. Manning; Andrey Fradkin; John J. Horton
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November 17, 2025 at 8:45 PM
Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences and Single-Peaked Preferences
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November 17, 2025 at 7:45 PM
A characterization of strategy-proof probabilistic assignment rules: Sai Praneeth Donthu; Souvik Roy; Soumyarup Sadhukhan; Gogulapati Sreedurga
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November 17, 2025 at 6:45 PM
Identity-Compatible Auctions
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November 17, 2025 at 5:45 PM
Mechanism Design with Information Leakage: Samuel H\"afner; Marek Pycia; Haoyuan Zeng
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November 17, 2025 at 4:45 PM
Matchings Under Biased and Correlated Evaluations: Amit Kumar; Nisheeth K. Vishnoi
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November 10, 2025 at 11:45 PM
Non-induced Preferences in Matching Experiments: Sarah Kühn; Papatya Duman; Britta Hoyer; Thomas Streck; Nadja Stroh-Maraun
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November 10, 2025 at 10:45 PM