• Yaneer Bar-Yam
• Stephen Wolfram
and others.
Together, they cover a wide range of topics,
from complexity, fragility, and risk to ergodicity.
Check it out:
resilienceengineers.github.io/Expert-Repos...
Let me know what you think!
• Yaneer Bar-Yam
• Stephen Wolfram
and others.
Together, they cover a wide range of topics,
from complexity, fragility, and risk to ergodicity.
Check it out:
resilienceengineers.github.io/Expert-Repos...
Let me know what you think!
No.
This can be done with your free ChatGPT Account.
If you get the ($20) pro version, you can do even deeper analysis.
I've put together the exact how-to descriptions
including videos & prompt template.
resilience13.gumroad.com/l/AICrisisCo...
No.
This can be done with your free ChatGPT Account.
If you get the ($20) pro version, you can do even deeper analysis.
I've put together the exact how-to descriptions
including videos & prompt template.
resilience13.gumroad.com/l/AICrisisCo...
Unfortunately leaked to the journalist.
Maybe she won't mention it?
She will, and you have to react live in the interview.
After that, you'll get a transcript of the interview
and have it analysed to learn what went well, and what not.
Unfortunately leaked to the journalist.
Maybe she won't mention it?
She will, and you have to react live in the interview.
After that, you'll get a transcript of the interview
and have it analysed to learn what went well, and what not.
Don’t just audit success, rehearse coordinated failure.
4. Support a culture of systemic awareness. Encourage
people to flag design-level fragilities, not just execution errors.
Don’t just audit success, rehearse coordinated failure.
4. Support a culture of systemic awareness. Encourage
people to flag design-level fragilities, not just execution errors.
1. Map interdependencies. Focus not just on tasks,
but on how functions interact under stress.
2. Introduce slack. Time buffers, reversible decisions,
and fallback procedures reduce propagation risk.
1. Map interdependencies. Focus not just on tasks,
but on how functions interact under stress.
2. Introduce slack. Time buffers, reversible decisions,
and fallback procedures reduce propagation risk.
• Are there nonlinear, opaque interdependencies across teams or tools?
• Do multiple subsystems interact in unpredictable ways?
If the answer to both is yes, you are operating
in a domain where normal accidents are structurally plausible.
• Are there nonlinear, opaque interdependencies across teams or tools?
• Do multiple subsystems interact in unpredictable ways?
If the answer to both is yes, you are operating
in a domain where normal accidents are structurally plausible.
To evaluate your exposure, ask:
𝗜𝘀 𝘆𝗼𝘂𝗿 𝘀𝘆𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗺 𝘁𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁𝗹𝘆 𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗽𝗹𝗲𝗱?
• Can steps be delayed or reordered without consequence?
• Are buffers (in time, resources, or control) present, or absent?
To evaluate your exposure, ask:
𝗜𝘀 𝘆𝗼𝘂𝗿 𝘀𝘆𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗺 𝘁𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁𝗹𝘆 𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗽𝗹𝗲𝗱?
• Can steps be delayed or reordered without consequence?
• Are buffers (in time, resources, or control) present, or absent?
Normal Accident Theory, which will be shared
in my Newsletter on Saturday.
Many organizations operate internal systems
(IT, logistics, compliance, finance) with
similar structural features.
Normal Accident Theory, which will be shared
in my Newsletter on Saturday.
Many organizations operate internal systems
(IT, logistics, compliance, finance) with
similar structural features.
DM me " SRM " if you want to join the waitlist.
DM me " SRM " if you want to join the waitlist.
And never listen to “experts” telling you that you
don’t have to worry because the scores are low.
And never listen to “experts” telling you that you
don’t have to worry because the scores are low.
We don’t know if we were simply lucky,
or if the system is truly resilient.
Also, ask London Heathrow Airport if they’re happy
that the 𝘢𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘢𝘨𝘦 downtime is 0.3 hours,
when they had to shut down for 24 hours.
Lesson of the story:
We don’t know if we were simply lucky,
or if the system is truly resilient.
Also, ask London Heathrow Airport if they’re happy
that the 𝘢𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘢𝘨𝘦 downtime is 0.3 hours,
when they had to shut down for 24 hours.
Lesson of the story:
"The Austrian SAIDI score is 0.6 hours, s
ystems are highly resilient."
Well, the reason for this conclusion is that the one
event that defines the whole outcome didn’t materialize this year.
The extreme event — the black swan.
"The Austrian SAIDI score is 0.6 hours, s
ystems are highly resilient."
Well, the reason for this conclusion is that the one
event that defines the whole outcome didn’t materialize this year.
The extreme event — the black swan.
the better the electrical reliability.
Everyone familiar with my posts will immediately
see two issues screaming BE CAREFUL:
• Interruptions LAST YEAR
• AVERAGE outage time
Don't get me wrong, this is, in some parts,
a legitimate score.
the better the electrical reliability.
Everyone familiar with my posts will immediately
see two issues screaming BE CAREFUL:
• Interruptions LAST YEAR
• AVERAGE outage time
Don't get me wrong, this is, in some parts,
a legitimate score.
You basically divide the sum of all customer interruption
minutes in the past year by the number of
customers during that year.
This represents how long the average
customer experiences an outage.
You basically divide the sum of all customer interruption
minutes in the past year by the number of
customers during that year.
This represents how long the average
customer experiences an outage.