I presented Eisenhower’s matrix to young leaders last week: do only what you alone can do; the rest delegate.

The idea is simple, the practice isn’t. Urgency creeps in, leaders micromanage, postpone strategy, team check-ins, or even their own health.

Start prioritising what really matters.

“Eyes on, hands off.” Mission command sounds simple, but micromanagement often creeps in. Too detailed orders, risk aversion, and a lack of trust make implementation difficult.

Currently in Stockholm to teach our latest in Mission Command in NATO.

📚 sjms.nu/articles/10.... (open access)

Wrong terms imply right terms, which in turn imply that you can define them (correctly).

We have yet to see that done in a meaningful manner, aside from the fact that some things in war tend to recur while others tend to change quickly.

If it's a caution against sensationalism, I am all for it.

I agree, and that is an important insight. In the Times article, there is no argument as to what war *is* or how it has changed, merely that this particular war is fought with different means, and these means will probably change again in the next war.

Is that distinction even meaningful? In an article we did a few years back on nature vs character, we found the debate echoed across academia, doctrine, and practice. Yet when it came to defining their actual content, there was no agreement.

(OA version in Ch5 here: www.fak.dk/globalassets... )

I suppose 'enraged' is also a form of engagement.

Grateful for the dialogue today; reminded that contributing to critical understanding of military institutions requires both courage and careful judgment.

Learn more in our 2024 article: sjms.nu/articles/10....

Thanks to Krigsskolen and @sjms.bsky.social for organising.

3️⃣ Your identity (insider, outsider), institutional affiliation, and relationship with gatekeepers all influence what is permissible and what ethical responsibility entails in practice.

2️⃣ Researchers must balance principles like openness, consent, and data integrity against security concerns. This balancing act isn’t theoretical; it shows up in design, access negotiation, data handling, and publication.

Today, we discussed research in classified or restricted environments with 25 engaged PhD students. A few reflections:

1️⃣ Even in classified or restricted military environments, meaningful and ethical research is possible, though not without trade-offs.

Today in Denmark,
The Dannebrog flies for those who went when asked,
for those who never came back,
and for those who still struggle.

#flagdag

Getting logistics right is one of the operation's overlooked successes. The book also describes this well.

I don't see how planning doctrine is rejected. I point out that there is a stark difference between the world described in doctrine and the empirical reality.

And often when officers describe how the world “actually works”, I have found that they tend to revert to the doctrinal world.

Here is this summer's best reading experience (and why anyone who teaches planning should read it, too).

This is a fascinating inside story of planning at the land component level before and during the invasion of Iraq.

TL;DR: Iraq was not an outlier; it represents the dynamics of modern C2 🧵

I would love to see it! The last three NATO HQs (one DIV, two JFCs) where I conducted fieldwork all had this issue. In one of them, the lead planner (six months in) had never engaged with COM.

This was not a 3/3-5/5 issue, but a matter of COM getting bogged down in other tasks.

I suspect there might be a self-image issue as well. We all grew up on the tactical bit. It feels safe. And troops in contact rightly have priority.

But at higher levels, this is not where the staff or COM should make their money and not at the expense of PLANS

"It is a planner's job to think about the 'How' and 'What if' of unfolding plans, but planners are not empowered to make decisions. That privilege is reserved for commanders."

But planners shape those decisions. Things may not be clear-cut in (the empirical) reality.

OA: 2-5.dk/wp-content/u...

4️⃣ While planning in doctrine is disinterested and rational, the book highlights individuals' influence (or lack of) on the process, including commanders and other staff officers, as well as those who attended specific war colleges and those who did not.

3️⃣ Current OPS draws attention; G5 was cut off from engaging with the CMD. Rank plays a part, plans were led by a COL, and OPS by a MG

So, commanders say that it is vital to engage with planners regularly. In the empirical reality, few manage to prioritise it because current ops take precedence.

2️⃣ Simple questions are sent into the organisation instead of being dealt with by higher staff (why can't we invade Iraq with a brigade?). Technology (email) makes it possible, easy and perhaps convenient to pass simple things on. This tendency overloads lower HQs.

A few observations:

1️⃣ There is not much guidance from the political level at the highest military levels. (and if I may: It's a feature, officers who wait for it will fail. Commanders need to fill this gap.)

👉 sjms.nu/articles/10....

👉 www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....

The book starts as a form of apology (we did prepare for the later stages of the war in Iraq, but...). Yet, the interesting part is the detailed descriptions of how planning works in the empirical world (as opposed to the ideal doctrinal world).

Here is this summer's best reading experience (and why anyone who teaches planning should read it, too).

This is a fascinating inside story of planning at the land component level before and during the invasion of Iraq.

TL;DR: Iraq was not an outlier; it represents the dynamics of modern C2 🧵