(As always, my old exams are archived here: )

stevesachs.com/exams/

And on the relationship of anti-Zionism, antisemitism, and the genocide libel:

An excerpt on the violence of the protest movement's aims: 4/

And on @ssrn.bsky.social : 3/

papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....

Read the whole thing! 2/

harvardlawreview.org/forum/vol-13...

I guess I'd say that, done properly, OMO approaches whatever OLO would say. :) If we want to know what the law was at time t0, and if part of that law was written law, we might look to any then-prevailing and legally relevant interpretive methods

2) My sense is that OMO tends to be defended directly on normative grounds, while OLO tends to be defended as a claim about existing law (which we might also have good reason to follow, but which we should at least report accurately). Cf journals.law.harvard.edu/jlpp/wp-cont...

I'd guess there are at least two:
1) If there were competing original methods, OLO would choose among them based on which has the better claim to having been part of the law at the time. I'm not sure, but I think different OMO theories might choose differently? Cf.:

In any case, read the whole thing! Comments welcome.

www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24...

6/6

States make separate public corps for the same reasons private corps make subsidiaries: to move risks into separate baskets, w/separate debts and subject to separate judgments. If a suit isn't going to bind the State, there's no reason for immunity! 5/

TL;DR: Sovereign immunity is for sovereigns. The immunity retained at the Founding was specifically for States, not corporations; the very thing States were worried about in Chisholm was being treated like corporations!

4/

And on @ssrn.bsky.social :

papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....

3/

Does NJ Transit, a separate public corporation, get the same sovereign immunity as the State of New Jersey? We say no.

From the summary of argument:

2/