Judas Everett is a researcher on the history and contemporary issues of Central Eastern Europe. He lives in Odesa.
You can read Judas’ first article for Tochnyi here:
tochnyi.info/2025/11/the-... 11/11

Cracks will first show in the regions. Falling payouts and squeezed budgets put Russia’s recruitment model in peril.
Russia’s recruitment challenges won’t start in Moscow - but in provinces that can’t afford to meet recruitment targets. 10/11

The Kremlin’s choices are all destructive:
– Seize more oligarch wealth
– Mobilise unwilling men
– Return to hybrid war
– Or accept “peace” and give up on their earlier war goals. 9/11

Crucially, bonuses are currently being slashed: Bashkortostan ₽1.6m→₽1m, Yamalo-Nenets ₽3.1m→₽1.9m, Samara ₽3.6m→₽2.1m, Belgorod ₽3m→₽0.8m.
Some regions have suspended payments, others look set to follow. The recruitment machine is under threat and could break down. 8/11

Regional bonuses of up to ₽3 million make “volunteering” irresistible. Regional budgets are now straining under this recruitment model. Despite being in the black in 2024, deficits in 2025 have reached ₽724.8 billion - a huge burden for provinces funding an illegal war. 7/11

Before the war, 3.5m Russians were unemployed and 17.8m lived below the poverty line. A 1.4m₽ sign-up bonus is life-changing. Poverty, especially in the regions, has been a key factor in keeping Russia’s army supplied for nearly four years. 6/11