"By the end of President Reagan’s administration, the originalist revolution was underway."

From State v. Every, decided by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals yesterday, in an opinion by Justice John W. Campbell, Sr., joined by Judges Robert L. Holloway, Jr., and Matthew J. Wilson: We glean the following facts from the record: On April 12, 2021, a Knoxville police officer shot and killed an African American male student in a bathroom at Austin-East High School. The incident caused social unrest, and community members began demanding transparency about the shooting, including the release of the officer's body camera video. On the evening of April 19, 2021, the Defendant and a group of protestors entered the Knoxville City-County Building during a Knox County Commission meeting. The Defendant activated the siren on a bullhorn and spoke through the bullhorn to demand release of the video. Uniformed police officers quickly escorted her and six other individuals out of the building and arrested them for disrupting the meeting. The court upheld defendants' conviction for "disrupting a lawful meeting," defined as "with the intent to prevent [a] gathering, … substantially obstruct[ing] or interfere[ing] with the meeting, procession, or gathering by physical action or verbal utterance." Taken in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that the Defendant posted on Facebook the day before the meeting and the day of the meeting that the protestors were going to "shut down" the meeting. During the meeting, the Defendant used a bullhorn to activate a siren for approximately twenty seconds. Witnesses at trial described the siren as "loud," "high-pitched," and "alarming." Commissioner Jay called for "Officers," and the Defendant stated through the bullhorn, "Knox County Commission, your meeting is over." Commissioner Jay tried to bring the meeting back into order by banging his gavel, but the Defendant continued speaking through the bullhorn. Even when officers grabbed her and began escorting her out of the Large Assembly Room, she continued to disrupt the meeting by yelling for the officers to take their hands off her and by repeatedly calling them "murderers." Commissioner Jay called a ten-minute recess during the incident, telling the jury that it was "virtually impossible" to continue the meeting during the Defendant's disruption. The Defendant herself testified that the purpose of attending the meeting was to disrupt the Commission's agenda and to force the Commission to prioritize its discussion on the school shooting. Although the duration of the disruption was about ninety seconds, the jury was able to view multiple videos of the incident and concluded that the Defendant substantially obstructed or interfered with the meeting. The evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction. Defendant also claimed the statute was "unconstitutionally vague as applied to her because the statute does not state that it includes government meetings," but the appellate court concluded that she had waived the argument by not raising it adequately below. Sean F. McDermott, Molly T. Martin, and Franklin Ammons, Assistant District Attorneys General, represent the state. The post Bullhorn Siren Protest at County Commission Meeting Was Crime of "Disrupting a Lawful Meeting" From State v. Every, decided by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals yesterday, in an opinion by Justice John W. Campbell, Sr., joined by Judges Robert L. Holloway, Jr., and Matthew J. Wilson: We glean the following facts from the record: On April 12, 2021, a Knoxville police officer shot and killed an African American male student in a bathroom at Austin-East High School. The incident caused social unrest, and community members began demanding transparency about the shooting, including the release of the officer's body camera video. On the evening of April 19, 2021, the Defendant and a group of protestors entered the Knoxville City-County Building during a Knox County Commission meeting. The Defendant activated the siren on a bullhorn and spoke through the bullhorn to demand release of the video. Uniformed police officers quickly escorted her and six other individuals out of the building and arrested them for disrupting the meeting. The court upheld defendants' conviction for "disrupting a lawful meeting," defined as "with the intent to prevent [a] gathering, … substantially obstruct[ing] or interfere[ing] with the meeting, procession, or gathering by physical action or verbal utterance." Taken in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that the Defendant posted on Facebook the day before the meeting and the day of the meeting that the protestors were going to "shut down" the meeting. During the meeting, the Defendant used a bullhorn to activate a siren for approximately twenty seconds. Witnesses at trial described the siren as "loud," "high-pitched," and "alarming." Commissioner Jay called for "Officers," and the Defendant stated through the bullhorn, "Knox County Commission, your meeting is over." Commissioner Jay tried to bring the meeting back into order by banging his gavel, but the Defendant continued speaking through the bullhorn. Even when officers grabbed her and began escorting her out of the Large Assembly Room, she continued to disrupt the meeting by yelling for the officers to take their hands off her and by repeatedly calling them "murderers." Commissioner Jay called a ten-minute recess during the incident, telling the jury that it was "virtually impossible" to continue the meeting during the Defendant's disruption. The Defendant herself testified that the purpose of attending the meeting was to disrupt the Commission's agenda and to force the Commission to prioritize its discussion on the school shooting. Although the duration of the disruption was about ninety seconds, the jury was able to view multiple videos of the incident and concluded that the Defendant substantially obstructed or interfered with the meeting. The evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction. Defendant also claimed the statute was "unconstitutionally vague as applied to her because the statute does not state that it includes government meetings," but the appellate court concluded that she had waived the argument by not raising it adequately below. Sean F. McDermott, Molly T. Martin, and Franklin Ammons, Assistant District Attorneys General, represent the state. appeared first on Reason.com.

10/8/1888: Chief Justice Melville Fuller takes the judicial oath. Chief Justice Melville Fuller The post Today in Supreme Court History: October 8, 1888 appeared first on Reason.com.

What's on your mind?

Justice Barrett's new book is not a memoir. Though she sprinkles the book with some anecdotes about her family, Listening Law is quite guarded concerning how Barrett came to be where she is now. Her press appearances have likewise been fairly controlled, and she seems to repeat the same sets of pre-scripted answers. Yet, if you read between the lines, we can start to tie some threads together. The first thread is that Justice Barrett did not aspire to be a judge before becoming a lawyer. Barrett's father was an attorney. But the Justice said in a recent press appearance that she wanted to be a teacher, like her mother. By contrast, some of Barrett's colleagues had their sights on the bench at a young age. In her high school yearbook, Elena Kagan wore a robe and held a gavel, and included a Felix Frankfurter quote. Samuel Alito's Princeton Yearbook said, "Sam intends to go to law school and eventually to warm a seat on the Supreme Court." Justice Jackson said that Judge Constance Baker Motley (with whom she shares a birthday) was a "North Star for me in my career." I don't get the impression that a young Amy Coney aspired for the bar or the bench, in the ways that some of her colleagues did. Second, even after Barrett clerked for Justice Scalia, it still does not seem that she aspired to the bench, at least not right away. As a law professor, she did not do the sorts of things that an aspiring judge would do. I've written before how Barrett did not become a member of the Federalist Society until 2014. And prior to Justice Scalia's passing, she did not attend the Federalist Society National Convention, and did not speak at any FedSoc events. I did not ever see Barrett in person until 2017, after she was already nominated to the Seventh Circuit. I was not alone. Ed Whelan recalls that he met Barrett for the first time at a memorial for Justice Scalia in November 2016, shortly before the election. In the cafeteria before the ceremony, I sat down at a table with other former Scalia law clerks, and I met for the first time a Notre Dame law professor by the name of Amy Coney Barrett. Little could she or I have imagined that four years later she would become President Trump's third appointee to the Supreme Court and complete his process of transforming the Court into a body that would expand and entrench Scalia's legacy. I consider Ed Whelan as one of the most plugged-in people in the conservative legal movement. He knows everyone, and remembers everything. How could it be that Whelan had never met her before? It appears that Barrett not only didn't attend any FedSoc events, but also did not attend the Scalia clerk reunions. "Little could" Whelan imagine that Barrett would make it to the Supreme Court. I suspect Professor Barrett in 2016 likewise could not have imagined at that point in time what would happen. Were Barrett to write a memoir, I think this is the story she would have to tell. Most of her colleagues who made it to the Court took a series of deliberate and strategic actions throughout the course of their career to make it onto the bench, and later on the Supreme Court. At a minimum, they all served in government or some other public service. Barrett, other than clerking for two prominent judges, did none of these things. Indeed, she declined the various opportunities to put herself a position to be recognized as a potential judge--other than being a popular law professor at Notre Dame. There is a third, and related thread. Justice Barrett by her own admission did not fully understand how she would be criticized as a Justice. For example, she told Jan Crawford: "If I had imagined before I was on the Court, how I would react to knowing that I was being protested, that would have seemed like a big deal, like, 'oh, my gosh, I'm being protested,'" she says. "But now I have the ability to be like, 'Oh, okay, well, are the entrances blocked?' I just feel very businesslike about it. It doesn't matter to me. It doesn't disrupt my emotions." She made similar comments in other venues--something to the effect of, I could have never imagined that X would happen. I've made the point many times that Professor Barrett was never subject to any sort of public scrutiny. Much was made of the "dogma" moment, but the full video tells a different story: A senile Senator asked a bizarre question, and Barrett just stared back blankly and didn't say a word. This was not exactly courage under fire. Let me tie the three threads together. First, I find it refreshing that a young Amy Coney Barrett did not clamor to be a judge. Frankly, I find it a bit pretentious when young people say they want to become judges. I've rolled my eyes at many 1Ls who tell me they aspire for the bench. Second, I also find it refreshing that Professor Barrett did not structure her career with an eye towards becoming a Supreme Court Justice. Indeed, I've written that anyone who wants to be a Supreme Court Justice should be immediately disqualified from the job. But there is also a problem with the inverse situation: someone who never planned to become a Supreme Court Justice yet is somehow elevated to that position. That brings us to the third thread. Because Barrett was never tested before becoming a judge, there was no way to predict how she would handle pressure when she becomes a Justice. Justice Gorsuch knew first hand from his mother's experience how D.C. works. Justice Kavanaugh had been at the center of many major controversies in his tenure. But what about Barrett? President Trump, or at least those advising her, took a gamble on her. There is a fourth, and related thread: Because Justice Barrett was not acculturated in the conservative legal movement, it was unknown who would prove influential to her. Now, Barrett has confirmed what I have long speculated: Justice Kagan has proven to be an influential colleague. Jan Crawford's piece relays: Still, Barrett insists that kind of language doesn't affect her relationship with Jackson, and that she works to have relationships with all the other justices. She says she enjoys talking about the law with Justice Elena Kagan, also a former law professor who, like Barrett has a more formalistic approach to the law than the Court's two other liberals, even though it leads them to very different places. In a recent interview, Bari Weiss of The Free Press asked Barrett to give one word for each of her colleagues. For Kagan, Barrett chose "analytical." That's a word she also used in our conversation to describe herself. I have written a lot about the Kagan-Barrett bond, and speculated (to much criticism) that Kagan was using that bond to influence Barrett's opinions. There were a (small) number of cases where Kagan joined Barrett's separate writings, Vidal v. Elster in particular. But here we have Barrett acknowledging what I suspected. I don't think Barrett has singled out any of her other colleagues with similar praise. Certainly she hasn't said these sorts of things about the other Trump appointees. Recall that Kagan went out of her way to make friends with Justice Scalia. She even went hunting with him! Query how often Kagan has gone hunting since Scalia's passing? I would wager the number is zero. Kagan, the former Dean, is very savvy, and knows how to play to people. This is precisely why Laurence Tribe urged President Obama to nominate Kagan over Judge Sotomayor: she would be able to persuade Justice Kennedy. Now, Kagan can persuade a Scalia disciple without even having to pick up a gun. She can naturally exude the "analytical" mode of a law professor. Yet, I have wondered over the past few months whether this relationship is faltering a bit. In earlier emergency docket rulings, Justice Barrett ruled more consistently with Kagan. But more recent orders have Barrett (likely) joining the conservative majority. And Kagan has taken shots at a majority opinion Barrett (likely) joined. Let's see what happens on the merits docket this year. The post Becoming Justice Barrett appeared first on Reason.com.

Plus, "I don't know how you can vehemently deny that when the evidence is staring us all in the face. That denial is still very troubling to me."

"The fact that disclosure means Plaintiffs 'could be deemed litigious' or that future employers 'may treat Plaintiffs' association with this litigation as a red flag' is not sufficient to allege a substantial privacy interest."

A short excerpt from yesterday's long Massachusetts high court decision in Weiss v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, written by Justice Scott Kafker: In a macabre scheme spanning several years, Cedric Lodge, the person responsible for the care of cadavers at the Harvard Medical School morgue, dissected, stole, and sold parts of the bodies of individuals who donated their remains for research purposes…. Decedents' relatives sued Harvard, and the court concluded that the case could go forward, despite "the 'good faith' defense under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA …)": As outlined in [a criminal] indictment, Lodge stole dissected portions of donated cadavers, including heads, brains, skin, bones, and other human remains, and transported them to his home in New Hampshire. From there, Lodge and his wife sold the stolen body parts to buyers, including the two alleged coconspirators, with whom they communicated via social media websites and cell phones. Lodge also allowed third parties unauthorized access to the morgue in order to select body parts for purchase. For example, alleged coconspirator Katrina Maclean {the proprietor of "Kat's Creepy Creations"} agreed to meet Lodge at the Harvard morgue at 1 p.m. on Wednesday, October 28, 2020, to purchase two dissected faces for $600. Lodge also assisted Maclean with finding human skin to provide to a third party in exchange for his services tanning other human skin into leather. Coconspirator Joshua Taylor sent thirty-nine electronic payments, totaling over $37,000, to a PayPal account operated by Lodge's wife, including a $1,000 transaction with the memo "head number 7" and a $200 transaction with the memo "braiiiiiins." While employed by Harvard during the period in which he was dissecting, removing, and selling donated body parts for profit, Lodge commuted to work in a car with a license plate that stated, "Grim-R." … [Section] 18 (a) [of the UAGA] specifies that "[a] person [including a corporation] who acts in accordance with [the UAGA] … or who attempts in good faith to do so, shall not be liable." … [W]e [have] defined "good faith" as "an honest belief, the absence of malice, or the absence of a design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage over another." We further explained that "it may be possible that evidence of a peculiarly pervasive noncompliance [with the act] could warrant an inference that a defendant acted maliciously, possessed a design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage over the plaintiffs, or acted out of something other than an honest belief" and thus failed to act in good faith. We conclude that the plaintiffs' factual allegations rise to this level and therefore warrant an inference that Harvard failed to act in good faith. We reach this conclusion for several reasons. First, the facts alleged constitute "peculiarly pervasive noncompliance" with the act. Instead of the dignified treatment and disposal of human remains required by the act, the donors' remains were ghoulishly dismembered and sold for profit under the most horrifying of circumstances…. "[T]here is 'a special sensitivity' required in the processing and handling of a deceased human body" …. "There is a duty imposed by the universal feelings of mankind to be discharged by some one towards the dead; a duty, and we may also say a right, to protect from violation" …. This horrific and undignified treatment continued for years and involved numerous donors. Although we focus our inquiry on Harvard's conduct, Lodge's misdeeds are relevant insofar as they demonstrate where Harvard failed to act in good faith in operating and overseeing the morgue. Despite the risk of harm being known to Harvard, as similar misconduct had previously occurred in a strikingly similar fashion in another medical school morgue [at UCLA], there were little to no controls in place to prevent this harm from occurring at Harvard. Instead, according to the allegations, an unsupervised Lodge was able to dismember the donated bodies; bring unauthorized people into the morgue to inspect and purchase body parts, including during working hours; and carry body parts out of the morgue for years. Other red flags, such as his license plate describing himself as the "Grim-R[eaper]," which revealed an unprofessional insensitivity given his position in a medical school morgue, were also ignored or tolerated.  Thus, Harvard's extraordinary failure to adequately supervise the morgue's operations and properly protect the donated remains in its care exemplifies the kind of "peculiarly pervasive noncompliance" we have said can demonstrate a lack of good faith…. We emphasize that "peculiarly pervasive noncompliance" is different in kind and not just degree from isolated acts of noncompliance, which alone are insufficient to defeat a good faith defense under the act…. Jeffrey N. Catalano, Kathryn E. Barnett, Jonathan D. Sweet, Leo V. Boyle & Chelsea Bishop represent plaintiffs. The post Possible Tort Liability for Harvard in Donated Cadaver Parts Theft Case appeared first on Reason.com.

The Hoover Institution at Stanford University, where I'm now a Senior Fellow, has long offered up-to-5-year paid in-residence positions (with no teaching obligations) in various fields. This year, we'll also be considering people who are interested in becoming legal academics. We expect the selection process to be highly competitive: The position is unusually generous, compared to other fellowships, in salary ($165K-230K/year plus a $20K housing allowance), potential length, and lack of teaching obligations. To be realistically eligible, applicants should have clerkships, top grades, published law review articles, and plans for new articles. It seems likely that most applicants will be from the Usual Suspect academic feeder law schools, but I'm a UCLA law graduate myself, so I'm certainly open to top people from other schools as well. We have no particular preferences for any particular fields within law: We'll gladly consider people who want to work in business law, constitutional law, international law, criminal law, immigration law, and all sorts of other topics. The application deadline is Nov. 18, and the details are at https://www.hoover.org/hoover-fellows-program. Note that there would be no obligation for people to stay the full five years (and probably an expectation that they would stay no more). If someone gets a tenure-track law school teaching position two or three years into the fellowship—which tends to be the norm in the law market—we would be delighted to see them take it. Here is the description from the link above; note that the title of the position is "Hoover Fellow," but that is different from other fellowships at Hoover (such as the long-term Senior Fellow position that Orin and I and Michael McConnell have, the one-year National Fellow position, and the various other fellowships): Opportunities for Early-Career Scholars The Hoover Institution at Stanford University seeks outstanding scholars for positions as a Hoover Fellow. The term of the appointment is five years, with the option to renew for one additional term. The position is located at the Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA. During their fellowship, Hoover Fellows are expected to publish scholarly articles and books with implications for public policy and to contribute to the intellectual life of the Hoover Institution. This position carries no teaching responsibilities. The 12‑month base salary range is $165,000 to $230,000, plus a $20,000 annual housing allowance. Candidates must have a Ph.D. or equivalent degree in a relevant field, such as economics, history, international relations, national security, political science, or public policy, and expect to complete that degree by September 1st, 2026. [A J.D. would count as an "equivalent degree" for people interested in law school teaching, because that is a norm of the legal academy, though of course law review articles will be expected as a rough analog to a dissertation. -EV] Hoover Fellows are encouraged to engage with Stanford's broader research community in their respective fields. The Hoover Institution is a research center at Stanford University, located in the heart of Stanford's campus. Please submit: * A cover letter or statement of interest that includes a description of academic background and experience * One or more recent publications, working papers, or draft book chapters * A curriculum vitae * A statement about future research plans (two pages maximum) * Three letters of recommendation that focus on the candidate's research and research potential If you have any questions, please contact [email protected]. Please note that we only monitor this email address periodically. Please submit completed applications online by November 18, 2025. The post Hoover Fellow Program: Up-to-5-Year Paid In-Residence Position for Aspiring Academics (Including Aspiring Legal Academics) appeared first on Reason.com.

The Court granted cert to review whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act is "penal" in character. But the defendant was ordered to pay restitution under a different statute.

To continue my preview of The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, which will ship on October 14, here are the authors of essays 201–216. * Essay No. 201: The Fifteenth Amendment —Earl M. Maltz * Essay No. 202: The Income Tax Amendment —Andy Grewal * Essay No. 203: The Popular Election Of Senators Amendment —Michael R. Dimino * Essay No. 204: The Senate Vacancies Amendment —Todd J. Zywicki * Essay No. 205: The Prohibition Amendment —Paul J. Larkin * Essay No. 206: The Suffrage Amendment —Judge Edith H. Jones & Jacob R. Weaver * Essay No. 207: The Presidential Terms Amendment —Brian C. Kalt * Essay No. 208: The Repeal Of Prohibition Amendment —Paul J. Larkin * Essay No. 209: The Presidential Term Limits Amendment —Judge Chad A. Readler & Andy Nolan * Essay No. 210: The District Of Columbia Electors Amendment —Derek T. Muller * Essay No. 211: The Poll Taxes Amendment —Derek T. Muller * Essay No. 212: The Presidential Succession Amendment—Sections 1 And 2 —John D. Feerick * Essay No. 213: The Presidential Succession Amendment—Section 3 —John D. Feerick * Essay No. 214: The Presidential Succession Amendment—Section 4 —John D. Feerick * Essay No. 215: The Minimum Voting Age Amendment —Michael R. Dimino * Essay No. 216: The Congressional Compensation Amendment —Giancarlo Canaparo The post The Heritage Guide to the Constitution: Essay Nos. 201–216 appeared first on Reason.com.

10/7/1982: I.N.S. v. Chadha was argued. The post Today in Supreme Court History: October 7, 1982 appeared first on Reason.com.

Financial Times (Ellesheva Kissin) reports: The Big Four accountancy and consultancy firm will repay the final instalment of its government contract after conceding that some footnotes and references it contained were incorrect, Australia's Department of Employment and Workplace Relations said on Monday…. In late August the Australian Financial Review reported that the document contained multiple errors, including references and citations to non-existent reports by academics at the universities of Sydney and Lund in Sweden…. While Deloitte did not state that AI caused the mistakes in its original report, it admitted that the updated version corrected errors with citations, references, and one summary of legal proceedings…. The post "Deloitte Issues Refund for Error-Ridden Australian Government Report That Used AI" appeared first on Reason.com.

Jane and I speak with Eric Heinze (Queen Mary University of London) about how the digital age has transformed the meaning and limits of free expression, from Britain’s recent Lucy Connolly case—involving online incitement and hate speech—to the philosophical and legal contrasts between the American Brandenburg standard and the U.K.’s more interventionist approach.

A revealing interview with the Supreme Court's "Steel Magnolia."

A reply to the Associate Justice's recent remarks.

From today's notice of dismissal, filed by the plaintiff's lawyerin Hook v. Rave: On October 3, defendants wisely abandoned their notice of intention to terminate Professor Hook for his First Amendment protected speech about a matter of substantial public interest. Defendants have returned Professor Hook to his full duties, and have not punished him in any way, nor do they seek to punish him in any way. So Professor Hook has received the relief he sought in this lawsuit, which makes this case moot. Accordingly, Professor Hook hereby dismisses it without prejudice in accordance with F. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Here's my post about an earlier court decision in the case: [* * *] From [the Sept. 24] decision by Judge Karen Schreier (D.S.D.) in Hook v. Rave: Hook is a tenured Professor of Art at the University of South Dakota. He has taught at the University since 2006. In the late afternoon on September 10, 2025, while at home and off work, Hook posted the following message concerning the recent shooting and killing of Charlie Kirk to his private Facebook account: Okay. I don't give a flying f*** [the original reads "fuck" -EV] about this Kirk person. Apparently he was a hate spreading Nazi. I wasn't paying close enough attention to the idiotic right fringe to even know who he was. I'm sorry for his family that he was a hate spreading Nazi and got killed. I'm sure they deserved better. Maybe good people could now enter their lives. But geez, where was all this concern when the politicians in Minnesota were shot? And the school shootings? And Capitol Police? I have no thoughts or prayers for this hate spreading Nazi. A shrug, maybe. Approximately three hours later, while still at home and off work, Hook removed the above message and made a second post. The second post stated: Apparently my frustration with the sudden onslaught of coverage concerning a guy shot today led to a post I mow [sic] regret posting. I'm sure many folks fully understood my premise but the simple fact that some were offended, led me to remove the post. I extend this public apology to those who were offended. Om Shanti. Around noon on September 12, 2025, South Dakota Speaker of the House Jon Hansen [and] {also a 2026 candidate for South Dakota Governor} shared a screenshot of Hook's first post and included the following message: Yesterday, I was made aware of these hateful and vile comments made by a University of South Dakota professor regarding the death of Charlie Kirk and Charlie's family. I am disgusted by his remarks, and think they are unbecoming of someone who works for and represents our University. Yesterday, after seeing the post, I immediately reached out to USD President Sheila Gestring and called on the professor to be fired. I understand that the professor is likely to be terminated from his position. I will keep you posted on the final decision. That kind of disgusting rhetoric from an employee and representative of our university directed toward a good man's family who was recently assassinated will not be tolerated. A few hours later, South Dakota Governor Larry Rhoden also shared a screenshot of Hook's first post and included the following message: When I read this post, I was shaking mad. The Board of Regents intends to FIRE this University of South Dakota professor, and I'm glad. This individual stands in front of South Dakota students to educate them. We must not send the message to our kids that this is acceptable public discourse. We need more Charlie Kirks on campus and less hatred like this. Around the same time, Hook received a letter from Kelley notifying Hook of Kelley's "intent to terminate [Hook's] contract as Professor with The University of South Dakota." The letter explained that the reason for Hook's termination was due to violations of SDBOR Policies 4.4.8 and 1.6.1. SDBOR Policy 4.4.8 provides: Neglect of duty, misconduct, incompetence, abuse of power or other actions that manifest an unfitness to discharge the trust reposed in public university faculty members or to perform assigned duties. SDBOR Policy 1.6.1 provides: Faculty members are members of a learned profession. When they speak or write as private citizens on matters of public concern, they must be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but their special position in the community imposes special obligations. As learned people and as educators, they should remember that the public may judge their profession and their institution by their utterances. Hence, they should at all times be accurate, show respect for the opinions of others and make every effort to indicate when they are not speaking for the institution. The court concluded that Hook had a "fair chance" of prevailing on his First Amendment challenge to the impending firing, and therefore issued a temporary restraining order reinstating Hook from administrative leave (and blocking his firing for the next two weeks): Because Hook spoke as a citizen and on a matter of public concern, [his speech protected unless] defendants have "produced evidence to indicate the speech had an adverse impact on the efficiency of the [University's] operations." If the court determines there is an adverse impact, then the court applies the balancing test laid out in Pickering v. Board of Education (1968). But "[w]here there is no evidence of disruption, resort to the Pickering factors is unnecessary because there are no government interests in efficiency to weigh against First Amendment interests." At this stage, defendants have failed to put on evidence that Hook's "speech had an adverse impact on the efficiency of the [University's] operations." Defendants allege that in the days following Hook's post, "hundreds of calls and message were made to the Board of Regents and/or the University of South Dakota commenting negatively regarding the comment or calling for the removal of Professor Hook." But "[m]ere allegations the speech disrupted the workplace or affected morale, without evidentiary support, are insufficient." See also Melton v. City of Forrest City, Ark. (8th Cir. 2025) (finding insufficient evidence of disruption where defendants only alleged that "'several' police officers and city-council members were upset and 'phone lines [were] jammed' with calls from concerned citizens"). Defendants have not demonstrated that there was any disruption to on-campus activities, Hook's teaching lessons, or the University's operations. And without more, "such 'vague and conclusory' concerns … runs the risk of constitutionalizing a heckler's veto." Thus, because defendants have failed to demonstrate any evidence of disruption, the court need not consider the Pickering factors at this stage…. Defendants are required to temporarily set aside their determination to place Hook on administrative leave. Defendants shall reinstate Hook's position as a Professor of Art at the University of South Dakota, retroactive to September 12, 2025, to remain effective until the preliminary injunction hearing on Wednesday, October 8, 2025, at 9:00 a.m. in Sioux Falls Courtroom 2. Here's a similar, though not identical, analysis from the Third Circuit two weeks ago in the Jason Jorjani case (though at a different stage of that lawsuit), which I blogged at the time: New Jersey Institute of Technology declined to renew a lecturer's contract based on his private comments about race, politics, and immigration. But NJIT's regulation of speech outside the classroom and off the campus is subject to the restraints of the First Amendment, and the school documented no disruption to its educational mission…. NJIT hired Jason Jorjani in 2015 to teach philosophy, and twice renewed his contract in 2016 and 2017. During this time, Jorjani "formed the Alt Right Corporation," to "widen the message of his philosophy, which he describes as an affirmation of the Indo-European Tradition" and "the idea that European cultures are intimately related to those of Greater Iran and the Persianate World, Hindu India and the Buddhist East and are the sources the [sic] world's greatest scientific, artistic and spiritual developments." He spoke at conferences and published an essay titled "Against Perennial Philosophy" on "AltRight.com," a website he helped found. In the essay, he argued that "human racial equality" is a "left-wing myth" and that a great "Promethean" "mentality" rests on a "genetic basis" which "Asians, Arabs, Africans, and other non-Aryan peoples" lack. The essay also argued that, through "genetic engineering" and eugenic "embryo selection," Iran could produce great philosophers by "restor[ing] the pre-Arab and pre-Mongol genetic character of the majority of the Iranian population within only one or two generations." Jorjani did not discuss these outside associations with his students or colleagues, nor did he disclose them as required by NJIT policy. Then, in 2017, a person posing as a graduate student contacted Jorjani to discuss "how the Left persecutes and silences Right wing thought in academia." But he was working with a group called "Hope Not Hate," whose goal is to "deconstruct[ ]" individuals it deems "fascist" or "extremist." The two met at a pub where the undercover operative recorded their conversations, at first with Jorjani's consent. But later, apparently assuming the recording had stopped, Jorjani commented on matters concerning race, immigration, and politics. The meeting became a piece published by the New York Times featuring a video excerpt from Jorjani's remarks at a conference characterizing "liberalism, democracy, and universal human rights" as "ill-conceived and bankrupt sociopolitical ideologies," before cutting to the secretly recorded portion of Jorjani's conversation where he predicts "[w]e will have a Europe, in 2050, where the banknotes have Adolf Hitler, Napoleon Bonaparte, Alexander the Great. And Hitler will be seen like that: like Napoleon, like Alexander, not like some weird monster, who is unique in his own category." The day after the Times piece was published, NJIT's President emailed all faculty and staff, denouncing Jorjani's statements as "antithetical" to NJIT's "core values." NJIT's Dean of the College of Science and Liberal Arts sent a separate email echoing those sentiments. In the following days, NJIT received some unverified number of calls and, at most, fifty emails expressing concern about Jorjani's recorded comments and his membership on the faculty. Faculty chimed in too, highlighting the content of Jorjani's "Against Perennial Philosophy" essay. Six days after the New York Times posted the article, NJIT sent a letter to Jorjani placing him on paid leave, explaining the article 1) "caused significant disruption at the university" that NJIT believed would "continue to expand," and 2) revealed "association with organizations" that Jorjani did not disclose on his outside activity form, despite prior direction to fully update the form the preceding Spring. The letter advised Jorjani that NJIT planned to investigate whether he had violated university policies or State ethics requirements. Fallout continued with NJIT's Department of Biology penning a statement published in the student newspaper asserting "Jorjani's beliefs, as revealed by his remarks, cannot help but produce a discriminatory and intimidating educational environment for [NJIT's] diverse student body." The Faculty Senate followed suit, releasing an "Official Faculty Senate Statement," explaining that "NJIT is a university that embraces diversity and sees that diversity as a source of strength. The NJIT Faculty Senate finds racist pronouncements made by University Lecturer Jason Reza Jorjani to be morally repugnant. Hate and bigotry have no place on the NJIT campus." The Department of History also joined the fray, demanding Jorjani's termination and asserting his "published beliefs create a hostile learning environment for students of color in particular." … Jorjani was eventually fired, and the District Court "conclude[d] that Jorjani's speech was not protected by the First Amendment because 'Defendants' interest in mitigating the disruption caused by Plaintiff's speech … outweighs Plaintiff's interest in its expression.' Seeing error in that conclusion, we will vacate and remand." The Court of Appeals in Jorjani articulated the legal standard for when the government may discipline or fire employees based on their speech (even if it couldn't imprison or fine ordinary citizens for their speech), pretty much the same standard as the one the District Court just applied in Hook: "[T]o state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a public employee plaintiff must allege that his activity is protected by the First Amendment, and that the protected activity was a substantial factor in the alleged retaliatory action." If those two requirements are satisfied, the burden shifts and the employer must show "the same action would have been taken even if the speech had not occurred." A public employee's speech is protected if 1) "the employee spoke as a citizen," 2) his "statement involved a matter of public concern," and 3) "the government employer did not have 'an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public' as a result of the statement he made." In assessing the third prong, we "balance … the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. (1968). So "the more substantially an employee's speech involves matters of public concern, the higher the state's burden will then be to justify taking action, and vice versa." … This standard leaves considerable room for a version of the "heckler's veto," under which someone's speech may be punished because it causes a hostile reaction by offended listeners. (So does the District Court's opinion in Hook, since it prevents a "heckler's veto" only if the hecklers are heckling only slightly, and thus in a way that doesn't cause "any disruption to on-campus activities, Hook's teaching lessons, or the University's operations.") When the government is administering the criminal law or civil liability, such a "heckler's veto" is generally not allowed: The government generally can't shut down a speaker, for instance, because his listeners are getting offended or even threatening violence because they're offended. But in the employment context, the Pickering balance often allows government to fire employees because their speech sufficiently offends coworkers or members of the public. Perhaps this stems from the judgment that employees are hired to do a particular job cost-effectively for the government, and if their speech so offends others (especially clients or coworkers) that keeping the employees on means more cost for the government than benefit, the government needn't continue to pay them for what has proved to be a bad bargain. Still, when it comes to public university professors, especially as to their off-the-job speech, courts have often applied the Pickering balance in a way that deliberately offers more speech protection (though perhaps not the same speech protection as ordinary citizens enjoy when it comes to the criminal law). That is what the Third Circuit did in Jorjani (though the District Court didn't see the need to formally consider any possible special rule for university professors, since its holding as to lack of disruption would prevent the firing of pretty much any government employee). To illustrate the Third Circuit's reasoning, I underline the passages supporting such extra protection, and italicize the passages that seem to leave open room for some sort of heckler's veto: NJIT's actions do not pass the ordinary Pickering analysis on this record. The parties agree that Jorjani spoke as a private citizen on a matter of public concern. So we consider only whether the distractions NJIT identified as flowing from Jorjani's speech outweigh interest in his discussion. They do not…. Begin with interest in Jorjani's speech, which cannot "be considered in a vacuum" as "the manner, time, and place of the employee's expression are relevant." Jorjani's speech occurred entirely outside NJIT's academic environs. His theories, even if lacking in classical rigor, remain of public import. It matters not that his opinions do not enjoy majoritarian support, since "the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express 'the thought that we hate.'" Matal v. Tam (2017)…. Against that interest, we weigh NJIT's need "as an employer" to promote "the efficiency of the public services it performs." NJIT points only to the "disruption" that followed the publication of Jorjani's remarks consisting of certain students' disapproval of Jorjani's speech, disagreement among faculty, and administrators fielding complaints. We "typically consider whether the speech impairs discipline or employee harmony, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships requiring personal loyalty and confidence, impedes the performance of the speaker's duties, or interferes with the enterprise's regular operations." And we focus mostly on what happened, not what might have been, because although NJIT can act to prevent future harms, and need not "allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest," it must ground predictions in reason, not speculation. The minimal evidence of disruption that NJIT cites differs little from the ordinary operation of a public university and therefore cannot outweigh interest in Jorjani's speech. First, there is no support for NJIT's contention that student disapproval of Jorjani's speech disrupted the administration of the university. Some students and alumni disagreed with Jorjani's views. But NJIT never identified the exact number of calls or complaints made in person or writing, nor any details about the students' concerns. And although Jorjani said that he perceived a "huge change in attitude toward [him] on the part of [his] students," NJIT points to no objective evidence that students questioned Jorjani's ability to teach, grade, or supervise his classes evenly, beyond one administrator recalling a student dropped Jorjani's class. Entirely absent is any evidence of specific student protests, upheaval, or unwillingness to abide by university policies. But "in the context of the college classroom," students have an "interest in hearing even contrarian views." Meriwether v. Hartop (6th Cir. 2021); see also Blum v. Schlegel (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that "the efficient provision of services" by a university "actually depends, to a degree, on the dissemination in public fora of controversial speech"). NJIT's theory that student dissent rose to the level of disruption is simply speculative. Second, the cited disputes among Jorjani and his colleagues are not disruption. NJIT cites the pointed letters denouncing Jorjani published by faculty in the pages of the student newspaper, but that is precisely the sort of reasoned debate that distinguishes speech from distraction. And there is no allegation these editorials, or Jorjani's belief they were defamatory and warranted suit, interfered with the ability of other faculty to fulfill their responsibilities in research, teaching, or shared governance, or otherwise thwarted the university's efforts to educate its students. So although challenges to "employee harmony" might pose disruption when disagreements disturb "close working relationships," that concern is irrelevant inside the university where professors serve the needs of their students, not fellow academics. {Bauer v. Sampson (9th Cir. 2001) ("[G]iven the nature of academic life, especially at the college level, it was not necessary that Bauer and the administration enjoy a close working relationship requiring trust and respect—indeed anyone who has spent time on college campuses knows that the vigorous exchange of ideas and resulting tension between an administration and its faculty is as much a part of college life as homecoming and final exams.").} That leaves only NJIT's ordinary obligation to field calls and emails, routine administrative tasks that, conceivably, might become so overwhelming in number or nature as to disrupt. But not here. The record reveals that throughout this occurrence there were "[p]ossibly" fifty emails received about Jorjani. Calls were so few that NJIT's witness was "not sure what the number is," and only knew "by reading some emails that so-and-so called the mother, and so-and-so called, former student called, things of that nature." All a most minor uptick in communications, if at all, and one that required no additional staffing to support the single administrator who handled these inquiries. While NJIT raises an "interest in providing a non-denigrating environment," and appeals to the notion that Jorjani's views could, theoretically, undermine the pedagogical relationship between a teacher and student, it has not pointed to anything in the record that indicates its determination was based on competence or qualifications. In essence, NJIT posits that because Jorjani offered views it disliked, the First Amendment should not apply, and it is entitled to summary judgment. We cannot agree, lest we permit "universities to discipline professors, students, and staff any time their speech might cause offense." {And this case does not implicate a university's "discretionary academic determinations" that entail the "review of [ ] intellectual work product" or "the qualifications of faculty members for promotion and tenure."} Back in the South Dakota case, James D. Leach represents Hook. The post Univ. of South Dakota Withdraws Planned Firing of Art Professor for Vulgar Tweet Calling Charlie Kirk a "Hate Spreading Nazi" appeared first on Reason.com.

While conservative criticisms of the Burger Court may be justified, those criticisms do not apply to the "The Chief." He had only one vote on the Court ... and, too often, too little support from his colleagues to reach originalist results.

I was one of the panelists on this program, and much enjoyed it. (It's framed around some controversies in Texas, but we're talking about much bigger questions.) You'll see that I pretty sharply disagree with the other panelists—my remarks start at around 38:50—but that's what makes it fun. Here's the summary from the producers: In recent months, Texas Governor Greg Abbott announced a ban on "Sharia law and Sharia compounds" in the state, citing longstanding principles that U.S. and Texas law take precedence over conflicting foreign law. This position is reflected in the 2017 American Laws for American Courts statute and in an Attorney General opinion affirming that contracts violating Texas public policy cannot be enforced. These commitments were tested in a North Texas family law case, where an Islamic prenuptial agreement called for disputes to be resolved under religious law. The Texas Supreme Court ultimately stayed the arbitration order and ordered review of the original arbitration agreement for "validity and enforceability." Other recent developments - including video accounts of a Houston imam calling for boycotts of certain businesses and reports of a proposed Muslim-exclusive residential community ("EPIC") - have prompted legislative responses such as HB 4211, which requires property transfer disclosures and ensures disputes are adjudicated under Texas and U.S. law. How should courts weigh religious arbitration against constitutional and statutory protections? What legal tools exist to address disputes that implicate cultural or religious norms? How can Americans both respect religious diversity and uphold constitutional imperatives? The post "Religious Arbitration, Family Law, and Constitutional Limits" appeared first on Reason.com.

That's the issue in Hagan v. Funk, decided last Monday by Chief Judge William L. Campbell, Jr. (M.D. Tenn.); here are the allegations from the Complaint: Plaintiff was employed as a prosecutor for the Office of the District Attorney General of the 20th Judicial District of Tennessee ("DA's Office") when she received a jury summons. The DA's Office has an employee manual with a policy governing jury duty. The policy states: Jury service is a responsibility of good citizenship, and all employees are expected to honor subpoenas for jury duty in any court. It is the office policy that employees serve rather than seek to be excused or exempted. Jury service is both a privilege and an obligation. Our court system is founded upon the right to a jury trial, and all citizens should participate in order to insure [sic] that this right is meaningful. Because jury service requires sacrifice, many citizens try to avoid this obligation. Our office should set a good example by our willingness to serve, and we should be positive about our justice system and encourage all citizens to take part. Every employee is to notify their respective supervisor immediately upon the receipt of a jury notice so that arrangements can be made to cover the employee's office assignments. Attorneys should also bring the matter to the attention of the judge of their court where appropriate. On each day at the conclusion of jury service, the employee shall return to work at the office, unless it is after office hours. All jury fees belong to the employee and will not affect an employee's pay. Upon receiving the jury summons, Plaintiff notified her supervisor as well as Defendant. Plaintiff appeared for jury service on July 15, 2024, for the case State of Tennessee v. Karlos Reynolds, 2023-B-1023. Plaintiff was juror number nine. Based on this number, she would presumptively serve on the jury unless either the Court removed her for cause or one of the parties used a peremptory challenge to remove her. During voir dire, the trial court judge identified Plaintiff as "a lawyer in the court system" and Plaintiff stated that she knew "everyone here." During specific questioning by the prosecutor, Plaintiff stated, "I am employed as an Assistant District Attorney. So you all are my colleagues." Following voir dire, the prosecutor stated that Plaintiff should be struck for cause because she "works for Glenn Funk." Judge Chappell ruled that Plaintiff should remain on the jury because "she said she could be fair, and I don't think simply her employment with the Prosecutor's Office makes her unfit." Each side used only two of its nine allotted peremptory strikes; none of the strikes was used to remove Plaintiff. Plaintiff then served as a member of the jury where she was selected as foreperson. The jury deliberated for less than one hour before returning a not guilty verdict on all counts. Later that week, Plaintiff met with Defendant and two Deputy District Attorneys. Defendant berated Plaintiff for her jury service, expressed outrage that she was foreperson, and accused her of being unethical. Defendant specifically took issue with the jury's returning a verdict of "not guilty," stating that the "not guilty" verdict could strain her relationship with law enforcement officers at the Metro Nashville Police Department. Defendant told Plaintiff that she could not work as an attorney and needed to be "on leave." On Monday, July 22, 2024, Plaintiff was formally placed on leave and told not to come to the office…. Plaintiff claims Defendant demoted her, reassigned her to non-attorney work, removed her from courtroom work, placed her on leave, and berated her in front of her superiors and colleagues in retaliation for her for serving on a jury and for voting "not guilty" during her jury service…. The court allowed plaintiff's First Amendment claim to go forward, though note that the court just held that plaintiff had adequately pled the claim—the actual facts remain to be determined: "Generally, the First Amendment protects a public employee's speech if: (1) the speech was on a matter of public concern, Connick v. Myers (1983); (2) the speech was not made pursuant to the employee's official duties, Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006); and, assuming the employee can satisfy the first two elements, (3) the employee's interest in speaking on a matter of public concern outweighs the employer's interest 'in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees,' Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. (1968)." Plaintiff claims Defendant retaliated against her based on her speech as a prospective juror during voir dire and as a juror in rendering a verdict of guilty in a criminal case for which her employer was the prosecutor. Defendant concedes that "an ADA is entitled to First Amendment protection in answering questions as a public employee empaneled in a jury pool and as a juror rendering a verdict." He argues, however, that Plaintiff's speech during her jury service was not protected speech because her interest in speaking does not outweigh Defendant's interest in managing its offices to ensure its "employees' official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer's mission." Defendant's argument encompasses the second and third prongs of the test for protected speech. First, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's speech in court as a private citizen summoned for jury duty was an "official communication" by an employee of the District Attorney's office. Even if there were a reasoned basis for this assertion (and the Court can think of none), a determination that Plaintiff's speech in connection with her jury service was pursuant to her official duties as an employee of the District Attorney's office would require the Court to construe the allegations in the complaint in a light most favorable to the Defendant, which is plainly not the standard on a motion to dismiss. Moreover, in making this assertion, Defendant fails to address the fact specific inquiry for determining whether speech is spoken as a private citizen or as an employee. Defendant's next argument is that Plaintiff's interests in speaking on the matter of her juror qualifications and rendering a verdict do not outweigh the interests of the District Attorney's office in promoting the legal and ethical conduct of its employees. This argument is also inappropriate on a motion to dismiss. Not only would it require the Court to construe the allegations in the Complaint in a light favorable to the Defendant, consideration of Defendant's asserted interests in limiting employee speech on these matters necessitates factual determinations and considerations of matters outside the pleadings not appropriate at this stage in the litigation. Perhaps recognizing that a motion to dismiss is not the proper vehicle for the Court to weigh the relative speech interests of the employer and employee, Defendant asks the Court to find as a matter of law that "an ADA is not protected by the First Amendment from her employer's scrutiny for failing to inform the court of the inherent conflict of interest created by her jury service when called to jury service in a criminal proceeding in the county in which she has sworn an oath of office to be an ADA." In support, Defendant points to the following authority: (1) Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct concerning conflicts of interest with regard to representation of clients and disruption of a tribunal (T.R.P.C. 1.7(a)(2) and 3.5); (2) a decision from the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals which has since been overruled regarding disqualification of government attorneys in criminal matters (State v. Grooms, 2020 WL 9171956, at (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2020), overruled by State v. Eady, 685 S.W.3d 689 (Tenn. 2024)); and (3) Justice [O'Connor's] concurring opinion in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 (1982), suggesting that if it is revealed post-trial that a juror is "an actual employee of the prosecuting agency" the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury would not allow a verdict to stand. The Court declines to make such sweeping pronouncement concerning the relative speech interests of all district attorney employers vis-à-vis all assistant district attorneys in their employ. Not only is such a ruling not directly supported by the cited authority, as stated above, balancing these interests in the specific context of this case is not appropriate at the motion to dismiss stage, and making these fact specific determinations as to district attorneys and their employees writ large is unlikely ever to be appropriate. {Throughout the motion to dismiss, Defendant either ignores or mischaracterizes the allegations in the complaint as stating that Plaintiff failed to notify the state trial court of her "conflict of interest" before serving on the jury when the complaint and trial transcript of the criminal court proceeding which is attached to the complaint clearly state that Plaintiff informed the trial court of her employment and that the trial judge considered whether it would be appropriate for Plaintiff to serve as a juror. This approach by Defendant is troubling, to say the least.} … And the court also allowed plaintiff's claim to go forward for violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-4-106(d), which provides, in relevant part: (1) No employer shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against an employee for serving on jury duty if the employee, prior to taking time off, gives the required notice pursuant to subsection (a). (2)(A) Any employee who is discharged, demoted or suspended because the employee has taken time off to serve on jury duty is entitled to reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and work benefits caused by such acts of the employer…. Plaintiff is represented by Christopher W. Smith, David Randolph Smith, and Dominick Randolph Smith of David Randolph Smith & Associates. The post Did DA's Office Retaliate Against Prosecutor, When She Was Serving as Juror, for Voting to Acquit Defendant? appeared first on Reason.com.

From Tuesday's opinion by Judge Aida Delgado-Colón (D.P.R.) in Ramos-Cruz v. P.R., granting summary judgment to plaintiff on her Second Amendment claim: The Court draws the following factual findings from the parties' admissions on the record and those statements of proposed facts submitted by plaintiff that comply with L. Civ. R. 56…. On November 19, 2022, after an argument with her husband, plaintiff left her residence in Ceiba and went to Luquillo where she called the police to make a report against him for domestic violence. At the Luquillo Police Station, PRPB [Puerto Rico Police Bureau] agents seized plaintiff's firearms license [a seizure that apparently made it illegal for her to acquire new guns -EV]. The agents then travelled to plaintiff's house, where her father-in-law was present, and proceeded to enter the home, where they seized her weapons and ammunition. This was done without her permission and without a court order, pursuant to Article 2.13 of [Puerto Rico Weapons Act]. The next day, on November 20, 2022, an ex parte temporary restraining order was entered in plaintiff's favor and against her husband…. Article 2.13… reads, in relevant part, as follows: Any law enforcement officer shall temporarily seize the license, firearms, and/or ammunition of a citizen if he has grounds to believe that the firearms license holder has used or shall use said firearms and ammunition unlawfully to harm other persons; for uttering threats to commit a crime; for stating the intention to commit suicide; for repeatedly demonstrating negligence or carelessness in handling the firearm; when it is believed that the firearms license holder has a mental illness, is considered to be a habitual drunkard, or is addicted to controlled substances; or in any other situation of grave risk or danger that warrants the seizure. The record before the Court shows that none of the enumerated exceptions applied to plaintiff's situation when she sought assistance from the PRPB. Rather, the PRPB effectuated the seizure pursuant to the last, broadly worded clause: "in any other situation of grave risk or danger that warrants the seizure." … Defendant argues that Rahimi stands for the proposition that "dangerousness" is a proper basis on which to disarm an individual. The statute at issue in that case was 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which bars a person from possessing a firearm … when a court, after the subject is given notice and an opportunity to be heard, makes the finding of "dangerousness" or explicitly proscribes the use of force…. [But] Article 2.13 allows a police officer to make the determination of dangerousness prior to any judicial process and based on his or her subjective appreciation of a situation's dangerousness…. The summary judgment record (such as it is) suggests that plaintiff was dispossessed of her firearm and firearms license solely because she (i) she was a firearms owner, and (ii) sought the government's protection against her husband in a domestic violence dispute. According to the uncontested material facts on record, which the Court reads in the light most favorable to the non-movant defendants, plaintiff is a citizen of the United States, employed as a private security officer, and had legally obtained and possessed a firearms license, firearms, and ammunition. She exercised her right to seek a protective order against her husband as an alleged victim of domestic violence under Puerto Rico law. After taking her complaint and being informed of the presence of firearms in the house, the PRPB went to the residence to detain her husband and seized several firearms. The PRPB also seized and retained plaintiff's weapons license. No warrant was ever issued for the seizure of either. Even after plaintiff withdrew her domestic violence complaint against her husband and repeatedly requested the return of her firearms and weapons license, she was refused. {Strikingly, after having also seized the alleged aggressor's firearms, the PRPB promptly returned them to him.} The PRPB retained both her firearms and license until on or about October 15, 2024, when they were returned to plaintiff. This happened a month and a half after she commenced the present action against defendants, on August 31, 2024. As the record stands, plaintiff's only relevant characteristic is being a purported victim of domestic violence who seeks a protective order. Rahimi involved the exact opposite situation: the disarmament applied to the person against whom a domestic violence restraining order has been issued. The Supreme Court found that the surety and going armed laws justified disarming a person "who poses a credible threat to the physical safety of another," and a person against whom a domestic violence restraining order has been issued is such a person. It stretches logic to find that the putative victim of domestic abuse can be disarmed under the same standard. {Of course, a person who exercises his or her right to keep and bear a firearm for self-defense purposes may be thought of, in the abstract, as posing a credible threat of physical harm against his or her aggressor. But that defies the logic behind the Second Amendment—the use of firearms in self-defense is at the core of the constitutional right. It would be unreasonable to justify disarmament under this premise.} When interpreted holistically, Article 2.13 suggests that its residual "grave risk or danger" clause only means to refer to situations like the ones immediately listed before it. That is, applying the ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction, "grave risk or danger" should be interpreted to extend to situations similar to when "the firearms license holder has used or shall use said firearms and ammunition unlawfully to harm other persons; for uttering threats to commit a crime; for stating the intention to commit suicide; for repeatedly demonstrating negligence or carelessness in handling the firearm; when it is believed that the firearms license holder has a mental illness, is considered to be a habitual drunkard, or is addicted to controlled substances …." All these instances evince a risk of danger to the person, to others, or to the community at large. Therefore, any circumstance posing a "grave risk or danger" should be comparable to the listed ones, if not already encompassed by these. To say that an alleged domestic abuse victim with a firearm presents a situation of comparable risk or danger to a drunk, a drug addict, or a mentally ill individual with a gun is, to put it mildly, unreasonable. In sum, Rahimi would likely justify upholding Puerto Rico laws disarming persons against whom an accusation of domestic violence has been made. See, e.g., P.R. Laws. Ann. t. 8, § 621 (temporarily disarming a person against whom a court issues a restraining order). However, it is a stretch to say that because Rahimi validated a federal disarmament statute based on a person's dangerousness to others, the broad, subjective criteria provided for in Article 2.13 … is ipso facto constitutional…. Osvaldo Sandoval-Báez (Legitima Defensa PR) and Jose M Prieto Carballo (JPC Law Office) represent plaintiff. The post Second Amendment Violated by Seizure of Firearms License from Alleged Domestic Violence Victim appeared first on Reason.com.

Predict all of the biggest cases at the Supreme Court.

To continue my preview of The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, which will ship on October 14, here are the authors of essays 176–200. * Essay No. 176: The Jury Trial Clause —Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt, Ian Brinton Hatch, & Greta Gieseke * Essay No. 177: The Vicinage Clause —Brian C. Kalt * Essay No. 178: The Informed Of Accusation (Arraignment) Clause —Judge Michael B. Brennan * Essay No. 179: The Confrontation Clause —John F. Bash, III * Essay No. 180: The Compulsory Process Clause —Judge Joel M. Carson Iii & Jefferson F. Serfass * Essay No. 181: The Right To Counsel Clause —Judge Lawrence Vandyke & Alexandria Overcash * Essay No. 182: The Civil Jury Trial Clause —Renée Lettow Lerner * Essay No. 183: The Re-Examination Clause —Renée Lettow Lerner * Essay No. 184: The Excessive Bail Clause —John F. Stinneford * Essay No. 185: The Excessive Fines Clause —John F. Stinneford * Essay No. 186: The Cruel And Unusual Punishments Clause —John F. Stinneford * Essay No. 187: The Ninth Amendment —Ryan Williams * Essay No. 188: The Tenth Amendment —Charles J. Cooper * Essay No. 189: The Eleventh Amendment —Ernest A. Young * Essay No. 190: The Twelfth Amendment —Michael T. Morley * Essay No. 191: The Thirteenth Amendment —Kurt T. Lash * Essay No. 192: The Citizenship Clause —Kurt T. Lash * Essay No. 193: The State Action Clause —Lee J. Strang * Essay No. 194: The Privileges Or Immunities Clause —Kurt T. Lash * Essay No. 195: The Due Process Clause —Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. Mcconnell * Essay No. 196: The Equal Protection Clause —Christopher R. Green * Essay No. 197: The Apportionment Of Representatives Clause —Gerard N. Magliocca * Essay No. 198: The Insurrection Or Rebellion Clause —Gerard N. Magliocca * Essay No. 199: The Public Debt Clause —Gerard N. Magliocca * Essay No. 200: The Enforcement Clause—James C. Phillips The post The Heritage Guide to the Constitution: Essay Nos. 176–200 appeared first on Reason.com.

10/6/2010: Snyder v. Phelps is argued. The post Today in Supreme Court History: October 6, 2010 appeared first on Reason.com.

What's on your mind?