Yohsuke Murase
@yohm.bsky.social
59 followers 45 following 10 posts
Team director of the Mathematical Social Science team at RIKEN iTHEMS. Interested in complex systems, network science, computational social science, and evolutionary game theory. https://yohm.github.io/
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yohm.bsky.social
This is awesome! Very natural and engaging.
yohm.bsky.social
The call is closed. We appreciate a lot of applications. Thank you!
yohm.bsky.social
📢 We’re hiring! RIKEN iTHEMS has launched a new Mathematical Social Science Team, and we’re looking for researchers to join us. If you're into cooperation, norms, or networks, check out the call!
🔗 www.riken.jp/en/careers/r...
Feel free to DM me if you have questions!
Seeking a few Research Scientists or Postdoctoral Researchers at Mathematical Social Science Team (W25015)
www.riken.jp
yohm.bsky.social
I updated the rb_call library, which allows you to call Ruby methods from Python code. It now works with the latest version of Python.
github.com/yohm/rb_call
Reposted by Yohsuke Murase
nikoletaglyn.bsky.social
A great summary of our recent articles, now live here 👇 The work was conducted at the MPI for Evolutionary Biology🧑🏻‍🔬 Check it out to learn more about game theory and cooperation 🤝
yohm.bsky.social
Free riders naturally try to hide defection, making detection harder. Our analysis shows that in such cases, punishment is the most efficient evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) to maintain cooperation.
yohm.bsky.social
Our study challenges this by showing that costly punishment can be highly effective when detecting free riders is difficult. If defectors can disguise their actions, punishment becomes the best strategy to sustain cooperation.
yohm.bsky.social
When reputation assessment is prone to errors, punishment can suppress free riders. But the earlier studies argued that frequent punishment lowers overall payoffs, making it less effective than ALLD. Its usefulness was thought to be very limited.
yohm.bsky.social
For instance, Ohtsuki et al. (Nature, 2009) found punishment ineffective in indirect reciprocity. When reputations are accurately assessed, simply refusing to cooperate deters free riders—costly punishment isn't needed.
yohm.bsky.social
Does costly punishment—paying a cost to reduce an opponent's payoff—help sustain cooperation in indirect reciprocity? Punishment is often seen as a powerful tool, but its effectiveness here is debated. Our new study explores this: sciencedirect.com/science/arti... 🧵