If at #APSA2025 don’t to miss the Climate and Conflict panel, Friday at 8 am. My amazing co-authors, Natalie Ayers, Laura Saavedra-Lux and Blair Welsh will be presenting our paper “After Rebel Rule”, examining how rebel occupation affects agricultural recovery after conflict. It is a great panel!

We’re also hiring in Comparative and Canadian: www.uwo.ca/facultyrelat...

🚨 My department @westernu.ca is hiring up to two TT Assistant Professors in International Politics (IR/CP).

I’m not on the search committee, but I’ll be at APSA next week — happy to chat & answer questions!

Application info: www.uwo.ca/facultyrelat...

#polisky #conflictsky #intsec #IR

Come work with me/us!!! Happy to answer questions about our dept, Western, and Canadian academia. I absolutely love it here and highly recommend. Several of us will be at APSA and happy to meet. 🇨🇦

We are very excited to have the brilliant @blairwelsh.bsky.social joining the Dept of Political Science @westernu.ca! Look for big things and important work in empirical IR; great for us and great for Canada!

politicalscience.uwo.ca/about_us/new...

The second meeting of the spring 2025 #VIPWorkshop series happens next week (3/27 @ 11am EST)! Leonor Oliveira Toscano (@leoatoscano.bsky.social) will present a paper on peace infrastructure in Kenya (w/discussant Blair Welsh @blairwelsh.bsky.social).

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Thanks, Brian!

Super thankful to all who commented on previous drafts, fantastic RAs, as well as the reviewers, Editors, and team at CMPS.

Overall, the research draws further attention to victims of political violence and (in a rather timely manner) the dynamics of concessions over hostages in civil war.

To probe the mechanism on attention, I use causal mediation analysis. I find the relationship is largely mediated by media and online attention surrounding attacks/victims. Other mechanisms, such as family pressure on government and media frames, are (in as much as it’s possible) ruled out.

I also consider some extensions, such as individual effects, temporal dynamics, demands for concessions, and whether strategy/reputation are important. For example, concessions are more likely for NGO staff and foreigners of allied nationalities.

In a victim-level analysis, I find the government are more likely to concede for the release of high-profile victims than non high-profile victims. There are small differences across the two main groups (ASG and NPA).

🔍 Descriptively, in the Philippines, 11% of the victims are foreign, 12% are women, and 5% are children. This suggests a majority of hostages are adult (18+) and male.

I test the theory with granular data on the Philippines. The data track hostage-taking activities by six insurgent groups from 1975 to 2018, detailing important victim-level characteristics and information on which attacks result in concessions.

Given substantial costs associated with granting concessions, I argue that governments only concede for the release of hostages where the victim is likely to attract attention, compelling states to intervene. This occurs when the hostage is a high-profile victim.

There remains increasing evidence of governments conceding to rebel organizations, particularly for the release of hostages. But it’s unclear when and why this occurs.

When do governments grant concessions for the release of hostages?

Excited to share my article on hostage concessions in civil war is now published in Conflict Management and Peace Science.

🔗 journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/...

Small thread on findings:

#Polisky #PoliSciSky #PoliticalScience